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## SUMMARY

### **Annual Action Programme 2018 part 2 in favour of Myanmar/Burma to be financed from the general budget of the Union**

#### **1. Identification**

Budget heading	21.020200
Total cost	EUR 40 000 000 of EU contribution  Annex 1: This action is co-financed in joint co-financing by EU and other donors contributing to the Joint Peace Fund for the amount of EUR 89 383 889 (previous EU contributions totalling EUR 28 823 687). This action is also co-financed by potential grant beneficiaries for an indicative amount of EUR 473 684.  Annex 2: This action is co-financed by potential grant beneficiaries for an indicative amount of EUR 1 052 631.
Basic act	Regulation (EU) No 233/2014 of 11 March 2014 Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 of 11 March 2014

#### **2. Country background**

Despite the privileged geographical location and the richness of its natural resources, Myanmar/Burma remains one of the poorest countries in Asia, and lags behind most of its regional neighbours on most social and economic development indicators. A national Household Survey (2009-2010) indicated that 26% of the overall population lived under the poverty line, with the worst conditions found in ethnic states and in areas directly affected by armed conflict.

For almost 60 years, Myanmar/Burma has been under military rule and suffered widespread ethno-nationalist insurgencies. However, since 2011 the country has embarked on an ambitious transition towards democracy and prosperity. The 2015 elections and the successful transition to a new democratically-elected government opened a promising new era in Myanmar. The main challenges of the government, in office since April 2016, are to sustain the democratic transition and strengthen key institutions of democratic governance, move forward with the complex peace process, improve respect of human rights, develop a more decentralised governance, provide more and better social services with more equitable access, and create opportunities for broad-based, inclusive and sustainable economic development.

From the outset of the transition in 2011, and more concretely since 2016, the EU swiftly responded to political changes and provided strong support to encourage reforms.

### **3. Summary of the Action Programme**

#### **1) Background**

##### **EU Peace Support in Myanmar/Burma – PEACE IV**

Efforts to bring about a sustainable and inclusive end to Myanmar/Burma's decades long civil war commenced in 2011 under the previous nominally-civilian Government. Multilateral negotiations were undertaken for a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), which has been signed by ten out of the sixteen recognised Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs). The evanescent implementation of the NCA as well as progress in advancing a comprehensive political dialogue has been slow to materialise. Progress in the national political dialogue process has been limited and contested. Peace efforts are being undermined by intensified fighting in several ethnic states and involving both NCA-signatory and non-signatory EAOs. This situation is also aggravated by the exodus of 800,000 Rohingyas into Bangladesh since the attacks perpetrated by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in northern Rakhine State in August 2017 and the retaliation by Myanmar/Burma's security forces.

Ethnic areas consistently demonstrate lower levels of development across a range of indicators. Myanmar/Burma continues to have large Internally Displaced People (IDP) populations, some of which are the result of long term displacement and escalation of conflict. Estimates suggest that as of January 2018 there are 241,000 IDPs in camps or camp-like situations due to armed conflict and inter-communal violence in the ethnic states. The need for broader development is also pressing, not least to address long-held grievances regarding inequality between central and more remote areas mainly inhabited by ethnic nationalities. Women and girls including of childbearing age in Myanmar/Burma carry extraordinary burdens as gender-based violence, deep poverty and gender discrimination are compounded by armed conflict and inter-communal violence. Women and girls affected by conflict and forced displacement in Myanmar, are more at risk of conflict-related sexual and domestic violence. One of several effects of this sexual violence are children born out of rape.

##### **Strengthening Indigenous Provision of Education in Ethnic Areas of Myanmar**

The education sector in Myanmar/Burma is highly diverse and is marred by the country's complex and long history of conflict. Government education – mandating Myanmar/Burmese as the sole language of instruction and using a centralised curriculum that does not reflect local contexts, history and cultures – has long been perceived by ethnic groups as a tool for assimilating non-Bamar populations and has been a key driver of conflict. In contrast, indigenous providers of education have developed and defined their own systems based on culture, ethnicity and language origins.

Over a quarter of education services in Myanmar/Burma are provided by either indigenous providers, the monastic system or faith-based organisations. Indigenous providers of education include the education departments of EAOs, as well as indigenous community-based organisations. They provide education services in non-government-controlled areas, as well as in many mixed administration and

government-controlled areas where government education services have recently been established but often remain weak and under-resourced.

Despite progress with enrolment and completion in government-led primary education, decades of underinvestment, conflict and poverty have stymied progress in ethnic areas. Early dropout and high rates of out-of-school children in ethnic areas are much higher than the national average. Data on education outcomes show that 63% of conflict-affected townships score below the national average on a composite education sub-index. Where government education services exist in conflict and post conflict areas, they remain inaccessible for many indigenous children as they lack linguistic and cultural relevance. Indigenous providers of education are therefore filling critical gaps by providing access to culturally relevant quality education for some of Myanmar/Burma's most marginalised and disadvantaged children in conflict and post-conflict areas. They serve about 350,000 children but a further 720,000 children are out of school in the geographical areas they reach.

The National Education Strategic Plan (NESP) recognises that *'an important factor in the successful implementation of the basic education reforms is the extent to which they are mainstreamed in other organisations involved in basic education provision, such as [...] schools managed under ethnic education systems.'* This opens an unprecedented space for supporting and facilitating engagement by both sides on the transition to a diverse but coherent and equitable education system. However, this remains highly sensitive politically given persistent distrust on both sides. It is therefore critical that a conflict sensitive approach is applied to effectively contribute to peace and reconciliation.

