



This action is funded by the European Union

### ANNEX 1

of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2018 – Part 3 (including one action on budget 2019) in favour of the ENI South countries to be financed from the general budget of the Union

### Action Document for "Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) – EU Peacebuilding Initiative (EUPI) 2018 and 2019"

#### INFORMATION FOR POTENTIAL GRANT APPLICANTS

#### WORK PROGRAMME FOR GRANTS

This document constitutes the work programme for grants in the sense of Article 110(2) of the Financial Regulation and action programme/measure in the sense of Articles 2 and 3 of Regulation No 236/2014 in the following section concerning calls for proposals: 5.3.1

<b>1. Title/basic act/ CRIS number</b>	Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) – EU Peacebuilding Initiative (EUPI) 2018 and 2019 CRIS number: ENI/2018/041-450 CRIS number: ENI/2019/041-580 financed under European Neighbourhood Instrument	
<b>2. Zone benefiting from the action/location</b>	Middle East The action shall be carried out at the following location: Israel and Palestine <sup>1</sup> and tentatively EU Member States and Jordan.	
<b>3. Programming document</b>	Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) - 2014-2020. Regional South Strategy Paper (2014-2020) and Regional South Multiannual Indicative Programme (2018-2020)	
<b>4. Sector of concentration/ thematic area</b>	Building a partnership with people	DEV. Aid: YES <sup>2</sup>
<b>5. Amounts concerned</b>	Total estimated cost: EUR 12,350,000 Total amount of EU budget contribution: EUR 10,000,000 The contribution is for an amount of EUR 5,000,000 from the general budget of the European Union for financial year 2018 and for an amount of EUR 5,000,000 for financial year 2019 subject to the availability of	

<sup>1</sup> This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.

<sup>2</sup> Official Development Aid is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective.

	appropriations following the adoption of the relevant budget This action is co-financed by potential grant beneficiaries for an indicative amount of EUR 2,350,000 Budget line: 22.040103			
<b>6. Aid modality(ies) and implementation modality(ies)</b>	Project Modality Direct management: – grants – call for proposals – procurement of services			
<b>7. DAC code(s)</b>	15220 - Civilian peace building, conflict prevention and resolution			
<b>8. Markers (from CRIS DAC form)</b>	<b>General policy objective</b>	<b>Not targeted</b>	<b>Significant objective</b>	<b>Main objective</b>
	Participation development/good governance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Aid to environment	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Gender equality (including Women In Development)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Trade Development	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Reproductive, Maternal, New born and child health	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<b>RIO Convention markers</b>	<b>Not targeted</b>	<b>Significant objective</b>	<b>Main objective</b>
	Biological diversity	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Combat desertification	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change mitigation	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change adaptation	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>9. Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC) thematic flagship</b>	Civil Society and Local Authorities Thematic Programme			
<b>10. SDGs</b>	Main Sustainable Development Goal (SDG): Goal 16 - Promote peaceful and inclusive societies			

## SUMMARY

In alignment with the EU Council Conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP)<sup>3</sup>, the overall objective of the programme is to support and promote the conditions for a sustainable resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through civil society and citizens' positive engagement.

<sup>3</sup> FAC Council Conclusions can be accessed at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/public-register/>.

The programme will be implemented through a Call for Proposals which will finance civil society initiatives in Israel, Palestine, and tentatively EU Member States and Jordan aiming: 1) to promote conditions for a negotiated settlement of the conflict via participatory civil and political engagement; 2) to build mutual understanding, confidence and trust; 3) to contribute to peacebuilding through cross-border work in strategic areas (e.g. trade and business, higher education, scientific and technological advancement, environment, agriculture, health and climate change etc.); 4) to promote the creation and strengthening of cross border networks of civil society organisation active in peacebuilding

## **1 CONTEXT**

### **1.1 Sector/Country/Regional context/Thematic area**

The EU remains committed to the two-state solution, with Jerusalem as shared capital of the two states - the State of Israel and the State of Palestine. This position is based on the Oslo Accords and the international consensus embodied in the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. As repeatedly stated by High Representative /Vice President of the Commission Mogherini, this is the only realistic and viable way to fulfil the legitimate aspirations of both parties.

The peace process has been stalled since the break-down of the (former United States US Secretary of State) Kerry initiative in April 2014 and the lack of a credible political horizon has contributed to raising tensions on the ground. In summer 2014 another devastating conflict took place in Gaza, the third and most deadly in the past six years. Despite the agreement signed between the Palestinian factions in Cairo in October 2017, intra-Palestinian reconciliation is still not achieved, and the Palestinian Authority has been unable to resume its governmental responsibilities in Gaza. This, together with the continuing closure of the Gaza Strip, has led to a further deterioration of the socio-economic situation, with serious humanitarian consequences. This fragile and worsening situation risks triggering a renewed escalation of violence as it has been witnessed since March 2018 on the deadly events at the fence with Israel in Gaza.

The December 2017 announcement by the United States President Trump to recognise Jerusalem as Israel's capital and move the US embassy to Jerusalem, which departed from decades of international consensus, and the repercussions this may have on the prospect of peace are of serious concern for the EU whose position remains unchanged. As mentioned in Foreign Affairs Council conclusions of 18 January 2016 'only the re-establishment of a political horizon and the resumption of dialogue can stop the violence' and 'the underlying causes of the conflict need to be addressed.' The EU seeks to contribute to addressing the underlying causes and to re-build the conditions for a dialogue between Israeli and Palestinians also through this specific programme.

In the current circumstances, it is therefore of utmost importance to help preserve the viability, and acceptance by society, of a two-state solution on the ground, pending the emergence of a more favourable bilateral, regional and international context. For this, Palestinian and Israeli constituencies need to continue to build mutual trust and confidence in a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

Since 1998 the EU has been actively supporting civil society initiatives in the Middle East as an essential means of reinforcing dialogue and restoring mutual confidence.

Initially such support was provided through the European Union's People to People (P2P) Programme (1998 - 2001) and subsequently from 2002 to the present, through its successor, the EU Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP). Based on the findings of an external consultation conducted in 2014 on the PfP Programme 2007-14, and in order to clarify and enhance the programme's relevance to the current regional political context, it has been decided to rename the programme as "EU Peacebuilding Initiative" (EUPI).

#### ***1.1.1 Public Policy Assessment and EU Policy Framework***

The central objective of the EU in the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) is a just and comprehensive resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, based on the two-state solution, with the State of Israel and an independent, democratic, contiguous, sovereign and viable State of Palestine, living side by side in peace and security and mutual recognition. This includes a negotiated solution to all final status issues, including borders, Jerusalem, security, water and refugees. The EU has reiterated its readiness to contribute substantially to post-conflict arrangements for ensuring the sustainability of a peace agreement.

The positions of the EU on the MEPP are communicated on a regular basis through conclusions of the EU Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). The FAC conclusions provide the political basis for implementing EU policy on MEPP through direct support for actions on the ground by civil society and other actors. The EU's Special Representative to the MEPP was appointed in April 2015 to support the work of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The Quartet on the Middle East, comprising the EU, Russia, United Nations and the USA, is a framework for the international community to provide policy co-ordination in the peace process.

At the regional level, the Arab Peace Initiative (API) remains a point of reference for any relaunch of negotiations and the EU will continue to work with all relevant stakeholders towards a renewed multilateral approach to the peace process including through the action of its Special Representative,<sup>4</sup>

The EU has urged both sides to demonstrate, through policies and actions, a genuine commitment to a two-state solution in order to rebuild trust and create a path back to meaningful negotiations, and to avoid any action that could undermine peace efforts and the viability of a two-state solution. The EU is remaining engaged politically in the MEPP via policies which aim to maintain the viability of the two state solution and encourage the parties to return to negotiations. The EU has called for significant transformative steps to be taken by the parties to the conflict, consistent with the transition envisaged by prior agreements, in order to restore confidence and rebuild trust. It has urged both sides to implement such measures, particularly in Area C, where a fundamental change of policy would significantly increase economic opportunities, empower Palestinian institutions and enhance stability and security for both Israelis and Palestinians.

The Council Conclusions of 20 June 2016<sup>5</sup> reiterated the need of both parties to demonstrate, through policies and actions, a genuine commitment to a peaceful solution in order to rebuild mutual trust and create conditions for direct and

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<sup>4</sup> FAC Council Conclusions, 18 January 2016.

<sup>5</sup> [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2016/6/47244642934\\_en.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2016/6/47244642934_en.pdf).

meaningful negotiations aiming at ending the occupation. The Council also reaffirmed the European proposal, as endorsed in the Council Conclusions of December 2013<sup>6</sup>, of an unprecedented package of political, economic and security support to be offered to and developed with both parties in the context of a final status agreement.

On 23 September 2016<sup>7</sup> the Quartet reiterated its call on the parties to implement the recommendations of the Quartet Report of 1 July 2016<sup>8</sup>, and create the conditions for the resumption of meaningful negotiations that will end the occupation that began in 1967 and resolve all final status issues. It expressed concern about recent actions on the ground that run counter to its recommendations. In particular it emphasized its strong opposition to ongoing settlement activity, including the retroactive “legalization” of existing units, and the continued high rate of demolitions of Palestinian structures, expressed concern for the dire humanitarian situation and illicit arms build-up in Gaza and called on all sides to de-escalate tensions and prevent incitement.

This was followed by the UNSCR 2334 of December 2016, which reaffirms that Israel’s establishment of settlements in Palestinian territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, has no legal validity, constitutes a flagrant violation under international law and a major obstacle to the vision of two States living side-by-side in peace and security, within internationally recognised borders.

In September 2017, EU Foreign Ministers reaffirmed the EU’s unity and commitment to the goal of two states living side by side in peace and security. Against that background, a comprehensive review of the modalities of EU engagement on the ground has been launched in 2018 to ensure that our engagement is as efficient and as effective as possible to reach the goal of a two-state solution. Relevant considerations stemming from the review should therefore be reflected in this initiative. A related safeguard clause was included in December 2018 in the Commission Decision adopting the "European Joint Strategy 2017-2020", which replaces the Single Support Framework.

The EU and its Member States have reiterated their commitment to ensure continued, full and effective implementation of existing EU legislation and bilateral arrangements applicable to settlements products, whilst noting that this does not constitute a boycott of Israel which the EU strongly opposes. The European Commission, at the request of Member States, has issued in 2015 an interpretative notice to clarify certain elements linked to the interpretation and implementation of existing EU legislation on the indication of origin of products from territories occupied by Israel since June 1967<sup>9</sup>.

Already in 2013, the European Commission published Guidelines on the eligibility of Israeli entities and their activities in the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967 for grants, prizes and financial instruments funded by the EU from 2014

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<sup>6</sup> [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/140097.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/140097.pdf).

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sg2232.doc.htm>.

<sup>8</sup> [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/7022\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/7022_en).

<sup>9</sup> Interpretative Notice on indication of origin of goods from the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967, 11.11.2015 C(2015) 7834 final.

onwards<sup>10</sup>, clarifying EU policy with regard to the territorial applicability of EU legislation and bilateral EU-Israel agreements. The Guidelines make a specific exception (section 15) for activities which are carried out by Israeli entities over the Green Line which aim at promoting the Middle East peace process in line with EU policy, provided that they are registered within pre-1967 border.