To this end, the action will support indigenous providers of education to deliver a high-quality education that drives improvements in learning outcomes for indigenous boys and girls. It will build their policy advocacy capacity so that they can collectively engage in productive policy dialogue with the Ministry of Education (MoE) on key education reforms, and will promote progressive alignment between government and indigenous education systems. The action fosters dialogue, cooperation and collaboration between indigenous providers of education and the MoE in support of the country's objective of "leaving no child behind", the achievement of MoE's NESP targets, and national peace building efforts.

Through this action, the EU will: (i) foster inclusion of different ethnic and minority groups in the process of nation building, (ii) address inequities in education provision and performance, (iii) model an effective conflict sensitive approach to supporting the education sector, and (iv) demonstrate that a balanced commitment to government and non-government providers is possible and necessary during this transition period.

## 2) Cooperation related policy of beneficiary country

In July 2016, the new government released a 12-point Economic Policy which presents a market-led outward-oriented approach to building a dynamic, diversified and sustainable economy that is people-centred and inclusive.

The government has declared peace and national reconciliation as one of its top priorities. The NCA continues to provide the main path for Myanmar/Burma's peace process. It foresees a Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism and a National Political Dialogue in order to find a new political settlement that should meet all parties' historical demands and expectations for a future federal Union. Stability and peace should also bring economic prosperity and development to all ethnic areas, including

Rakhine State, where the recommendations of the Rakhine Advisory Commission (RAC) were fully endorsed by the Government. Myanmar/Burma is also preparing the ground for the repatriation of Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh.

The NESP goal is: *'Improved teaching and learning, vocational education and training, research and innovation leading to measurable improvements in student achievement in all schools and educational institutions'*. It is comprehensive, covering all sub-sectors from preschool to higher education and Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET), alternative education, teacher education, as well as management and quality assurance, aiming at a comprehensive overhaul and modernisation of the whole education system. It foresees the development of *'a partnership mechanism to support the participation of different education service providers in basic education reforms.'*

The actions align with the government strategies as well as with the stated top government priorities – peace and national reconciliation.

### 3) Coherence with the programming documents

The actions are consistent with the priorities outlined in the "Joint Communication: Elements for an EU Strategy vis-à-vis Myanmar/Burma: A Special Partnership for Democracy, Peace and Prosperity"<sup>1</sup> adopted on 1 June 2016 and the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions<sup>2</sup> of February 2018.

The actions are also coherent with the priority areas of intervention of the Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014-2020 for Myanmar/Burma. The action "*EU Peace Support in Myanmar/Burma – PEACE IV*" is relevant to specific objectives 1 and 3 in the area of *Peace building support* (section 3.4 of the MIP). The action "*Strengthening Indigenous Provision of Education in Ethnic Areas of Myanmar*" is also relevant to specific objective 3 in the area of *Peace building support*, and to specific objectives 1 and 2 in the area of *Education* (section 3.2 of the MIP).

### 4) Identified actions

#### 4.1. EU Peace Support in Myanmar/Burma – PEACE IV

The overall objective is to contribute to lasting peace, security, stability and sustainable development in Myanmar/Burma.

The specific objectives are:

- 1) Successive milestones of the peace process are reached, including effective progress in terms of women's participation in this process.
- 2) Improved socio-economic recovery in conflict-affected areas and areas affected by intercommunal violence with a special focus on gender equality and women's and girls empowerment.

#### 4.2. Strengthening Indigenous Provision of Education in Ethnic Areas of Myanmar

The overall objective is to contribute to a peaceful and inclusive society for sustainable development in Myanmar/Burma<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>[http://eeas.europa.eu/myanmar/docs/join\\_2016\\_24\\_f1\\_communication\\_from\\_commission\\_to\\_inst\\_en\\_v5\\_p1\\_849592.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/myanmar/docs/join_2016_24_f1_communication_from_commission_to_inst_en_v5_p1_849592.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/32958/st06418-en18.pdf>

<sup>3</sup> In line with the SGDs 5 and 16

The specific objective is improved access and learning for indigenous children, youth and women in conflict affected and post-conflict areas who benefit from indigenous education and training harmonised with national education standards.

#### 5) Expected results

The results of both actions are expected to contribute to (i) EU's policy dialogue with the Government on the peace process, education, as well as on human rights with a particular emphasis on gender equality, women's empowerment and meaningful participation, (ii) poverty reduction by improving socio-economic recovery in conflict-affected communities, (iii) Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 "Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development" and (iv) SDG 5 "Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls". The action "*Strengthening Indigenous Provision of Education in Ethnic Areas of Myanmar*" will also contribute to (v) SDG 4 "Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education". Finally, both actions will contribute to (vi) cross-cutting issues including gender equality, environment sustainability, good governance and human rights. In addition (vi) this will also contribute to the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda and EUs policy in this regard.

#### 6) Past EU assistance and lessons learnt

##### *EU Peace Support in Myanmar/Burma – PEACE IV*

The Action "*EU Peace Support in Myanmar/Burma – PEACE II*" builds on the ongoing EU support to peacebuilding under the AAP 2013, AAP 2014, AAP 2015, AAP 2017 and experience with socio-economic recovery and development in ethnic areas under the Aid to Uprooted People and Non State Actors budget lines, as well as support through multi-donor trust funds for health, education and livelihoods. The Action takes into account the need to be realistic about what international aid can accomplish in this sector and to prevent development assistance from getting ahead of the political process. Past actions have highlighted that actors can support but should not lead transitions to peace and inter-communal reconciliation, as these processes must be locally owned. The Action will work with an adequate and up to date understanding of the context through systematic gender- and conflict analysis and continued monitoring of development, and will recognise the critical role of gender in addressing fragility. This Action will seek to work for transformative outcomes and develop aid strategies that are different from the vast majority of development assistance models. Furthermore, diplomatic/political engagement will be necessary to complement/reinforce development assistance. This action also recognises the importance of not necessarily assuming that development is conducive to peace and security, and that consultations with all stakeholders affected by international interventions are necessary including civil society. An important lesson learnt consists in the need to recognise an intractable situation. The role of humanitarian assistance and development agencies is to support communities in vulnerable situations, during this process, not to create the necessary changes themselves. Moreover, grievances must be better understood and acknowledged. The Action will ensure that not all resources are concentrated in one single instrument, and that projects can be easily adapted to changing political circumstances. Special measures will be required in order to ensure women's meaningful participation in the implementation and monitoring of the ceasefire agreement, further peace negotiations, peace-building and reconciliation. Special focus on the conflict related sexual and gender-based violence is to be guaranteed.

##### *Strengthening Indigenous Provision of Education in Ethnic Areas of Myanmar*

There is substantial global evidence of the challenges faced by national education systems to adequately support ethnic minority children. This is due to the remoteness of many ethnic communities, the significant poverty profile and the complex multi-lingual/multi-cultural contexts where many ethnic minority children live. These children often find it challenging to adapt to a standardised national curriculum that is foreign to their traditional way of knowing and does not include content that acknowledges their history or culture. High dropout and poor performance often typify the experiences of many indigenous children in national government systems. It is also a very challenging environment for non-indigenous teachers. International experience shows that diverse systems are especially important in multi-cultural and multi-lingual societies. In Myanmar/Burma, non-state (ethnic, faith-based, community) schools play an important role by complementing state education in underserved areas and for the most disadvantaged children. Studies show that they are culturally resonant and more responsive to local needs.

Education service provision in Myanmar/Burma falls within the humanitarian-development nexus, particularly in areas affected by conflict and recovering from conflict. It calls for a greater emphasis on strengthening local capacities, sustaining indigenous provision and promoting inclusive governance at the national and state level. This would address long standing grievances and a key driver of conflict and hence would support the democratic transition and progress in the peace process. To this end, the action builds on a previous ECHO-funded project, which supported a network of indigenous providers of education to expand their reach to communities without education services, bringing 12,534 out of school children into school. The transition from humanitarian aid to development will ensure indigenous providers of education can sustain and strengthen their services, improve the quality of education and learning outcomes, and support and engage with the MoE collectively and effectively in policy dialogue on the national education reform agenda.

#### 7) Complementary actions/donor coordination

In addition to bilateral assistance, EU assistance for Myanmar/Burma is provided through thematic and regional programmes in various areas<sup>4</sup> and planned in synergy with the humanitarian aid provided by ECHO, particularly in similar areas of interventions, such as peace building support in conflict-affected areas.

Both actions have been prepared to complement the support provided by other bilateral and multilateral development partners (DPs) in the same fields. More specifically, "*EU Peace Support in Myanmar/Burma – PEACE IV*" will continue to support coordinated action in the peace sector. With more than USD 100 million pledged by eleven donors and USD 75 million committed so far, the Joint Peace Fund is coordinating and channelling international support to the Myanmar/Burma peace process based on mutually agreed priorities and within nationally led processes and structures. In 2015, UNFPA, Australia, Canada, Finland, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom launched a 3-year US\$14.5 million joint initiative to protect the rights of women and girls in Myanmar. The initiative is a commitment to prevent and respond to violence perpetrated against women and girls in Myanmar, and to realize their sexual and reproductive health and rights also to be included in early education. The EU contribution will strengthen this endeavour and expand similar activities to

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<sup>4</sup> Thematic: Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP); Non-State Actors in Development Programme (NSA); Non State Authorities and Local Authorities in Development; European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR); Regional: Aid to Uprooted People (AUP); the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), Asia Investment Facility (AIF), Switch Asia.

other ethnic regions of the country. Other efforts on supporting the peace process are coordinated through the Peace Support Group (PSG), which includes development partners active in supporting peace in Myanmar/Burma, as well as the UN and the World Bank. Most of the PSG members are active contributors to the JPF.

The action "*Strengthening Indigenous Provision of Education in Ethnic Areas of Myanmar*" directly complements the EU "*Enhancing the education and skills base in Myanmar*" education sector reform contract (ACA/2018/039-665) action and ensures a conflict-sensitive and balanced EU support to education provision in Myanmar/Burma. Through these two actions, EU support will improve the quality and expand the reach of both government and indigenous provision of education; strengthen alignment and equivalency between government and non-government education systems; and foster greater dialogue, cooperation and collaboration between the MoE and indigenous providers of education in order to forge, in the longer term, a diverse but coherent national education system that promotes and protects the right of indigenous children to a quality education. It also complements a project funded by the Global Partnership for Education and the World Bank, a core component of which will be to drive forward the development of the NESP partnership mechanism between MoE and indigenous providers of education.

Cooperation among DPs is led by the Development Assistance Coordination Unit and ensured through a number of Sector Coordination Groups and other coordination bodies. The EU is actively involved in these donor coordination mechanisms. Besides Sector Working Groups, the EU also supports joint programmes with other DPs, notably the multi-donor trust funds for education, rural development and peace.

#### **4. Communication and visibility**

Specific Communication and Visibility Plans will be elaborated for the actions before starting its implementation on the basis of the Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action. Communication and Visibility measures will be implemented either by the Commission, and/or by the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and entrusted entities.