As regards the situation in Gaza, the EU has urged all parties to take swift steps to produce a fundamental change to the political, security and economic situation in the Gaza Strip, including the end of all rocket fire, the end of the closure and a full opening of the crossing points, the lifting of import and export restrictions, while addressing Israel's legitimate security concerns.

The EU has urged all Palestinian factions to engage in good faith in the reconciliation process, based on non-violence, as an important element for reaching the two state solution. Strong, inclusive and democratic institutions, based on respect of the rule of law and human rights, and working together to address the needs of the Palestinian population, including through the return of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to Gaza, are crucial in view of the establishment of a viable and sovereign Palestinian State.

In addition, the necessity of an increased participation of women should be actively promoted. According to its Resolution 1325, adopted in 2000 the UN Security Council stated the necessity of women's full and meaningful participation in all efforts to maintain and promote peace and security and to prevent conflict. Since its adoption, women's position and role in peace processes has positively evolved offering them more empowerment and involvement. However, despite the approval of Resolution 1325 by both Palestinian Authority and Israeli government, the inclusion of women in the political aspects of MEPP remains minimal.

### ***1.1.2 Stakeholder analysis***

The main stakeholders of the programme are civil society organisations (CSO), including Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and not necessarily working on conflict-resolution, local authorities, leaders and opinion-formers in Palestine, Israel and in the region as well as their European partners and international organisations. Women and youth organisation are particularly targeted.

CSOs, through their capacity to reach down to the grass-roots level, can also be effective in ensuring that national or more macro-level initiatives reflect real needs and perspectives on the ground.

The final beneficiaries are the people of the Middle East and the Mediterranean Partner Countries.

An external evaluation and consultation of the EU Partnership for Peace programme (PfP) was conducted from December 2013 until January 2015. During the consultation phase, interviews, meetings and focus groups were held with a range of Israeli and Palestinian stakeholders, including journalists, politicians, youth, women and religious groups. European Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and EU staff in HQ and Delegations were also consulted.

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<sup>10</sup> Official Journal of the European Union C205/9 19 July 2013 at [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/20130719\\_guidelines\\_on\\_eligibility\\_of\\_israeli\\_entities\\_en.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/20130719_guidelines_on_eligibility_of_israeli_entities_en.pdf).

In the past years support for the two state solution decreased among Palestinians and Israelis, with each side continuing to view the intentions of the other as posing an existential threat. Still both sides continue to prefer the two-state solution to all other conflict resolution options.

In such a context, engagement in MEPP and peacebuilding in general, is often understood differently by Israelis and Palestinians. As the political situation has deteriorated further on the ground over recent years, despite attempts to revive peace talks, anti-normalisation movements in Palestine (and Jordan) have been increasingly vocal in advocating for a freeze of all joint activities between Palestinians and Israelis.

Despite the negative atmosphere surrounding it, the evaluation of the PfP programme found that *"results at project level were generally positive, often very much so. The **relevance** of the projects to the broader objectives of the programme was found to be high, even though this was not reflected in public perceptions of the programme. This remained true for projects with constituents generally seen as being unsympathetic to peacebuilding."*

Similarly, despite certain disillusionment with the MEPP, the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations remains an important issue for both societies, and is reflected in the overwhelming attention paid to it in the media and political commentary. It is also noted that annual calls for proposals generally attracts over 110 applications from Israeli, Palestinian and European Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), thus indicating a consistently high level of interest in peacebuilding work despite the difficult circumstances.

### ***1.1.3 Priority areas for support/problem analysis***

The political environment has a direct impact on the work done by Israeli and Palestinian CSOs which are working towards an end to the conflict. During periods of direct peace talks, activities gain momentum and during the outbreak of conflict, such as the recent rounds of violence in 2014 and 2015 and the 2017 USA president announcement on Jerusalem, activities tend to be negatively affected, albeit temporarily. The last years have also witnessed a more restrictive environment for CSOs operating in both Palestine and Israel. Democratic space is increasingly being challenged, in particular for CSOs operating in Palestine from different angles: financial pressure, political pressure, cultural pressure but also in the form of violence and intimidation. In this particular moment, CSOs are marginalised by all sides: the Palestinian Authority, the de facto authority in the Gaza Strip and Israel. Israel is putting pressure especially on the CSOs present in East Jerusalem, CSOs involved in "non-violent resistance" or supportive of the Boycott, Disinvestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement (to whose activities the EU is opposed), and the Israeli Human Rights and anti-occupation NGOs. The charges brought during the summer 2016 against some international NGOs active in the Gaza Strip (and allegations of aid diversion) have also put at risk those who need humanitarian assistance most. Whilst the conflict itself remains long term and intractable, it is also unpredictable at times, requiring flexibility and rapid response to events which can either deteriorate quickly into violence, or alternatively, require encouragement of positive steps.

When it comes to gender equality, Israeli and Palestinian women are facing partly different challenges. The impact of the political environment and statehood development - both at institutional and economic level - on the Israeli and Palestinian population in general, and on women in particular is different. Israel is a developed

OECD<sup>11</sup> member country. It presents a highly gender equality-oriented legal and legislative system, due in large part to many years of feminist activism and a lively civil society arena. Despite this, there are obstacles – mainly political, national and cultural – that put hurdles in the way of gender equality. Two challenges are unique to Israel: (1) the centrality of the military in many aspects of everyday life and (2) the undefined (or unclear) boundaries between state and religion. These constitute unique elements of increasing gender inequality and present additional challenges to gender equality in Israel, in addition to the basic gender challenges that already affect the lives of women all over the world. They also affect traditional gender challenges such as economic inequality, gender based violence and mobilization. In Palestine, there is a deficit of women's access to decision making processes and representation. In addition, women face increased unstable environments, inequality and violation of their rights as a consequence of the increased human rights violations, acts of displacement, economic insecurity and marred social networks. The complex factors hindering Palestinian women and their families' well-being lie in protracted crisis characterized by restrictions on movement and access, increased settlement expansion and settler violence, demolitions of Palestinian infrastructure and displacement, fragmentation and closure of the territories. This together with a patriarchal society and discriminating cultural norms (such as Sharia Law) prescribing acceptable behaviors have an impact on access to adequate health services, access to justice, access and quality of education, violence against women, discrimination in social protection, access to labour market and employment, social security and political participation. Although policies, programmes and the overall institutional framework are in place in Palestine, their adequate implementation and enforcement remains an issue.

Taking into account the complex social and political environment in which it operates, the EUPI will be tackling three mutually reinforcing priority areas that aim to enhance the attempts by EU and international actors to move Israelis and Palestinians towards an agreed settlement to the conflict:

**1. Engagement of a wide range of stakeholders** is necessary in order to broaden support and to build mutual confidence. Ensuring broadest levels of engagement in solving the conflict is not only important as a democratic principle, but also to encourage realistic and accepted solutions, while ensuring that all actions are coherent with and support the framework of overall EU policy on the MEPP. This means civil and political engagement of people at large and of communities from both sides who are not generally active or visible in conflict resolution but fundamental for conflict transformation. This is particularly necessary regarding grass-roots level initiatives engaging with women and youth (young women and men). Investing in women's and youth's (young women and men) contributions to conflict resolution, not only conflict management, is an important move towards the prevention of further violence as well as the sustainability of the attained peace agreement.

**2. The values of equity, sustainable peace, non-violence and tolerance need to be supported on both sides** as well between parties in conflict in order to altering the discourse between Israeli and Palestinians. Understanding of these values, also through learning from successful settlement of conflicts in other countries, is a

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<sup>11</sup> Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.



fundamental factor in reaching a sustainable resolution. In this regard, activities range from combatting incitement and misinformation to encouraging understanding of 'the Other'. Such activities can occur within educational institutional frameworks, in public spaces especially by diffusing positive Israeli-Palestinian partnerships and coexistence experiences through media and social networks, and through joint learning from European experiences. Specific focus is to be addressed on conducting comprehensive gender analysis and to integrate systematically a gender perspective in all activities.

3. Whilst **cross-border co-operation** between Israelis and Palestinians is subject to increasing anti-normalisation pressure and misinformation, experience shows that this kind of actions can strongly contribute to build confidence and mutual understanding between the sides. With the aim of maintaining the conditions for the viability of the two-state solution, joint actions will be promoted by demonstrating the practical potential dividends of peace and co-operation. Acknowledging the asymmetry between Israeli and Palestinians, actions shall directly empower and benefit the communities affected by the conflict. By working together, violence can be counteracted and hope can be instilled, hence contributing to building peace. This includes strengthening the CSOs who want to increase joint work for a stronger advocacy impact vis-à-vis both the internal and the international arena. Encouraging more interaction between Israel and Palestinian civil society and business and ensure that our funding goes to activities that contribute to creating an atmosphere conducive to peace is an important part of the EU review of the modalities of our engagement on the ground.

A more inclusive framework with equal involvement and representation of women is recommended along the three priority areas. Women's involvement in conflict prevention activities would contribute to a greater understanding of the common as well as different needs of the male and female populations.

## 2 RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS

<b>Risks</b>	<b>Risk level (H/M/L)</b>	<b>Mitigating measures</b>
Disruption of activities linked to instability of the political situation	M	Flexibility in implementation, for example using flexible procedures for crisis and emergency situations
Joint activities lack participation due to anti-normalisation pressures in Palestine, or social/political pressures in Israel.	M	Due to sensitivity, whenever confidentiality of beneficiaries has to be granted, the visibility of events/project/participants could be kept low.
Lack of permits for Israelis and Palestinians to enter each other's territories	L	Contacts with relevant authorities issuing permits
<b>Assumptions</b>		
Local civil society organisations continue to seek the support of the programme, as evidenced by consistently high number of applications to calls for proposals.		

### **3 LESSONS LEARNT, COMPLEMENTARITY AND CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES**

#### **3.1 Lessons learnt**

The external evaluation and consultation undertaken in 2013-2015 made a number of specific recommendations. Firstly, given the low participation of Jordan in the programme, consideration should be given to the involvement of the EU Delegation in Amman in the management of the programme. Whilst Jordan should remain a priority third country under the programme, the focus must nevertheless remain on Israel and Palestine.

The evaluation further assessed that whilst projects funded under the EU Partnership for Peace programme were generally positive, most projects were not found to directly impact on peace negotiations. Given the disillusionment that Israelis and Palestinians have with the peace process, it was recommended that the programme reduce its direct linkage to MEPP. However, overall the EU policy on the MEPP remains a relevant factor in outlining a solution, acceptable to significant parts of both populations, and requires reinforcement to counteract influences which can pull in other directions. EU positions are also sometimes subject to misinformation when reported in the local media. To that end, the political and operational work of the EU in both Delegations is aligned.