#### **5. Cost and financing**

EU Peace Support in Myanmar/Burma – PEACE IV	EUR 20 000 000
Strengthening Indigenous Provision of Education in Ethnic Areas of Myanmar	EUR 20 000 000
Total EU contribution to the measure	EUR 40 000 000

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This action is funded by the European Union

## **ANNEX 1**

of the Commission Implementing Decision on the financing of the Annual Action Programme  
in favour of Myanmar/Burma for 2018 part 2

### **Action Document for EU Peace Support in Myanmar/Burma – PEACE IV**

#### **INFORMATION FOR POTENTIAL GRANT APPLICANTS**

##### **WORK PROGRAMME FOR GRANTS**

This document constitutes the work programme for grants in the sense of Article 110(2) of the Financial Regulation in the following section concerning calls for proposals: 5.3.1 – Grants – call for proposals “Support to the conflict affected territories and the peace process in Myanmar/Burma” (direct management).

<b>1. Title/basic act/ CRIS number</b>	EU Peace Support in Myanmar/Burma – PEACE IV ACA/2018/040-879 Financed under the Development Cooperation Instrument	
<b>2. Zone benefiting from the action/location</b>	Myanmar/Burma The action shall be carried out at the following location: Yangon, Nay Pyi Taw and the ethnic states of Myanmar/Burma	
<b>3. Programming document</b>	Addendum No 1 to the Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014-2020) for Myanmar/Burma <sup>1</sup>	
<b>4. Sector of concentration/ thematic area</b>	Peace-building support	DEV. Aid: YES
<b>5. Amounts concerned</b>	Total estimated cost: EUR 109 857 573 Total amount of EU budget contribution: EUR 20 000 000 This action is co-financed in joint co-financing by EU and other donors contributing to the Joint Peace Fund for the amount of EUR 60 560 202. In addition, the Joint Peace Fund received previous EU contributions totalling EUR 28 823 687 This action is co-financed by potential grant beneficiaries for an	

<sup>1</sup> C(2018)4741 of 20 July 2018



	<p>indicative amount of EUR 473 684</p> <p>This action is tentatively co-financed in joint co-financing by Italy, Sweden and Australia contributing to the Women and Girls First phase 2 programme for an amount to be determined.</p>			
<b>6. Aid modality(ies) and implementation modality(ies)</b>	<p>Project modality</p> <p>– Direct management – grants – call for proposals</p> <p>– Indirect management with an International Organisation (UNOPS and UNFPA)</p>			
<b>7 a) DAC code(s)</b>	<p>15220 – Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution; 15230 – Post conflict – peace-building</p>			
<b>b) Main Delivery Channel</b>	<p>41119 – United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)</p> <p>41502 – United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)</p> <p>20000 – Non Governmental Organisations and Civil Society</p>			
<b>8. Markers (from CRIS DAC form)</b>	<b>General policy objective</b>	<b>Not targeted</b>	<b>Significant objective</b>	<b>Main objective</b>
	Participation development/good governance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
	Aid to environment	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Gender equality (including Women In Development)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Trade Development	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Reproductive, Maternal, New born and child health	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<b>RIO Convention markers</b>	<b>Not targeted</b>	<b>Significant objective</b>	<b>Main objective</b>
	Biological diversity	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Combat desertification	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change mitigation	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change adaptation	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>9. Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC) thematic flagships</b>	<p>Spotlight Initiative to eliminate violence against women and girls</p>			
<b>10. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)</b>	<p>Main SDG 16: Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies;</p> <p>Secondary SDG 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere; SDG 5: Gender Equality</p>			

<b>SUMMARY</b>
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Efforts to bring about a sustainable and inclusive end to Myanmar/Burma's decades long civil war commenced in 2011 under the previous nominally-civilian Government. Initially, bilateral ceasefire agreements were signed with 14 of the 16 Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs). Multilateral negotiations were also undertaken for a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), which was signed in October 2015 by the Government, the Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) and eight EAOs (out of 16 EAOs that were part of the negotiating team). The EU co-signed the NCA as a formal witness to the peace process. In February 2018 two additional smaller EAOs joined the NCA.

Since the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK), swept to victory in historic democratic elections in 2015, the peace process and national reconciliation efforts have repeatedly been declared as the top priority for the Government. Nevertheless, significant challenges remain to finding a lasting political settlement to ethnic and inter-communal conflicts. The evanescent implementation of the NCA as well as progress in advancing a comprehensive political dialogue has been slow to materialise. Progress in the national political dialogue process has been limited and contested. Peace efforts are being undermined by intensified fighting in several ethnic states and involving both NCA-signatory and non-signatory EAOs.

Since taking up office, the Government has taken some initiatives to address the serious inter-communal tensions, in particular between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State. In August 2017, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) staged coordinated attacks on security installations in Rakhine State. The incident was met with disproportionate use of force by the armed forces, which resulted in a new displacement of more than 800,000 Rohingya from northern Rakhine State into Bangladesh, drawing widespread international attention.

The overall objective of this action is to contribute to lasting peace and national reconciliation, security, stability and sustainable development in Myanmar/Burma. The action aims at providing support to peace process stakeholders to continue nationally-led peace negotiations and progress on the formal implementation of the NCA, including the ceasefire monitoring mechanism and the national political dialogue. Additionally, this action aims at providing support to displaced populations and host communities by strengthening the humanitarian-development-peace/security nexus, linking relief with rehabilitation and socio-economic recovery (LRRD) in conflict-affected areas and protracted situations of displacement and inter-communal violence. Simultaneously, the precarious situation of women and girls affected by sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) will be addressed.

The EU intends to further increase aid effectiveness in the area of peace through an additional contribution to the Joint Peace Fund (JPF<sup>2</sup>), delivering coordinated international financial and technical assistance to the peace processes. The action will aim at women's meaningful participation in the implementation and monitoring of the ceasefire agreement (NCA), further peace negotiations, peace-building and reconciliation. The systematic integration of gender perspectives on making the peace process more inclusive and peace agreements and outcomes more sustainable. As part of the support for socio-economic recovery in conflict-affected areas, a strong emphasis will be given to Rakhine State in order to alleviate inter-communal tensions and address serious human rights concerns.

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<sup>2</sup> Implemented by UNOPS, the JPF was set up in December 2015. For more details see sections 1.1 and 3.2 - <https://www.jointpeacefund.org/>.

# 1 CONTEXT

## 1.1 Sector/Country/Regional context/Thematic area

### Political, economic and social situation

Following more than fifty years of military rule, Myanmar/Burma has embarked upon a remarkable transition in 2011, followed by historic democratic elections in November 2015 and the accession to power of the NLD-led Government in April 2016. From the beginning of the reform process, the EU, alongside other international partners, has been providing support to this multi-dimensional transition in a spirit of cooperation and partnership. However, Myanmar/Burma continues to face considerable challenges in achieving inclusive and sustainable peace and addressing serious human rights concerns, as illustrated by continued fighting in ethnic areas and the recent Rohingya exodus into Bangladesh following reports of serious human rights abuses by the armed forces in Rakhine State.

With regards to core international human rights conventions, Myanmar/Burma has ratified CEDAW, CRC, CRPD and most recently ICESCR<sup>3</sup>. In November 2017, CEDAW requested the government to submit an *"Exceptional Report on the Situation of Women and Girls from Northern Rakhine State"* by 28 May 2018. It is only the fourth time an exceptional report has been requested by the Committee since holding its first session in October 1982. The Committee called for information concerning cases of sexual violence, including rape, against Rohingya women and girls by security forces; and to provide details on the number of women and girls who have been killed or have died due to other non-natural causes during the latest outbreak of violence. It also requested information on investigations, arrests, prosecutions, convictions and sentences or disciplinary measures imposed on perpetrators, including members of the armed forces, found guilty of such crimes. Myanmar/Burma did not present the aforementioned report by the deadline. The Government sent a draft report to CSOs for consultation purposes in July 2018, and is expected to submit the final report to CEDAW in August 2018. Regarding further reporting obligations on the implementation of international human rights conventions, Myanmar/Burma has so far failed to submit the latest CRC report, which was due in February 2017, as well as the latest CRC-OP-SC<sup>4</sup> report, which was due in February 2014. Myanmar/Burma's latest Universal Periodic Review (UPR) took place in November 2015, one week after the general elections. Out of the 281 recommendations, Myanmar/Burma accepted 124, 88 would be examined and 69 noted. Its mid-term report, due in May 2018, is yet to be submitted. Myanmar/Burma's accession to core international human rights conventions has been on the agenda of all four EU-Myanmar Human Rights Dialogues since 2014, which were led by the EU Special Representative for Human Rights.

### Sector context: policies and challenges in the peace process

Myanmar/Burma is one of the world's most heterogeneous countries in terms of ethnicity and religion with 135 officially recognized ethno-linguistic groups. Since the earliest years of independence through to the present day, the country has faced intra-ethnic tensions and conflict. Post-colonial Myanmar/Burma has never been at peace or entirely under central Government control. During the 1960s-1980s, several EAOs were able to carve out

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<sup>3</sup> CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; CRC: Convention on the Rights of the Child, CRPD: Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; ICESCR: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

<sup>4</sup> CRC-OP-SC: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography

effectively independent micro-states with their own governments, service provision and foreign policies, and this remains the case in certain areas. Myanmar/Burma's transition necessarily involves simultaneous comprehensive legal, economic and democratic reforms.

The NCA, a text agreed by all negotiating parties (Government, Tatmadaw and 16 EAOs) in March 2015, continues to provide the main path for Myanmar/Burma's peace process. However, only ten out of 16 EAOs involved with negotiating the text have so far signed the NCA. Crucially, around 80% of ethnic armed combatants remain outside the formal peace process.

The NCA envisages a peace architecture comprised of a tripartite (Government, Tatmadaw and EAO) Joint Implementation Committee Meeting (JICM) as the highest joint decision-making mechanism. Two major committees then lead the process at the Union level, with the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC-U) and the tripartite Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC), with the latter leading and coordinating a multi-year national political dialogue process. Membership includes Government representatives, EAOs and members of political parties who won seats in the 2015 election. The Tatmadaw is currently focused on the JMC-U, whilst the NLD leads in the UPDJC.

The NLD has declared peace and national reconciliation as one of its top priorities. The State Counsellor's Ministry led by ASSK is the focal ministry and a Peace Commission (PC) was established to lead negotiations with signatory and non-signatory EAOs. The Peace Commission has separate subcommittees for negotiation with NCA-signatory and non-signatory EAOs. In 2016, the Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC<sup>5</sup>) was dismantled and replaced by the National Reconciliation and Peace Centre (NRPC). Unlike the MPC, the NRPC is a governmental institution under the State Counsellor's Ministry. It serves as the Secretariat to the Peace Commission. The NRPC functions as a new institution in terms of staff and premises and despite financial and technical support provided by the EU through the JPF, their capacities remain quite weak. NCA-signatory EAOs are today represented by the Peace Process Steering Team (PPST) and the Peace Process Working Team (PPWT), with a secretariat office based in Yangon<sup>6</sup>. During 2017, evolving ethnic alliances have produced an increasingly fragmented landscape of ethnic armed actors bound together in shifting alliances. The United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC<sup>7</sup>) – a four-member non-signatory bloc – has been in periodic negotiations with the Government since the NCA was signed<sup>8</sup>. Their demands largely relate to assurances on the structure of the JMC and potential role of

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<sup>5</sup> The MPC, funded by the EU since its inception with a total of EUR 8.5 million, was a quasi-governmental institution that acted as the Secretariat to the previous Government's Chief Negotiator. Support was provided to formal and informal negotiations, and meetings with diverse stakeholders. Between 2012 and 2016, the MPC supported on average 75 dialogues/meetings per month.