The external evaluation and other consultations conducted by the EU, have pointed consistently to a high level of satisfaction of the complementarity of the three areas covered by the programme: 1) promoting political resolution, 2) dialogue and mutual confidence and 3) cross-border co-operation. This was seen as important in outreach to a wide range of stakeholders, rather than being limited to only certain kinds of organisations or population groups.

Given the difficult political situation, peacebuilding projects often require significant support and attention from the EU Delegations. In addition to a high level of involvement by Task Managers, specific service contracts were introduced aimed at enhancing skills of project beneficiaries (e.g. trainings on monitoring and evaluation, outreach and public diplomacy), as well as supporting communication and visibility activities which often require additional efforts in view of the complex context. In addition, with regular contacts between Israelis and Palestinians dwindling, these joint activities provide valuable and safe networking opportunities, adding to the coherence of the programme. All these actions have been well received by project partners and have added value to the programme, and its objectives, as a whole.

#### **3.2 Complementarity, synergy and donor co-ordination**

The Programme will take into account, seek complementarities with, and avoid duplication with bilateral and regional actions, in particular under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights<sup>12</sup>, the Civil Society Facility and the Civil Society and Local Authorities Thematic Programme, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)<sup>13</sup>, and the East Jerusalem Programme<sup>14</sup> under the EU-Palestinian Authority bilateral co-operation.

<sup>12</sup>

Regulation (EU) No 235/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 March 2014 (OJ L 77, Vol. 57 15 March 2014), establishing a financing instrument for democracy and human rights worldwide. Available at: (<http://www.eidhr.eu/files/dmfile/EIDHR.2014-2020.pdf>).

Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an instrument contributing to stability and peace (OJ L 77/1, 15.3.2014).

In general, donor co-ordination as regards peace-building initiatives has been limited, reflecting diverse strategies, sensitivities and funding mechanisms for this type of activities. Notwithstanding, informal co-ordination efforts amongst donors has stepped up in recent years, with the aim to share information on ongoing actions and partners on a more regular basis. Until now, a number of meetings have taken place in Ramallah and in Tel Aviv with the participation of EU and other donors.

### 3.3 Cross-cutting issues

The EUPI will seek coherence with the EU Comprehensive Approach to the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security<sup>1516</sup> by encouraging initiatives directly addressing women and the meaningful participation of women in the analysis, design, planning, actions and evaluation. Engagement of women has remained a priority under the programme and is in line with the Joint Staff Working Document on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment: Transforming the Lives of Girls and Women through EU External Relations 2016-2020<sup>17</sup>. The Gender Action Plans and a Right-Based Approach will guide the Call for Proposals.

Cross-cutting issues such as environmental sustainability and rights of persons with disabilities will be given due consideration in the context of the programme by respectively encouraging applicants to adopt a mainstreamed approach and raising their awareness on environmentally friendly and inclusive operations.

## 4 DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION

### 4.1 Objectives/results

In line with EU Council Conclusions on the MEPP, the **overall objective** of the programme is to support and promote the conditions for a sustainable resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through civil society and citizens' positive engagement.

The programme will set out four **specific objectives**:

*1.1 To support practical and innovative actions that will influence the political sphere with the aim to break the current political impasse and/or reverse current negative trends.*

*1.2 To support practical and innovative actions that can promote conditions for a negotiated settlement of the conflict through attitudinal change and inclusion of key constituents.*

Expected results:

- Citizens support and advocacy for political efforts to the resolution of the conflict is reinforced.

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<sup>14</sup> Commission Implementing Decision of 20.7.2016 on the Annual Action Programme 2016 part 2 in favour of Palestine to be financed from the general budget of the European Union, C(2016) 4671.

<sup>15</sup> This policy is currently under revision and when the updated policy and Council Conclusions are in place these will be the directing and guiding documents on Women, Peace and Security.

<sup>16</sup> <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2015671%202008%20REV%201>

<sup>17</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/staff-working-document-gender-2016-2020-20150922\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/staff-working-document-gender-2016-2020-20150922_en.pdf). See Objective 17: Equal rights and ability for women to participate in policy and governance processes at all levels.

- New and old constituencies have an improved sense of ownership over the political processes which can lead to an agreed settlement.
- Commitment to the values of peace, tolerance and non-violence and understanding of how they have contributed to resolution of conflicts is strengthened within diverse communities.
- Better understanding of barriers to conflict resolution caused by misinformation, incitement and biased narratives amongst Israelis and Palestinians is achieved.

*1.3 To support co-operation between Israelis and Palestinians, including at grass-roots level, and to create sectors of influence on policy arrangements in key areas of mutual interest, such as trade and business (including tourism), higher education, scientific and technological advancement, health and climate change among others, with the aim of building mutual confidence and helping maintain the conditions for the viability of the two-state solution.*

Expected results:

- Confidence between both sides and better understanding of the benefits of the two-state solution is supported.
- Fear and mistrust between Israelis and Palestinians working together is reduced.
- New policy arrangements are put forward in strategic areas of mutual interest.

*1.4 To strengthen the voice, capacity, advocacy and policy shaping efforts of Israeli and Palestinian peace oriented CSOs through the creation or consolidation of wider networks, platforms or fora, at cross border level, with active participation of stakeholders from both sides.*

Expected results:

- stronger advocacy is carried out jointly by CSOs in the local and international arena in favour of a peaceful settlement of the conflict.
- Civil society actions are better co-ordinated and more effective.

## **4.2 Main activities**

The activities under the programme include:

(1) measures to promote conditions for a negotiated resolution of the conflict via participatory civil engagement such as advocacy and awareness-raising of political processes and peace initiatives, including at grass-root level, research for ending the conflict, dissemination of peace-related information, capacity-building support to peace activists and mediators.

(2) initiatives to build mutual understanding, confidence and trust such as counteracting incitement and misinformation; non-violent culture and peace programmes; dissemination of information and promotion of knowledge on barriers to conflict resolution and peace.

(3) Cross-border work supporting co-operation between Israelis and Palestinians, and creation of sectors of influence on policy arrangements in key areas of mutual interest, such as trade and business (including tourism), higher education, scientific and technological advancement, environment, agriculture, health and climate change among others.

4) Wider advocacy campaign and multi-sector actions implemented by coalitions and cross border networks of Peacebuilding CSOs.

### **4.3 Intervention logic**

As a strategic programme, the EUPI aims to support actions which can lead to an improved atmosphere in which peace negotiations can operate and progress, or at the other end, to prevent escalation of violence. This means to address short terms needs such as immediate engagement of the Israeli/Palestinian societies for peace negotiations, as well as longer term needs to prepare local populations for a sustainable peace agreement and the practicalities of 'the day after'.

The four specific objectives of the programme contribute towards the overall objective by promoting peacebuilding amongst both societies in three different dimensions: political, attitudinal, and relationship-building.

Diverse and mutual reinforcing objectives allow the programme to reach to a wider range of stakeholders and beneficiaries, including women and women's organisations, rather than being limited to only certain kinds of organisations or population groups, in line with the priorities of the Gender Action Plan.

## **5 IMPLEMENTATION**

### **5.1 Financing agreement**

In order to implement this action, it is not foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner countries.

### **5.2 Indicative implementation period**

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 4.2 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 72 months from the date of adoption by the Commission of this Action Document.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission's authorising officer responsible by amending this Decision and the relevant contracts and agreements; such amendments to this Decision constitute technical amendments in the sense of point (i) of Article 2(3)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014.

### **5.3 Implementation modalities**

The envisaged assistance is deemed to follow the conditions and procedures set out by the restrictive measures adopted pursuant to Article 215 TFEU<sup>18</sup>.

#### **5.3.1 Grants: call for proposals (direct management)**

(a) Objectives of the grants, fields of intervention, priorities of the year and expected results

Each action grant has its own objectives and expected results deriving from the specific situation the action intends to address, within the scope of the objectives and results described in section 4.1.

As per the type of actions eligible for financing, they must be in line with the activities described in section 4.2. Actions will cover a range of civil society

<sup>18</sup>

[https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/8442/consolidated-list-sanctions\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/8442/consolidated-list-sanctions_en).

initiatives, and where relevant may involve governmental, international organisations and private sector stakeholders. Priority will be given to: actions expanding the peace camp outreach by reaching widespread and diverse audiences in a substantial manner through the use of media and social networks; actions involving marginalised groups and/or targeting sceptical groups that are not committed to conflict resolution or to the values and policies which the EUIP supports; actions fostering local leadership and grass-roots initiatives able of producing multilevel and long term relation-building impact, actions that foster joint work and networks between several organisation active in peacebuilding on both sides of the divide.

Proposals should be designed according to a Right-Based Approach, taking into account the following working principles: (i) legality, universality and indivisibility of human rights, (ii) participation, (iii) non-discrimination and equal access, (iv) accountability, (v) transparency and access to information<sup>19</sup>.

Proposals should build on a clear local dimension, take into account past experiences and consider sub-granting mechanism for actions when relevant. The role of international organisations and partners within the partnerships should focus on the transfer of knowledge, mediation and/or innovation, helping the local organisations to strengthen relationships with their constituency.

All actions shall be assessed whether they may directly or indirectly lead to violence, even if they have been established for non-violent purposes. Particular attention will be paid to prevent that EU-supported activities contribute to incitement to hatred and/or violence. Implementation of this action will be in line with the intent of the EU Framework Decision on racism and xenophobia.

All actions must be consistent with EU foreign policies, specifically with regard to a negotiated two-state solution.

All actions, regardless of the objective, must be implemented in Palestine and/or Israel, or in Jordan and/or in EU Member States if directly involving Israeli and Palestinians. Specific activities, within the scope of the action and if duly justified, can be implemented in the region and/or abroad.

#### *(b) Eligibility conditions*

In order to be eligible for a grant, the applicant must:

- be a legal person and
- be non-profit-making and
- be a specific type of organisation such as: non-governmental organisation, public sector operator, local authority, international (inter-governmental) organisation as defined by Article 156 of Regulation 2018/1046 and
- be established<sup>20</sup> in a Member State of the European Union or one of the ENI South countries<sup>21</sup> or a country that is beneficiary of Pre-Accession

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<sup>19</sup> Cf. Council conclusions on a rights-based approach to development and Tool-box – a rights-based approach encompassing all human rights for EU development co-operation: [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sectors/rights-based-approach-development-co-operation\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sectors/rights-based-approach-development-co-operation_en).

<sup>20</sup> To be determined on the basis of the organisation's statutes which should demonstrate that it has been established by an instrument governed by the national law of the country concerned. In this respect, any legal entity whose statutes have been established in another country cannot be considered an eligible

Assistance<sup>22</sup> or a Member State of the European Economic Area (EEA)<sup>23</sup> (this obligation does not apply to international organisations) and

- be directly responsible for the preparation and management of the action with the co-applicant(s) and affiliated entity(ies), not acting as an intermediary.

Subject to information to be published in the call for proposals, the indicative amount of the EU contribution per grant is EUR 300,000–750,000 and the grants may be awarded to sole beneficiaries and to consortia of beneficiaries (co-ordinator and co-beneficiaries). Where the lead applicant is not established in Israel or Palestine, then partnership with a local organisation co-operation is required.