<sup>6</sup> Financial and technical support to NCA-S EAO peace process participation and the establishment and running costs of the NCA-S EAO Office is being provided by the JPF. The PPST/PPWT members are: All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABDSF), Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), Chin National Front (CNF), the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), the Karen National Union (KNU), KNU/Karen National Liberation Army-Peace Council (KNU/KNLA-PC), Pa-O National Liberation Organisation (PNLO) and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS). The two recent signatories that joined the NCA, the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) have not formally joined this office yet, although they will probably do so in the coming months.

<sup>7</sup> Founded in 2011, the UNFC is an umbrella of various non-signatory groups. In 2017, the UNFC started to disintegrate after months of internal tensions over whether to sign the NCA. During 2017, the Kachin Independent Army (KIA), Wa National Organisation (WNO) and the Shan State Progressive Party (SSPP) formally requested to withdraw their membership, leaving only the Arakan National Council (ANC), the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) in the formerly seven-member alliance.

<sup>8</sup> Financial and technical support to UNFC EAO peace process participation is being provided by the JPF.

internationals. In February 2018, the NMSP and LDU signed the NCA, decreasing the role and negotiating position of other UNFC members. Meanwhile, a parallel seven-member non-signatory alliance, the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) was formed and led by the powerful United Wa State Army (UWSA). It includes the outlawed Northern Alliance of four EAOs currently engaged in active conflict with the Tatmadaw<sup>9</sup>.

The agreed Framework for Political Dialogue (FPD) outlines a multi-layered process, with national and subnational consultation and dialogue processes led by different actors (including Government, political parties and EAOs). Union Peace Conferences (UPC) are periodically convened as part of the national political dialogue process to agree on policy options for inclusion in the Union Peace Accord (UPA), which will eventually form the basis of Constitutional change. Since January 2016, three UPCs have been convened, with the last one held in July 2018. China plays a pivotal role in the peace process and has an influential position in Myanmar/Burma's wider transition efforts.

In advance of the UPC, pilot national dialogues are held in several states and regions of Myanmar/Burma, organised by EAOs, Government, local authorities and also jointly by the UPDJC. A first CSO Forum was also convened in February 2017. There are several challenges, including in gaining permissions for some ethnic-based dialogues. Nevertheless, these subnational consultation and dialogue events represent the commencement of a critical aspect of the national political dialogue process in Myanmar/Burma.

As regards the NCA-implementation more broadly, there is growing disillusionment on the part of a number of signatory EAOs. Lack of joint decision-making, barriers to national dialogues and limited progress in the development of interim arrangements are all key concerns. Without careful management, these simmering inter- and intra-ethnic divisions threaten to jeopardise future negotiations and the sustainability of existing and future ceasefires, peace agreements and implementation mechanisms. There is also a need to address serious inclusion concerns with regards to national dialogues, women, youth and civil society participation. This is an area which requires substantial investment in capacity development of participants and the groups they represent (including achieving a 30% gender quota agreed to at the first UPC). The capacity of key actors remains low and development of key peace process support and implementation mechanisms remains nascent.

As the most inclusive and supported multilateral negotiation process in Myanmar/Burma to date, the NCA process remains a significant opportunity to establish a comprehensive and sustainable settlement to conflict, including robust joint ceasefire monitoring mechanisms at national, state and local levels. However, an inclusive and meaningful political dialogue process in Myanmar/Burma would likely need to last many years to enable the substantive participation of a broader spectrum of stakeholders than were involved in NCA negotiations as well as greater breadth and depth of discussion on key issues.

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<sup>9</sup> The seven northern groups are operating under the umbrella of the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultation Committee (FPNCC). Originally, the FPNCC made it clear that it pursues a different ceasefire and political process but will not sign the NCA without proposed changes. Following a series of meetings with the Chinese Special Envoy and the Peace Commission, a strategic move forward from the current deadlock in negotiations with the Government and Tatmadaw cannot be excluded. The FPNCC EAO groups are: the Arakan Army (AA), Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/KIA), Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA/ Kokang), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA/Mongla), SSPP and United Wa State Party/Army (UWSP/UWSA).

## **Sector context: Rakhine State**

The situation in Rakhine State poses one of the greatest challenges to Myanmar/Burma's democratic transition. The Rohingya are a Muslim minority group who reside in Rakhine State. Full citizenship for the Rohingya remains highly controversial in Myanmar/Burma. Successive Governments have labelled the population as 'Bengali' to stress their alleged foreign origin, and neither Rohingya nor Bengali is included among the country's 135 officially recognised distinct ethnic groups<sup>10</sup>.

The plight of the stateless Rohingya population has been the focus of renewed international attention during 2017 and 2018. On 25 August 2017 – months after their initial emergence in October 2016 – ARSA launched attacks on 30 Border Guard Police (BGP) posts and an army base. These attacks were swiftly followed by a severe military response which did not discriminate between militants and civilians and included clearance operations and widespread burning of villages. This was orchestrated by the Tatmadaw, BGP and ethnic Rakhine civilians. Human rights groups have documented numerous unlawful killings, rape and other forms of sexual violence against women and children, widespread burning of tens of thousands of Rohingya homes and other structures. This builds on the structural discrimination and previous chapters of violence and instability in the history of the Rohingya in Rakhine State<sup>11</sup>. To date more than 800,000 Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh. They are housed in rapidly growing and overstretched camps near Cox's Bazar, creating a major humanitarian crisis. Large scale returns are not considered likely in the short-term, nor is this considered advisable (see risks section). This results in significant needs in Bangladesh as well as Myanmar/Burma for the foreseeable future. Approximately 320,000 Muslims remain in central Rakhine State (many of whom are Rohingya); 120,000 remain confined to camps since violence in 2012. These populations are extremely vulnerable to resurgence in inter-communal tensions as anti-Muslim sentiment is rife. Current needs of the remaining populations in northern Rakhine State centre on food, protection, health, education, water and sanitation.