The indicative duration of the grants (their implementation period) is 36-50 months.

*(c) Essential selection and award criteria*

The essential selection criteria are financial and operational capacity of the applicant.

The essential award criteria are relevance of the proposed action to the objectives of the call; design, effectiveness, feasibility, sustainability and cost-effectiveness of the action.

*(d) Maximum rate of co-financing*

The maximum possible rate of co-financing for grants under this call is 80% of the eligible costs of the action.

If full funding is essential for the action to be carried out, the maximum possible rate of co-financing may be increased up to 100%. The essentiality of full funding will be justified by the Commission's authorising officer responsible in the award decision, in respect of the principles of equal treatment and sound financial management.

*(e) Indicative timing to launch the call*

The call will be launched in 4<sup>th</sup> Quarter of 2018.

**5.3.2 Procurement (direct management)**

	Type (works, supplies, services)	Indicative number of contracts	Indicative trimester of launch of the procedure

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local organisation, even if the statutes are registered locally or a "Memorandum of Understanding" has been concluded.

<sup>21</sup> Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia..The eligibility criteria formulated in Commission Notice Nr. 2013/C-205/05 (OJEU C-205 of 19.07.2013) shall apply to this call for proposals. This notice, entitled "Guidelines on the eligibility of Israeli entities and their activities in the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967 for grants, prizes and financial instruments funded by the EU from 2014 onwards", can be consulted at: [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C\\_.2013.205.01.0009.01.ENG](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2013.205.01.0009.01.ENG).

<sup>22</sup> Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey.

<sup>23</sup> Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway.

Support measures	Services	1	4th quarter of 2018
Support measures (including communication and visibility)	Services	3	1 <sup>st</sup> quarter of 2020

#### 5.4 Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply, subject to the following provisions.

The Commission's authorising officer responsible may extend the geographical eligibility in accordance with Article 9(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.

#### 5.5 Indicative budget

	EU Contribution 2018	EU Contribution 2019	Total EU Contribution	Indicative 3 <sup>rd</sup> Party contribution in currency identified	Total
Grants – Total under Enveloppe section 5.3.1	4,900,000	4,500,000	9,400,000	2,350,000	11,750,000
<b>Procurement – total envelope</b> under section 5.3.2 <sup>24</sup>	100,000	150,000	250,000		250,000
5.8 – Evaluation, 5.9 Audit <sup>25</sup>	-	-	-	-	-
5.10 – Communication and visibility		350,000	350,000		350,000
Contingences	-	-	-	-	-
Totals must correspond to the amounts in the 4th line in the summary table on page 1	5,000,000	5,000,000	10,000,000		12,350,000

<sup>24</sup> In order to avoid details on budgets for individual contracts, it is sufficient to indicate the total envelop for procurement. If budgets for individual contracts are public, tenderers tend to orientate themselves on them and not on the terms of reference.

<sup>25</sup> The financing of the evaluation and audit shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing Decision.



## **5.6 Organisational set-up and responsibilities**

The programme will be co-managed by EU offices in Palestine (EUREP) and Israel (DELTA). The call for proposals will be administered by EUREP as the Contracting Authority.

EUREP and DELTA services will work jointly in managing the call for proposals as well for the organisation of joint events, if any. They will also attend events, meetings and monitoring visits together when relevant and keep each other regularly informed on the projects progress. Where, applications include actions implemented in Jordan or Jordanian applicants, the EU Delegation in Amman will be consulted.

As a general principle, the distribution between the different delegations in terms of contract/project management is made on the grounds of the nationality of the applicant: Palestinian and European applicants are processed by EUREP whereas Israeli ones are processed by DELTA. In case of a grants contract with a Jordanian beneficiary, the management of the action may be delegated to the EU Delegation to Jordan.

The management of the procurement contracts will be divided between EUREP and DELTA on the basis of the location of the activities and nationality of beneficiaries.

## **5.7 Performance monitoring and reporting**

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of projects resulting from the call for proposals will be a continuous process and part of the beneficiaries' responsibilities. To this aim, the beneficiaries shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (outputs and direct outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the logframe matrix (for project modality) or the list of result indicators (for budget support). The report shall be laid out in such a way as to allow monitoring of the means envisaged and employed and of the budget details for the action. The final report, narrative and financial, will cover the entire period of the action implementation.

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

## **5.8 Evaluation**

An external evaluation of the programme is carried out at regular intervals. The latest one was conducted from December 2013 until January 2015 covering the period 2007/2013. Recommendations were duly taken on board in the design of the Programme and in the definition of the call for proposals.

The Commission may, during implementation, decide to undertake an evaluation for duly justified reasons either on its own decision or on the initiative of the beneficiaries.

The evaluation reports shall be shared with the beneficiaries and other key stakeholders. The beneficiaries and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions

and recommendations of the evaluation and, where appropriate, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project.

The financing of the evaluation shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing Decision.

## **5.9 Audit**

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audits or expenditure verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.

The financing of the audit shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing Decision.

## **5.10 Communication and visibility**

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated at the start of implementation and supported with the budget indicated in section 5.5 above.

In terms of legal obligations on communication and visibility, the measures shall be implemented by the Commission, the partner countries, contractors, grant beneficiaries and/or entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, the financing agreement, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.

EU staff will continue to communicate widely on the programme as a whole and on the various individual projects. With regard to the latter, EU press and communication services remain involved in the delivery of training on EU communication and visibility requirements and assistance on any communication related activities. Finally, EU staff will ensure dissemination of projects' outputs among all E grant beneficiaries.

An estimated number of 2 procurement contracts for the above-mentioned communication and visibility purposes shall be concluded in the form of procurement of services under direct management with an indicative total budget of EUR 350,000.

## APPENDIX - INDICATIVE LOGFRAME MATRIX

The activities, the expected outputs and all the indicators, targets and baselines included in the logframe matrix are indicative and may be updated during the implementation of the action without an amendment to the financing Decision. The indicative logframe matrix will evolve during the lifetime of the action: new lines will be added for listing the activities as well as new columns for intermediary targets (milestones) when it is relevant and for reporting purpose on the achievement of results as measured by indicators.

	Intervention logic	Indicators	Baselines (Reference year 2014-if data available)	Targets (incl. reference year )	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions
Overall objective: Impact	<i>To support and promote the conditions for a sustainable resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through civil society and citizens' positive engagement.</i>	Number of Palestinian an Israeli CSOs working to enhance public support and positive attitudes towards peace negotiation and conflict resolution.	In December 2017, support for two-state solution dropped at around 46% for both Palestinians and Israeli Jews  No ongoing peace negotiations.	No further drop in support for two-state solution.	Public surveys.  Political pro-peace campaigns.  Media and social pro-peace campaigns.  Published documents.	
Specific objective(s): Outcome(s)	<i>1.1 To support practical and innovative actions that will influence the political sphere with the aim to break the current political impasse and/or reverse current negative trends.</i>  <i>1.2 To support practical and innovative actions that can promote conditions for a negotiated settlement of the conflict through attitudinal</i>	Number of projects which support political efforts to the resolution of the conflict.  Number of projects which work with new constituencies, such as religious communities.	TBD at inception phase  TBD at inception phase	8 project  2 projects	Annual project evaluation reports.  Periodic beneficiary reports.  Information, and data provided by beneficiaries.  Published documents.  Media reports.	Instability of the political situation as well as escalation of violence will not prevent activities from being carried out and reverse positive effects of projects.  Anti-normalisation (affecting willingness to participate in joint activities) will be contained and mitigated by low

	<p><i>change and inclusion of key constituents.</i></p> <p><i>2.1 To support co-operation between Israelis and Palestinians and to create sectors of influence on policy arrangements in key areas of mutual interest, such as trade and business (including tourism), environment, agriculture, higher education, scientific and technological advancement, health and climate change among others, with the aim of building mutual confidence and helping maintain the conditions for the viability of the two-state solution.</i></p> <p><i>2.2 To strengthen the voice, capacity, advocacy and policy shaping efforts of Israeli and Palestinian peace oriented CSOs through the creation or consolidation of wider networks, platforms or fora, at cross border level.</i></p>	<p>Number of projects which support concrete co-operation between Israelis and Palestinians on practical issues.</p>	<p>TBD at inception phase</p>	<p>5 projects</p>	<p>Public surveys.</p>	<p>visibility of selected events.</p>
		<p>Creation or reinforcement of a peace platform to co-ordinate peace oriented civil society on both sides.</p>	<p>Two very weak CSO peace networks and one coalition supporting the two state solution under establishment during 2017</p>	<p>One strengthened network of CSOs</p>		<p>Permits for Israelis and Palestinians to enter each other's territories are issued.</p>

<b>Outputs</b>	<p><i>Expected outputs from projects:</i></p> <p>Effective lobbying and political advocacy activities implemented</p> <p>Research reports developed</p> <p>Material promoting peace available for public</p> <p>Media and social pro-peace campaigns organised and well attended</p> <p>Training, workshops and conferences organised and well attended</p> <p>Joint activities (cross-border activities) implemented</p>	<p>Number of events, campaigns, trainings, workshops and conferences.</p> <p>Number of participants in events, campaigns trainings, workshops and conferences.</p> <p>Number of reports and publications.</p> <p>Quantifiable media exposure and reach.</p> <p>Number of strategic cross-border partnerships.</p>	<p>TBD on information, and data provided by beneficiaries.</p>	<p>TBD on information, and data provided by beneficiaries.</p>	<p>Annual project evaluation reports.</p> <p>Periodic beneficiary reports.</p> <p>Media reports.</p> <p>Public surveys.</p>	<p>Continued co-operation of Israeli and Palestinian peace organisations</p> <p>Continued commitment of all partner organisations to co-operate under the regional programme in promoting the two-state solution</p> <p>Sustained final beneficiaries interest in the two-state solution</p>
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This action is funded by the European Union

## ANNEX 2

of the Commission Implementing Decision on the Annual Action Programme 2018 – Part 3 (including one action on budget 2019) in favour of ENI South countries to be financed from the general budget of the Union

### Action Document for "2018 Programme to Support Youth and Culture in the Southern Neighbourhood"

<u>ANNUAL PROGRAMME</u>		
This document constitutes the work programme in the sense of Article 110(2) of the Financial Regulation and action programme in the sense of Articles 2 and 3 of Regulation N° 236/2014		
<b>1. Title/basic act/ CRIS number</b>	2018 Programme to Support Youth and Culture in the Southern Neighbourhood CRIS number: ENI/2018/041-260 financed under the European Neighbourhood Instrument	
<b>2. Zone benefiting from the action/location</b>	Neighbourhood South countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine <sup>1</sup> , Syria and Tunisia. Countries neighbouring the Neighbourhood region <sup>2</sup> : Members for Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) which are not Neighbourhood South countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Turkey and Mauritania) and African states bordering the Neighbourhood countries (Chad, Mali, Niger, Sudan and non-autonomous territory of Western Sahara).	
<b>3. Programming document</b>	Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) - 2014-2020. Regional South and East Strategy Paper (2014-2020) and Multiannual Indicative Programme (2018-2020)	
<b>4. Sector of concentration/ thematic area</b>	Regional South MIP 2018-2020 – Sector 1: Building resilience and promoting stability	DEV. Aid: YES <sup>3</sup>
<b>5. Amounts</b>	Total estimated cost: EUR 13,611,111.	

<sup>1</sup> This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.

<sup>2</sup> In accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 (ENI Regulation).

<sup>3</sup> Official Development Aid is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective.

<b>concerned</b>	Total amount of EU budget contribution: EUR 12,250,000. The action is co-financed by potential grant beneficiaries for an indicative amount of EUR 1,361,111. Budget line: 22.040101			
<b>6. Aid modality(ies) and implementation modality(ies)</b>	Project Modality Direct management: Grants – calls for proposals			
<b>7 a) DAC code(s)</b>	15150 – Democratic participation and civil society			
<b>b) Main Delivery Channel</b>	52000 - Other			
<b>8. Markers (from CRIS DAC form)</b>	<b>General policy objective</b>	<b>Not targeted</b>	<b>Significant objective</b>	<b>Main objective</b>
	Participation development/good governance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	X
	Aid to environment	<input type="checkbox"/>	X	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Gender equality (including Women In Development)	<input type="checkbox"/>	X	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Trade Development	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Reproductive, Maternal, New born and child health	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<b>RIO Convention markers</b>	<b>Not targeted</b>	<b>Significant objective</b>	<b>Main objective</b>
	Biological diversity	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Combat desertification	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change mitigation	<input type="checkbox"/>	X	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change adaptation	<input type="checkbox"/>	X	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>9. Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC) thematic flagship</b>	NA			
<b>10. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)</b>	SDG 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls SDG 8: Decent work and economic growth SDG13: Climate action SDG 16: Peace, justice and strong institutions			

## **SUMMARY**

This action contributes to building resilience and promoting inclusive development and stability in the countries covered under the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) South through support to youth and culture.

**Component 1:** Youth –Active Participation of Young People in Building Inclusive, Democratic Societies.

This component aims at empowering youth and promoting their participation in public life, through youth partnerships, the promotion of networks and exchanges, a culture of human rights, accountability, as well as democratic practices and good governance. The action will reinforce the competencies, knowledge and awareness of a regional network of youth civil society organisations, while promoting youth as proactive citizens and credible, capable leaders of change, both at the regional and national levels, within societies undergoing profound transformation. The action will also seek to enhance the pro-active participation of youth in the preservation of tangible and intangible cultural heritage at the Mediterranean level.

**Component 2:** Culture as a Vector for Employment and Resilience in the Southern Neighbourhood

The action will seek to strengthen culture's contribution to sustainable development and furthering co-operation and solidarity with the countries of the Southern Neighbourhood; engage in joint actions with Member States and the EU as well as European and local cultural actors. It will also strengthen professional associations, networks and alliances for creative entrepreneurs, and it will mobilise youth and youth organisations on the promotion of artistic freedom as a fundamental prerequisite of democracy and an essential element for the wellbeing of societies. Finally, the action will contribute to the democratisation of culture and the preservation of ENP South countries cultural heritage.

## **1 CONTEXT**

### **1.1 Sector/Country/Regional context/Thematic area**

**Component 1 – Active Participation of Young People in building Inclusive, Democratic Societies.**

The Southern Neighbourhood has undergone major changes in recent times which have impacted on all aspects of life. While each country has its own particular set of circumstances there are nevertheless a number of common features which are shared across the countries of the region. The stability of the region as a whole depends largely on the ability to channel the energy of young people in a positive direction, addressing their demands for access to decent employment and education and allowing their voice to be heard at national and regional level, playing an important role in the decision-making process. In the countries of the region (Morocco, Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia), almost 60% of the regional population is under the age of 30 and the number of young people under the age of 15 is forecast to increase by over 18% by 2020. With an average of about



30% youth unemployment and around 50% for young women, the region has one of the highest youth unemployment rates in the world. There is an urgent necessity of finding opportunities for political, social and economic inclusion of the region's large youth population, increasing their resilience, including to radicalisation, and helping to break down the institutional barriers to work and participation in the political process. These are particularly urgent in the case of young women who often face double exclusion from both sectors.

The hope initially raised by the "Arab Spring", which began in Tunisia in 2011 before spreading to other countries, that the exclusion of young people from the economic and political spheres would be addressed, has largely faded into frustration, fuelled by and contributing to, political instability and economic stagnation. Despite being active drivers of change in the region, young people continue to struggle to secure social and economic inclusion in their communities but also to improve the political situation and bring about democratic change. Political activism among youth and their civic commitment are seen as critical pathways towards political reform and more equitable development in the region. However, this assumption is largely untested within the current context of the Partner countries. As a result, planners and policymakers lack reliable evidence on which to base their strategies for promoting civic engagement among Arab youth, supporting resilience and increasing employability.

Young people civic engagement in sustainable development proves to be particularly urgent. The Mediterranean region is considered as the most affected by climate change worldwide, impacting public health, food and water safety, economic growth and migration. It is important that youth takes leadership in climate action and sustainable development at the regional level, as climate change impacts all Mediterranean countries and requires strong co-operation between different actors.

Furthermore, fostering intercultural dialogue among young people from the region represents a high potential for societal resilience and stability. The EU committed to engaging youth and regional institutions in protecting and safeguarding their tangible and intangible cultural heritage and promoting cultural diversity as a vital element of preventing violent extremism. Culture is an ideal means of communicating across language barriers, empowering people and facilitating social cohesion.

Following the ENP Review's emphasis on an integrated and comprehensive response to protracted crises to protect those most in need (displaced youth, refugees and host communities), this regional Project will pursue a tailored, participatory and inclusive approach. This will contribute to the development of effective and flexible partnerships that better respond to evolving needs, foster ownership of actions by national stakeholders, and engage civil society including existing national networks of youth organisations.

## **Component 2: Culture as a Vector for Employment and Resilience in the Southern Neighbourhood**

Culture can make a significant contribution to addressing today's key social and technological challenges, achieving greater social cohesion across the Southern Neighbourhood. The arts, culture and education, together with sport and youth policies, are crucial to prevent radicalisation, promote greater tolerance and understanding and engage new segments of society as well as being a source of growth and jobs in their own right.

Culture is an important asset for the economy. Due to its direct contribution to jobs, growth and external trade, but also because cutting edge economic sectors rely on creativity to maintain their competitive advantage, and because countries and cities increasingly rely on

culture to attract tourists. One challenge in this respect is for such programmes to reach out to areas beyond the capital cities. Building where possible on existing networks the project should aid beneficiaries to develop the relevant knowledge, skills, values and attitudes to increase their collective resilience, influence and regional outreach in the fields of protection and promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.

Within the past decade, the EU has increasingly come to acknowledge the contribution of the sector to economic development, social inclusion, integration and civil empowerment. The cultural sector in the ENP South Partner Countries continues to suffer from lack of esteem at official level and poor financing as well as lack of cultural policies and strategies.

In order to address these challenges in the various cultural sectors (media, film, performing arts, cultural heritage and cultural enterprising) the EU has proposed to the Partner Countries a variety of regional and bilateral programmes aimed at increasing capacities, financing actions, building bridges, exchanging experiences and knowledge, improving policies and advocacy for the cultural sector.

### ***1.1.1 Public Policy Assessment and EU Policy Framework***

Both components of the proposed action are in line with sector priority 1 of the 2018-2020 Multi-Annual Indicative Programme for ENI South: Building resilience and promoting stability. The empowerment of youth and the promotion of the culture sector represent key elements in the construction of resilient and open societies and in the development of regional co-operation and integration. They contribute to the consolidation of stability and security in the southern neighbourhood, identified as a main priority by the 2017 European Consensus on Development<sup>4</sup>, the 2016 Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy<sup>5</sup> and the 2015 revised European Neighbourhood Policy<sup>6</sup>.

## **Component 1: Active Participation of Young People in building Inclusive, Democratic Societies.**

Component 1 is guided by the 2015 Joint Communications of the European Commission and of the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 'Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy'<sup>7</sup>, which sees youth as a vector of resilience and stabilisation, and emphasizes the need to "engage with youth across the neighbourhood".

The communication was more recently backed by the Council conclusions on the role of young people in building a secure, cohesive and harmonious society in Europe, adopted on 22 May 2018<sup>8</sup>, in which the Council of the European Union invites the European Commission to "Ensure active and meaningful youth participation in building peaceful and inclusive societies". In this regard women's meaningful participation is key to peace and security as enshrined in EU policy on Women, Peace and Security<sup>9</sup>.

Component 1 is also in line with the two Joint Communications of the European Commission and of the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 'A partnership for democracy and shared prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean' and 'A new response

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<sup>4</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/european-consensus-on-development-final-20170626\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/european-consensus-on-development-final-20170626_en.pdf)

<sup>5</sup> [https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top\\_stories/pdf/eugs\\_review\\_web.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf)

<sup>6</sup> [http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/documents/2015/151118\\_joint-communication\\_review-of-the-enp\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/documents/2015/151118_joint-communication_review-of-the-enp_en.pdf)

<sup>7</sup> Idem.

<sup>8</sup> <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7834-2018-INIT/en/pdf>

<sup>9</sup> <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2015671%202008%20REV%201>

for a changing Neighbourhood’, asserting Europe’s solidarity with and support for the struggle for democracy, dignity and prosperity. The first Communication calls for ‘(...) partnerships not only with governments but also with civil society (...)’ and ‘(...) increasing opportunities for youth exchanges (...)’

The proposed action complies with the new EU Youth Strategy<sup>10</sup>, which emphasizes the need to empower youth and foster its participation in democratic life. The Strategy proposes a series of indicative activities under the priority ‘Engage’, such as promoting dialogue and participatory mechanisms at all level of decision-making, encouraging social and civic engagement of young people, and exploring innovative and alternative forms of democratic participation.

Moreover, the action is consistent with the Regional South Multiannual Indicative Programme (2018-2020), which “calls for deepening work on education, culture and youth to foster pluralism, coexistence and respect as a way for strengthening resilience and promoting stability”..

Youth and culture also counts amid the Partnership Priorities.<sup>11</sup> It also complements the Single Support Frameworks (SSFs), particularly in relation to youth and the inclusion of civil society in the light of the EU’s renewed emphasis on building deep democracies and promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Finally, component 1 responds to the Union for the Mediterranean strategic orientation, which identifies youth as a priority target group. Young people represent a significant resource as agents for positive change and development in their respective country, promoter of intercultural dialogue and international co-operation, and barrier to extremism.

## **Component 2: Culture as a Vector for Employment and Resilience in the Southern Neighbourhood.**

The EU is committed to promoting culture in its international relations, in line with the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Council conclusions on cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue in EU external relations<sup>12</sup>, the European Parliament resolution on the cultural dimension of the EU external action<sup>13</sup> and its preparatory action in this field, and the Council conclusions on culture in the EU's external relations with a focus on culture in development co-operation.