In August 2016, a Rakhine Advisory Commission (RAC), chaired by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was set up by the Government. The RAC released a final report<sup>12</sup> endorsed by the Government on 24 August 2017 (the day before the ARSA attacks triggered the most recent wave of violence and displacement). The report includes recommendations on economic and social development, citizenship, freedom of movement, humanitarian access, discrimination and segregation. Since 2016, a number of committees have also been established to address conditions in Rakhine State. In May 2016, the Government established a Central Committee on Implementation of Peace and Development in Rakhine State, chaired by ASSK, with a mandate to work on issues related to security and citizenship. In December

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<sup>10</sup> In many ways, the listed 135 official groups form the benchmark for official participation in the peace process. This further separates the conflict in Rakhine State from other conflict resolution processes in Myanmar/Burma. There is currently minimal appetite from any groups, including EAOs and civil society, for increased alignment of the processes.

<sup>11</sup> In 2012, intercommunal violence broke out between Buddhist Rakhine and Muslim Rohingya communities and left some 240 people dead and 140,000 people displaced and living in IDP camps. Violence targeting other Muslim citizens spread to other parts of the country in 2013 and tensions further increased in 2014 after the alleged killing of 48 Rohingya by security forces. Serious concerns remain about the rise of hate speech, often instigated and led by radical nationalist Buddhists. In October 2016, tensions in Rakhine increased following attacks on Border Guard Police (BGP) posts in northern Rakhine State by ARSA. In response, State security operations were deployed in several townships with large Rohingya populations. At this time some 75,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh. Some 1,000 people were reportedly killed during these security clearance operations.

<sup>12</sup> [http://www.rakhinecommission.org/app/uploads/2017/08/FinalReport\\_Eng.pdf](http://www.rakhinecommission.org/app/uploads/2017/08/FinalReport_Eng.pdf)

2016, the Government announced the establishment of a Union-level Commission of Inquiry into alleged human rights violations and abuses by the military and security forces. The first report of the Commission of Inquiry stated that there was no evidence to verify reports of human rights abuses. Continued lack of access has prevented any independent verification but satellite imagery analysis, alongside eyewitness interviews collected by international rights groups, suggest systematic destruction of property in villages. In November 2017 Myanmar/Burma and Bangladesh signed a repatriation agreement stating that returns must be voluntary. However, the situation on the ground is not yet conducive for return, due to a lack of security and absence of clarity on legal status. As a result, large-scale long-term confinement of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh's camps is a likely scenario. This would create significant pressures on Bangladesh and poses risks for regional relations and global security including radicalisation and violent extremism.

The EU-tabled resolution to the UN Human Rights Council of March 2017<sup>13</sup> decided to dispatch an independent and impartial international fact-finding mission to establish the facts and circumstances of alleged grave human rights violations by military and security forces in particular in Rakhine State. The Myanmar/Burma Government has not granted the mission access to the country.

In October 2017, the Government announced the creation of a national fund for Rakhine State under the direction of ASSK, the Union Enterprise for Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement and Development (UEHRD). The role of the UEHRD is to work with different ministries in line with the recommendations of the RAC, to provide humanitarian assistance, and to promote resettlement and socio-economic development. The fund has reportedly so far received more than USD 20 million from domestic (predominantly private sector) sources. The UEHRD's focus has so far been on infrastructure and food security. There is currently no formal coordination mechanism between the UEHRD and the international community. Some development partners (notably Asian donors) have made direct cash or in-kind contributions to the UEHRD.

The EU and other development partners continue to assess carefully the situation, seeking to evaluate responses in a range of scenarios and take a long-term approach to tackling the underlying political, social and economic drivers of conflict in Rakhine State. To this end, coordinated by the UN Humanitarian/Resident Coordinator and keeping the RAC recommendations as main reference, development partners have formulated the "Strategic Framework for International Engagement in Rakhine". It is still unclear how the framework will be operationalised, but most likely a common initiative/action (possibly a Multi-Donor Trust Fund) will be sought.

There remains a significant trust deficit in many Rakhine State communities regarding support from western development partners, which is often perceived to only address the needs of the Rohingya. An increasingly widespread strand of popular nationalism has been strengthened by events in 2017 which raises concerns for future inter-communal violence and has potential negative spill over effects for the ongoing peace process. Meanwhile, the backdrop of the 2020 elections raises the chances that development assistance in Rakhine State will be used as a tool of the government to win support from Rakhine communities. Combined, the international community faces challenges in providing needs-driven support in

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<sup>13</sup> <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G17/073/88/PDF/G1707388.pdf?OpenElement>

Rakhine State that minimises the risk of ‘doing harm’. A highly flexible and responsive approach will therefore be required during 2018 and beyond.

### **Sector context: development in the ethnic areas**

Ethnic areas consistently demonstrate lower levels of development across a range of indicators. This action therefore seeks to support the delivery of basic services (peace dividends) and implement confidence-building activities in conflict affected areas. Myanmar/Burma continues to have large IDP populations, some of which are the result of long term displacement and escalation of conflict. Estimates suggest that as of January 2018 there are 241,000 IDPs in camps or camp-like situations due to armed conflict and inter-communal violence in the ethnic states. The need for broader development is also pressing, not least to address long-held grievances regarding inequality between central and more remote areas mainly inhabited by ethnic nationalities. Prior to the surge in Rohingya refugees since August 2017, there were 479,706 refugees in neighbouring countries, many of whom remain to be resettled, integrated or voluntarily returned to Myanmar/Burma. As of March 2018, there are 99,886 verified refugees from Myanmar/Burma residing in Thailand.