The proposed action is also aligned with the EU's commitments to international agreements, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression, which remains the main legislation in this area.

The action is consistent with the 2016 Joint Communication ‘Towards an EU strategy for International Cultural Relations’<sup>14</sup>, endorsed by the Council in May 2017. The document proposes an EU Strategy for International Cultural Relations that focuses on advancing cultural co-operation with partner countries across three main strands:

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<sup>10</sup> COM(2018)269 final,  
[https://ec.europa.eu/youth/sites/youth/files/youth\\_com\\_269\\_1\\_en\\_act\\_part1\\_v9.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/youth/sites/youth/files/youth_com_269_1_en_act_part1_v9.pdf)

<sup>11</sup> Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Algeria

<sup>12</sup> <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:cu0002&from=EN>, 2016.

<sup>13</sup> <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2011-0239>, 2011.

<sup>14</sup> JOIN(2016)29, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52016JC0029&from=EN>.

- supporting culture as an engine for sustainable social and economic development;
- promoting culture and intercultural dialogue for peaceful inter-community relations; and
- reinforcing co-operation on cultural heritage.

This Joint Communication led, for the first time, to the integration of a cultural dimension to the European Consensus for Development.

Moreover, the proposed action is fully coherent with the ‘The New European Agenda for culture’<sup>15</sup> adopted in 2018 and which foresees "Strengthening international cultural relations".

The action will also further the priorities defined by the 2015-2018 Work Plan for Culture, adopted by EU Culture Ministers in December 2014<sup>16</sup>, including:

- accessible and inclusive culture;
- cultural heritage;
- cultural and creative sectors: creative economy and innovation; and
- promotion of cultural diversity, culture in EU external relations, and mobility.

### *1.1.2 Stakeholder analysis*

The programme involves a wide variety of actors active in the Mediterranean Region. Rights-holders include:

- civil society and citizens in general with particular focus on youth and culture organisations, networks and operators;
- private businesses.

Duty-bearers include:

- Public administrations comprising local authorities – defined as ‘decentralised bodies in the partner countries, such as regions, departments, provinces and municipalities’ – and national authorities, which can play a major role in (i) participating in capacity-building activities (ii) including organisations in political and regional dialogues (iii) developing policies promoting culture and youth participation in public affairs (iv) enabling the implementation of projects in remote areas.
- EU institutions and other international organisations conducting complementary actions in affected countries (UN agencies, UfM, national development agencies, etc.). EU Delegations supporting youth and/or culture bilateral programmes need to be closely associated in order to ensure co-ordination, complementarity and synergies between national and regional activities.

The target groups of **Component 1-Specific objectives 1 and 2** are students and/or young graduates, indicatively between the age of 18 and 30, as well as national authorities, political representatives and universities. Special attention will be paid to empowering **youth organisations at grassroots level** as well as to consolidating and expanding existing organisations and networks that have emerged and which are **representative** of youth. As

<sup>15</sup> SWD(2018) 167 final, [https://ec.europa.eu/culture/sites/culture/files/commission\\_communication\\_-\\_a\\_new\\_european\\_agenda\\_for\\_culture\\_2018.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/culture/sites/culture/files/commission_communication_-_a_new_european_agenda_for_culture_2018.pdf).

<sup>16</sup> <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16094-2014-INIT/en/pdf>

such, targeted organisations and networks should be predominantly composed of members below 30. This condition should ensure that the youth organisations well-represent the voice of young people and not only act on their behalf.

Emerging youth organisations in the region face a number of challenges: they have to define their role and complementarity, in particular, on issues such as specialisation, more professional approach and mobilisation of the general public, isolation vs. regional networking and dialogue, young vs. older/institutionalised CSOs.

The target groups of **Component 1-Specific objective 3 is more inclusive and** focuses on empowering young women and men more at risk due to their socio-economic and geographical backgrounds (e.g. young people in rural areas). These young people, who represent a large part of the population, have limited access to quality education and employment, and limited mobility opportunities. The volunteering programme will offer them the opportunity to discover new cultures, interact with different actors and communities, and gain practical skills and knowledge.

Overall, the action should guarantee the participation of young women and youth with disabilities<sup>17</sup>, which represent a non-negligible part of youth in the Southern Mediterranean. The target groups of **component 2** are artists and cultural operators, organisations active in the area of culture (including in marginalized areas), businesses that are culture or tourism-based, including Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and chambers of commerce, and public institutions (ministries, agencies, universities, etc.) that contribute to the management and promotion of culture.

### ***1.1.1 Priority areas for support/problem analysis***

#### **Component 1:**

Many young people are frustrated by the tendency of their governments and international actors to treat youth as a problem to be solved, instead of as partners for progress. Young people throughout the Mediterranean expressed their loss of faith and trust in their governments, the international community and systems of governance that they feel excluded from, contributing to a strong and ongoing sense of injustice. This must be addressed in order to benefit from and support young people's contributions to democratisation and stability and to realize the potential of young people in the Southern Mediterranean.

Youth can act as a main driver for change, however, the limited experience of youth organisations in managing networks, implementing projects and participating in public life and dialogue curtails their potential. Youth organisations in the Southern Neighbourhood Region are often characterised by fragmentation, isolation and lack of strategy. There are needs to support capacity building on advocacy for public affairs and to reinforce their ability to co-ordinate and network with their peers from the region.

#### **Component 2:**

One of the EU's aims is to promote global sustainable development, and culture is an important driver and enabler of development. A cultural and creative industry is a main creator of jobs, with a recent estimate of 29.5 million worldwide. Culture, as the UN General Assembly emphasized, not only contributes to the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development, it also should be mobilized as a vehicle to foster tolerance, mutual understanding, peace and resilience.

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<sup>17</sup> The European Union is signatory to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

## 2 RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS

Risks	Risk level (H/M/L)	Mitigating measures
Political instability or a deteriorating security situation in one or more countries may disrupt the implementation of one or more components of the project.	H	Monitoring of the situation and supporting democratic structures and principles. Partner countries can choose between different schemes of co-operation and actions do not necessarily concern all countries. Non-inclusion of countries in crisis will not hamper project implementation, as this is a regional project that can be flexible in the countries it targets.
Changes to the law on freedom of association or other regulations may undermine effective participation of civil society organisations in the programme.	H	The EU's bilateral co-operation documents (Partnership Priorities) foresee a requirement to engage with CSOs at national level, and with regional entities such as the League of Arab States, and to promote a more enabling environment for the work of civil society, in an attempt to counteract any unwillingness on the part of partner countries' authorities to engage with CSOs.
The Southern Neighbourhood is the least integrated region in the world, with mobility between countries often affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of regional activities.	M	Care has to be taken in selecting locations for regional events. In some cases active intervention with the relevant authorities will be required in order to facilitate visas for participants.
Access restrictions to technology and internet, technological infrastructure problems and instability of networks	M	Recognition of risk
Low absorption capacity of youth organisations and cultural operators to use grant funds	H	Technical assistance, information campaigns and targeted training for staff in project management
<b>Component 1</b>		
Disagreements may arise among participating youth organisations.	H	The "rules of the game" should be clarified from the outset in order to avoid such situations and keep the project immune from political cleavages and possible 'hijacking' by predominantly political youth organisations.
Unwillingness of youth organisations to engage in policy	M	Tripartite dialogue where possible (between the authorities, the EU and

dialogue with the State or simply the lack of incentives to do so.		CSOs) will then help to highlight the usefulness for CSOs and also for the authorities of conducting a dialogue and working together.
<b>Component 2</b>		
Critically low level of knowledge of strengths and opportunities of the culture sector of other Southern Mediterranean neighbours	H	Careful project research and preparation with opportunities for intra-regional networking and information sharing
<b>Assumptions</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The political and security situation in all countries will allow the smooth implementation of the programme.</li> <li>- The partners involved are committed to participate in all activities throughout the duration of the programme.</li> <li>- National youth organisations are interested in networking together and joining forces in order to better advocate their causes.</li> <li>- Advocacy efforts lead to changes in laws and improved access to resources for young people.</li> <li>- Cultural actors in the Southern Neighbourhood see an added value in regional co-operation</li> <li>- Sufficient commitment exists on the part of such actors to inclusive cultural dialogue, commitment to diversity and to opposing violent extremism</li> </ul>		

### 3 LESSONS LEARNT, COMPLEMENTARITY AND CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

#### 3.1 Lessons learnt

The present action builds on an ongoing comprehensive independent external evaluation of Regional projects focusing on culture and youth in the Neighbourhood South, more specifically MED Culture and Net Med Youth.

#### Component 1:

Some preliminary lessons learnt from the NET MED Youth on-going evaluation:

- Strengthen the networking, co-operation and co-ordination among youth organisations at the regional level, including working with regional platforms and networks;
- Strengthen links with universities in the domain of policy-making;
- Make broader youth organisations' profile: include youth associations working on economy, culture, environment, etc.;
- Explore complementarity and synergies with other on-going national or international initiatives
- Ensure more support and engagement of the EU Delegations in policy dialogue with the public authorities to make pressure on government to consider youth project and to mainstream youth component in national strategies;

Moreover, a comprehensive independent external evaluation of Euro-Med Youth IV, an EU funded programme promoting the mobility of young people in the Southern neighbourhood, together with the different results-oriented monitoring (ROM) reports point to a converging set of lessons learnt:

- Avoid the fragmentation of inputs and efforts.
- Go beyond the ‘comfort zone’ of the programme and reach out to rural and marginalised youth organisations.
- Avoid working with the same circle of organisations and give the broadest possible range of youth organisations and groups the opportunity to benefit from support under the programme.
- Focus on the long-term sustainability of the action.
- Use a light and proactive implementation structure.

### **Component 2:**

Some preliminary lessons learnt from the MED Culture on-going evaluation:

- Explore the regional dimension from the early stage of the project, while also addressing the needs of cultural operators at the national level;
- Involve the private sector, especially in activities related to entrepreneurship;
- Co-operate and work closely with local and regional (within a single country) public authorities from the culture sector as it proved to be much more effective than working at the national level;
- Apply bottom-up approach: focus on policy changes at the local level while keeping the dialogue open with national authorities;
- Ensure better synergy with other on-going bilateral and regional projects and programmes;
- Develop new and innovative initiatives, including proactive outreach to marginalised communities.

An evaluation will also be carried out at the end of the MED Media project scheduled for mid-2018. This should allow recommendations to be incorporated into the terms of reference of a future call for proposals, notably with a view to anchoring regional activities more firmly into the bilateral context and operation).

## **3.2 Complementarity, synergy and donor co-ordination**

### **Component 1:**

In the field of youth empowerment, the proposed action will complement:

- Regional programmes including NETMED Youth, Erasmus+ non formal education strand, Erasmus+ Virtual Exchanges, EU4Youth, EU-Council of Europe Youth Partnership work programme, Empowering Youth in the Middle East: Young Voices Speak up, and Media Makes them Heard, Youthroom, Youth Mobility and regional integration of Maghreb countries, Supporting Youth Employment in the Mediterranean (YEM);
- Activities carried on at bilateral level through European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights/ Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities (EIDHR/CSOs-



LA) country-based support programmes and ENI bilateral programmes supporting (local) governance, participation and democracy (e.g. Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia)

- Established national and regional networks.

## **Component 2:**

In the field of culture, the proposed action will complement:

- Regional programmes including Med-Culture, Media and Culture programme;
- Intercultural dialogue programmes such as the Anna Lindh Foundation for Inter-Cultural Dialogue;
- Cultural diplomacy activities through collaboration between the EU Delegations and the EU Member States to emphasise the diversity of European culture and to facilitate meetings between European and Mediterranean artists;
- The regional and bilateral programmes dedicated to certain specific areas of culture (e.g.: film sector with Euromed audiovisual , Heritage with Euromed Heritage , culture in cross border regions with cross border co-operation [CBC], culture programme in Algeria, "Support to creativity and cultural diversity in Egypt" programme, etc.);
- The regional programme entitled "Support to the development of Culture and Creative Industries and Clusters in the Southern Mediterranean", concentrating largely on handicraft industries and expiring in 2019;
- The EU programme Creative Europe, which is partially open to the Southern Neighbourhood and in which Tunisia is participating.

For both components, synergies will be sought with the Civil Society Facility South programme, which aims at strengthening the role of civil society organisations in the reforms and democratic changes taking place in the Mediterranean.

### **3.3 Cross-cutting issues**

This programme is expected to contribute to the issues of democracy, governance, gender equality and environment.

The programme will be implemented following a rights-based approach, encompassing all human rights, with a focus on the rights of most vulnerable groups. The five following working principles will be applied at all stages of implementation: (a) legality, universality and indivisibility of human rights; (b) participation and access to the decision-making process; (c) non-discrimination and equal access; (d) accountability and access to the rule of law; (e) transparency and access to information. By supporting involvement and participation of young people in public affairs on the one hand, and by contributing to opening up the culture sector to the active engagement of civil society and the private sector in the other, a more healthy system of checks and balances will be supported. The role of culture in the promotion of civil society message is also key. By supporting involvement and participation of young people in public affairs on the one hand, and by contributing to opening up the culture sector to the active engagement of civil society and the private sector in the other, a more healthy system of checks and balances will be supported.

Likewise, increased exposure to EU policies and practices will enhance awareness of more open, participatory and accountable standards and, as such, good governance.

The proposed action also aims at consolidating inter-cultural dialogue and as such, working in favour of mediation and reconciliation processes, conflict prevention and respect for cultural and religious diversity.

**Gender equality.** Women constitute a targeted priority group of this programme. It aims at reducing the imbalance between men and women in the region, opening opportunities for women, and fully integrating them into the social and political spheres of their country. Women will be encouraged to engage in and shape the various activities led in the framework of this programme, and to put forth their needs and aspirations. Particular efforts will be made to include young women in rural areas and least-favoured urban areas, since they remain the most marginalised.

**Environment.** The programme is likely to have a direct impact on the environment, as youth organisations active in promoting environment-friendly behaviour (energy efficiency, reduction of emissions, etc.) will be eligible for support.

## **4 DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION**

### **4.1 Objectives/results**

The overall objective of the Youth and Culture programme is to promote youth and culture as vectors of democratisation, inclusive economic growth, regional integration and resilience in ENP South countries.

**Component 1 Objective 1:** To promote the active participation of young people in building inclusive, democratic societies.

**Component 2 Objective 2:** To enhance the role of culture as a vector for employment and resilience in the Southern Neighbourhood.

### **4.2 Main activities**

#### **Objective 1:**

**Specific objective 1:** supporting the effective development of regional youth networks and their inter-action with policy-makers while contributing to regional dialogue thus supporting resilience and promoting stability;

#### **Output 1:**

- Existing youth networks are consolidated and expanded of at local, national and regional levels;
- A ground-breaking culture of interaction between policy makers and youth organisations is created;
- The credibility of youth organizations and the development of trust-based partnerships with national institutions is enhanced;

Indicative types of activities:

- Promote the participation of women in youth organisations and network, in particular, promote the participation of women in local and national elections;
- Strengthen the co-operation between youth organisations and governmental actors in order to overcome the continued mistrust of youth towards public administrations (and vice-versa);

- Institutionalise measures to close the gap between the youth population and the representation of youth in local and national governance institutions and processes by adopting youth quotas, establishing youth advisory boards and roles, and facilitating young people's access to elected positions by aligning the age of eligibility to run for office with the voting age;

**Specific objective 2:** developing the unique ability of youth to engage in regional dialogue and transform the Sustainable Development Agenda into concrete innovative action that supports the sustainable use of natural resources and promotes climate change mitigation and adaptation in the region;

**Output 2:**

- Young people bring their ideas into the environmental debate and take part in projects for sustainable use of natural resources;
- Eco-friendly behaviours is adopted by more young people (i.e. turning off the light when leaving a room, decreasing one's consumption of plastic items, recycling, etc.).

Indicative types of activities:

- Provide technical assistance in the form of skills development to consolidate the capacity of youth organisations and networks to independently prepare projects and absorb the necessary funds to implement them;
- Elaboration of a communication campaign aiming at raising awareness on climate action and sustainable energy (including energy and resource efficiency, recycling, etc.).

**Specific objective 3:** engaging youth and regional institutions in protecting and safeguarding their tangible and intangible cultural heritage and promoting cultural diversity as a vital element of preventing violent extremism.

**Output 3:**

- Intra-regional youth mobility is increased;
- Awareness is raised among young people, volunteers, local communities, and concerned authorities of the need to protect and promote cultural heritage;
- Young people are involved in heritage preservation through concrete projects at sites;
- Young people are empowered, allowing them to learn skills, basic preservation and conservation techniques and raise their capacity as future decision-makers and global active citizens;
- Sustainable co-operation between non-profit organisations, site management, communities and authorities is strengthened;
- Mainstream gender perspectives based upon comprehensive gender analysis in all stages of the projects and geographical diversity among the properties where the action camps take place.

Indicative types of activities:

- Implementation of a South-South cultural heritage volunteering programmes. Participants are young people from the region, aged between 18 and 30 included.

Activities include but are not limited to: on-ground preservation tasks, awareness sessions, communication campaign.

**Objective 2:**

**Specific objective 1:** Promote a more democratic access to culture, targeting, in particular, remote areas and least-favoured segments of the population.

**Output 1:**

- Access to cultural products, events and activities is increased and improved;
- The sense of ownership of cultural creations and cultural heritage is enhanced;

Indicative types of activities:

- Support informal cultural education.
- Implement measures to favour access to culture for young people
- Encourage access to cultural heritage to the public.
- Organise regional awards and valorise festivals at regional level.

**Specific objective 2:** Promote culture as a vector for employment and employability.

**Output 2:** Artistic and cultural education are reinforced and jobs are better recognised.

Indicative types of activities:

- Mapping of the needs and opportunities on the cultural professional market of ENP South countries in order to provide a base-line for assessing needs;
- Capacity-building for cultural operators;
- Specific training for added-value job positions;
- Setting up a pan-Arab network of "Creative Hubs" to support the digitisation and boost the innovation capacity and the economic growth of Cultural and Creative Industries.

**Specific objective 3:** Promote culture as a vector of social cohesion, democratisation, and tolerance, promote cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue for peaceful inter-community relations.

**Output 3:** Activism and advocacy in the field of culture as a solution to promote tolerance and cultural diversity are strengthened.

Indicative types of activities:

- Facilitate the inter-regional exchange of artworks and build networks between cultural operators throughout the region;
- Establish partnerships between philanthropists/patrons and small cultural organisations. A networking platform is developed.
- Encourage networking and South-South circulation of cultural operators and donors co-ordination, as well as South-North collaboration;
- Capacity building activities targeting small cultural organisations are conducted, including in communication, programme development and implementation, and funding strategies.

### **4.3 Intervention logic**

With a view to reaching the objectives and implementing the activities as described in section 4.2, and in the framework of direct centralised management, the proposed programme shall be implemented via grants as:

This allows a civil- society driven leadership rather than an EU driven one. It thus opens the possibility to more creative ideas and implementation of the priorities of civil society. Actors operating in the region benefit from a better understanding of the issues affecting youth empowerment and the promotion of culture and of how to address them. Their knowledge of the region enables the implementation of a common regional programme that would take into account the specificities of each territories reached by the programme. As part of civil society, and as such representative of the population, the grantees will also have the legitimacy to raise issues to local and national authorities.

Two separate grant contracts will be awarded (one for each component) on the basis of a call for proposals. International organisations will be eligible to apply.

## **5 IMPLEMENTATION**

### **5.1 Financing agreement**

In order to implement this action, it is not foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner countries..

### **5.2 Indicative implementation period**

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 4.2 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 66 months from the date of adoption by the Commission of this Action Document.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission's authorising officer responsible by amending this Decision and the relevant contracts and agreements.

### **5.3 Implementation modalities**

The envisaged assistance is deemed to follow the conditions and procedures set out by the restrictive measures adopted pursuant to Article 215 TFEU<sup>18</sup>.

All actions shall be assessed whether they may directly or indirectly lead to violence, even if they have been established for non-violent purposes. Particular attention will be paid to prevent that EU-supported activities contribute to incitement to hatred and/or violence. Implementation of this action will be in line with the intent of the EU Framework Decision on racism and xenophobia.

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<sup>18</sup> [https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/8442/consolidated-list-sanctions\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/8442/consolidated-list-sanctions_en).

### **5.3.1 Grants: calls for proposals for components 1 & 2 (direct management)**

(a) Objectives of the grants, fields of intervention, priorities of the year and expected results

#### **Component 1:**

Support the effective development of regional youth networks and their inter-action with policy-makers while contributing to regional dialogue thus supporting resilience and promoting stability;

Reinforce freedom of expression and access to information, and strengthening independent, plural, reliable and credible media that better channel young voices into public debate with a view to reinforcing good governance and democracy;

Develop the capacity of youth to engage in regional dialogue and transform the Sustainable Development Agenda into concrete innovative action that supports the sustainable use of natural resources and promotes climate change mitigation and adaptation in the region.

#### **Component 2:**

Promote a more democratic access to culture, targeting, in particular, remote areas and least-favoured segments of the population; give more visibility to artists and artworks from the region;

Promote culture as a vector for employment and employability;

Promote culture as a vector of social cohesion, democratisation, and tolerance, promote cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue for peaceful inter-community relations.

(b) Eligibility conditions

Place of establishment of applicants: ENI south countries, EU Member States, countries covered by Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) and European Economic Area (EEA) countries.

Type: International organisations and CSOs as defined by COM(2012) 0492 "the Roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil Society in external relations": all non-State, not-for-profit structures, non-partisan and non-violent, through which people organise to pursue shared objectives and ideals, whether political, cultural, social or economic. Operating from the local to the national, regional and international levels, they comprise urban and rural, formal and informal organisations. They include membership-based, cause-based and service-oriented CSOs. Among them, community-based organisations, non-governmental organisations, faith-based organisations, foundations, research institutions, women's organisations, gender and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) organisations, co-operatives, professional and business associations, and the not-for-profit media. Trade unions and employers' organisations, the so-called social partners, constitute a specific category of CSOs.

Subject to information to be published in the calls for proposals, the indicative amount of the EU contribution per grant will be EUR 6.25 million for component 1 and EUR 6 million for component 2. Grants may be awarded to sole beneficiaries or to consortia of beneficiaries (co-ordinator and at least two co-beneficiaries).

The indicative duration of the grants (their implementation period) is 48 months, of which the likely period for activities will be 36 months.

(c) Essential selection and award criteria

The essential selection criteria are financial and operational capacity of the applicant.

The essential award criteria are relevance of the proposed action to the objectives of the calls; design, effectiveness, feasibility, sustainability and cost-effectiveness of the action.

(d) Maximum rate of co-financing

The maximum possible rate of co-financing for grants under these calls is 90% of the eligible costs of the action.

If full funding is essential for the action to be carried out, the maximum possible rate of co-financing may be increased up to 100%. The need for full funding will be justified by the Commission's authorising officer responsible in the award decision, in respect of the principles of equal treatment and sound financial management.

(e) Indicative timing to launch the calls

1<sup>st</sup> quarter 2019.

## 5.4 Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply, subject to the following provision.

The Commission's authorising officer responsible may extend the geographical eligibility in accordance with Article 9(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the realization of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.

## 5.5 Indicative budget

	EU Contribution 2018	Total Contribution EU	Indicative 3 <sup>rd</sup> Party contribution in currency identified	Total
Grants – Total Enveloppe under section 5.3.1	12,250,000	12,250,000	1,361,111	13,611,111
<b>Procurement – total envelope under section 5.3.2<sup>19</sup></b>	-	-	-	-
5.8 – Evaluation, 5.9	-	-	-	-

<sup>19</sup> In order to avoid details on budgets for individual contracts, it is sufficient to indicate the total envelop for procurement. If budgets for individual contracts are public, tenderers tend to orientate themselves on them and not on the terms of reference.

Audit <sup>20</sup>				
5.10 – Communication and visibility <sup>21</sup>				
Contingences	-	-	-	-
Totals must correspond to the amounts in the 4th line in the summary table on page 1	12,250,000	12,250,000		13,611,111

## 5.6 Organisational set-up and responsibilities

This action will be managed by Commission Services (Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations). For each component, in the cases where a steering committee is created, the participation as observer of relevant Commission Services is foreseen.

## 5.7 Performance monitoring and reporting

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of projects resulting from the calls for proposals will be a continuous process and part of the beneficiaries' responsibilities. To this aim, the beneficiaries shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (outputs and direct outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the log frame matrix (for project modality) or the list of result indicators (for budget support). The report shall be laid out in such a way as to allow monitoring of the means envisaged and employed and of the budget details for the action. The final report, narrative and financial, will cover the entire period of the action implementation.

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

## 5.8 Evaluation

Having regard to the nature of the action, a mid-term evaluation and a final evaluation will be carried out for this action or its components via independent consultants contracted by the Commission.

The Commission shall inform the beneficiaries at least 2 weeks in advance of the dates foreseen for the evaluation missions. The beneficiaries shall collaborate efficiently and

<sup>20</sup> The financing of the evaluation and audit shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing Decision.

<sup>21</sup> The financing of the communication and visibility shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing Decision.



effectively with the evaluation experts, and inter alia provide them with all necessary information and documentation, as well as access to their premises and activities.

The evaluation reports shall be shared with the partner countries and other key stakeholders. The beneficiaries and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, in agreement with the partner countries, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project.

The financing of the evaluation shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing Decision.

## **5.9 Audit**

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audits or expenditure verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.

The financing of the audit shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing Decision.

## **5.10 Communication and visibility**

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated at the start of implementation and supported with the budget indicated in section 5.5 above.

In terms of legal obligations on communication and visibility, the measures shall be implemented by the Commission, the partner countries, contractors, grant beneficiaries and/or entrusted entities. All stakeholders and implementing partners shall ensure the visibility of EU financial assistance provided through the European Neighbourhood Instrument throughout all phases of the programme cycle. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, the financing agreement, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Requirements for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.

Visibility and communication actions shall be complementary to the activities implemented by the European Commission, the European External Action Service and the EU Delegations in the field.

The Commission and the EU Delegations should be fully informed of the planning and implementation of the specific visibility and communication activities.

## **6 PRE-CONDITIONS**

Not applicable.

## 7 APPENDIX - INDICATIVE LOGFRAME MATRIX (FOR PROJECT MODALITY)

	Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (incl. reference year)	Targets (incl. reference year)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions
Overall objective: Impact	To contribute to the sustainable and democratic stability of the Southern Neighbourhood,	Reinforced and systematic consultation of young people in the region on policy dialogue for resilience and stability. Increased involvement of cultural sector in building resilience of population and combatting violent extremism.  In all cases, contractors will be requested to provide sex-disaggregated data.	Ideally, to be drawn from the partner's strategy	Ideally, to be drawn from the partner's strategy	To be drawn from the partner's strategy.  Political declarations from regional and national bodies.  Number of consultations held.  Number of organisations involved.	Shrinking space for civil society in the region  Lack of political will to work closer with civil society  Instability of the region: obstacles to regional integration  Creating synergies with Neighbours of Neighbours  Various negative subregional dynamics
Specific objective(s): Outcome(s)	Component 1:  Active Participation of Young People in Building Inclusive, Democratic Societies.	Number of networks that have been developed or identified at regional level per key theme  Number of CSOs representatives participating to capacity		At least 4  (200 CSOs or	A regional mapping regional roadmap(s) Dialogue Fora reports Seminars with LAS/UfM Web platform for CS  Capacity Tools for	National legislations preventing civil society to develop their networks  Political will to continue

		development activities		more)	and of the Hub Evaluation and review Consultations of CS	supporting Dialogue with regional CSOs
	Supporting the effective management of regional youth networks and their co-operation with policy-makers while contributing to regional dialogue thus supporting resilience and promoting stability;	Number of young leaders benefiting from the workshops Number of CSOs benefiting from coaching by young leaders.		Up to 100	Inclusion in Dialogue and policy making regionally. Coaching online, gatherings and expertise gained	Changes in thematic priorities
	Developing the unique ability of youth to engage in regional dialogue and transform the Sustainable Development Agenda into concrete innovative action that supports the sustainable use of natural resources and promotes climate change mitigation and adaptation in the region;	Number of CSOs developing expertise at regional level on resilience and stability. Number of participants to events and workshops that become trainers of trainers in this field.			Research and studies, Workshops with EU Delegations, regional entities (UfM, LAS), regional CSOs, networks of media, of local authorities of the region.	Lack of political will from leaders to work with Youth
	Engaging youth and regional institutions in protecting and safeguarding their tangible and intangible cultural heritage and promoting cultural diversity as a vital element of preventing prevent violent extremism.					
	Component 2: Culture as a Vector					

	for Employment and Resilience in the Southern Neighbourhood					
	<p>Promote a more democratic access to culture, targeting, in particular, remote areas and least-favoured segments of the population; give more visibility to artists and artworks from the region.</p> <p>Better recognition of artistic and cultural education and jobs.</p> <p>Promote culture as a vector of social cohesion, democratisation, and tolerance, promote cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue for peaceful inter-community relations.</p>	<p>Role of the cultural sector in terms of social and human development of the ENP South</p> <p>Role of the cultural sector in terms of economic development of the ENP South</p>	To be obtained in part from Eurostat (MEDSTAT IV)		<p>Activities and campaign reports</p> <p>Draft laws official statements</p>	<p>Decision makers stay at present level of openness to cultural rights and movements or become more open</p>

					Projects and EU delegations reports	
Outputs	<p>OUTPUTS: Component 1</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Existing youth networks are consolidated and expanded of at local, national and regional levels;</li> <li>A ground-breaking culture of interaction between policy makers and youth organisations is created;</li> <li>The credibility of youth organisations and the development of trust-based partnerships with national institutions is enhanced;</li> </ul>	<p>Measures the degree of delivery of the outputs. For example, number of schools built and teachers trained disaggregated by sex.</p> <p>Number of key representatives for thematic dialogue with the EU and regional entities</p> <p>Number and type of regional or international entities integrating CS recommendations in their policy and programmes</p> <p>Number of key political meetings where CS is invited at regional level</p>	2018-2020	<p>About 100 CSOs are key representatives for thematic dialogue</p> <p>At least the EU, LAS, UfM</p> <p>At least 2 consultations per year in the whole region (in so far as possible with</p>	<p>Reports and by consulting of other international organisations, other CSOs partners/platforms, EU Inster institutional Steering Group, Media, EU Delegations, Regional entities (UfM, Anna Lindh Foundation, LAS).</p>	<p>Factors outside project management's control that may impact on the output-outcome linkage.</p> <p>Lack of co-ordinationordina tion between international organisations, regional entities And willingness to work closely with civil society</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Young people bring their ideas into the environmental debate and take part in projects for sustainable use of natural resources;</li> <li>• Eco-friendly behaviours is adopted by more young people (i.e. turning off the light when leaving a room, decreasing one's consumption of plastic items, recycling, etc.).</li> <li>• Intra-regional youth mobility is increased;</li> <li>• Awareness is raised among young people, volunteers, local communities, and concerned authorities of the need to protect and promote cultural heritage;</li> <li>• Young people are involved in heritage preservation through concrete projects at sites;</li> <li>• Young people are empowered, allowing them to learn skills, basic preservation and</li> </ul>	<p>Number of sub-regional/regional networking events delivered, and number of participants to these events</p> <p>Level of sharing of best practices among youth organisations from the region</p>		CSOs from countries in war)		
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	<p>conservation techniques and raise their capacity as future decision-makers and global active citizens;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sustainable co-operation between non-profit organisations, site management, communities and authorities is strengthened;</li> <li>• Mainstream gender equality in all stages of the projects and geographical diversity among the properties where the action camps take place.</li> <li>•</li> </ul>					
	<p>Component 2</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Access to cultural products, events and activities is increased and improved;</li> <li>• Ownership of cultural creations and cultural heritage is enhanced;</li> <li>• Significant amounts of material are stored and made available;</li> <li>• Better curated online art</li> </ul>	<p>Number of countries in which campaign can be organised.</p> <p>Number of activities registered per towns/governorates</p> <p>Improvement as regards to the level of professionalism in the cultural sector</p>	0	All southern Neighbourhood Countries (with exception of Syria)	CSO partners/Media/EU Delegations	Freedom of expression and speech is not suppressed and media are not censored.

	<p>collections.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Artistic and cultural education and jobs are better recognised</li> <li>• Activism and advocacy in the field of culture as a solution to promote tolerance and cultural diversity are strengthened.</li> </ul>	<p>Increase in the level of contacts between cultural professionals at national and regional level</p> <p>Level of sharing of best practices among the cultural operators from the region</p>				
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