The situation in the south-east (Kayah, Kayin, Mon and Tanintharyi) is considered more stable (although recent fighting has occurred between the Army and the KNU). A mixture of NCA signatory and non-signatory EAOs is operational in these areas. This is the region from where the majority of the Myanmar/Burma refugees in Thailand originate. Numerous international and national NGOs are implementing community-level activities and livelihood and rehabilitation support in the areas of return. As a signal of positive socio-political and security developments within Myanmar/Burma spontaneous returns began in October 2016, although numbers are still very low.

As of January 2018, an estimated 120,00 people remained displaced in Kachin and northern Shan States, with many of the displaced (about 43% in Kachin State) residing in areas outside of Government control with limited humanitarian access. In north-eastern Myanmar/Burma, the situation has become protracted and remains tense and volatile with continuing conflict triggering further displacement.

The lack of livelihood opportunities is a major challenge for IDPs in camps in non-Government controlled areas. Several communities rely solely on humanitarian and development aid to survive. This perpetuates a lack of food security, and increased protection risks as food purchase and income generation often requires cross-border travel to China and force IDPs to take higher risks. Local organizations are underfunded and struggle to respond to new displacements. Limited livelihood opportunities, labour market saturation, market fluctuation and the unpredictable nature of the conflict result in extremely fragile livelihoods and low levels of resilience. Continued close proximity of armed personnel (Tatmadaw and EAOs) to civilians also creates serious continued protection concerns. These include lack of access to humanitarian services, gender-based violence, forced recruitment including of children, forced labour, lack of documentation, land grabbing, human trafficking and serious risks associated with landmines.

#### **1.1.1 Public Policy Assessment and EU Policy Framework**

The Council conclusions of the EU for Myanmar in 2016 sets the framework for EU policy and support to the ongoing reforms in the country. The EU has pledged to support the peace process on all sides and has established a regular political dialogue involving all concerned stakeholders to a) achieve sustainable peace in Myanmar/Burma by addressing longstanding



differences in an inclusive way; b) consolidate democratic achievements, including gender equality; c) strengthen human rights and the rule of law; and d) adhere to international agreements.

The Council conclusions of October 2017 further reconfirmed the EU and its Member States' strong engagement to support the country's democratic transition, peace, national reconciliation and socio-economic development. However, the conclusions also underlined human rights concerns, particularly related to harm to civilians in Rakhine State. The conclusions reiterated EU readiness to support the government of Myanmar/Burma in the swift and full implementation of the recommendations of the RAC. Most recently, Council conclusions were published in February 2018 in response to continued lack of progress in resolving the Rohingya crisis. In April 2018, the EU's arms embargo was further strengthened and targeted restrictive measures imposed on senior military officers involved with human rights violations in Rakhine State.

The EU firmly supports gender equality and empowerment of women worldwide. The "Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment: Transforming the Lives of Girls and Women through EU External Relations (2016-2020)" (renewed Gender Action Plan) guides transformative EU action on gender. The Spotlight Initiative focuses attention on eliminating all forms of violence against women and girls.

#### **1.1.2 Stakeholder analysis**

- In April 2016 the NLD-led **Government** has taken overall responsibility for the peace process. However, the new NRPC lacks capacity and experience for conducting credible negotiations with all EAOs. The forthcoming elections scheduled for 2020 will increasingly provide an important backdrop for domestic politics, including as regards the relationships between the civilian Government, the Tatmadaw and the EAOs. Events in both the peace process and Rakhine State have evidenced the internal power struggles that are one of the greatest threats to the country's stability moving forward. The creation of a Government-chaired committee to implement the RAC recommendations exemplifies ongoing efforts by the NLD Government to exert control over the situation.
- The **Tatmadaw** is a key actor in the peace process and national politics. They continue to hold 25% of Parliamentary seats, three critical Government ministries and several key powers under the 2008 Constitution. They also form part of Government delegations in major peace process bodies. Local commanders have been closely involved in the negotiation of bilateral ceasefires in their areas, and senior generals were part of the negotiations of the NCA. Traditionally, the Tatmadaw has perceived itself as the sole guarantor of national unity and sovereignty, and has historically been adamantly opposed to any discussion on federalism, which it perceives as a threat to Myanmar/Burma's territorial integrity. In this context, commitments at the UPC to a federal democratic union are significant. Nevertheless, the unwillingness to discuss details or alternative wording from the 2008 Constitution is symptomatic of their ongoing resistance to structural change required to reach a lasting negotiated settlement to conflict. During 2017, the role of the Tatmadaw and security forces in committing acts of violence and human rights abuses in Rakhine has drawn widespread international condemnation. Domestically however, the events and reactions have conversely generated a resurgence of support for the Tatmadaw.
- There are more than 16 major **EAOs** (excluding a significant number of smaller splinter groups and ethnic-based militias), 10 of which have signed the NCA. The EAOs' goals vary greatly, as does their strength and local support. During the two years of NCA

negotiations, important progress was made in shaping a common negotiating position. However, the previous mobilization by 16 EAOs to negotiate as a block was compromised following differing strategies and the partial signing of the NCA by only eight groups. This fostered an environment of reduced trust between groups and has created different levels of participation requirements and eligibility. Signatory and non-signatory EAOs have different status. Seven non-signatory EAOs have engaged in separate bilateral peace negotiations with the Government and in April 2017, the FPNCC, which includes the militarily most powerful groups and the majority of those that remain in active conflict. The FPNCC position is that it will not sign the NCA as it stands as they seek to negotiate certain amendments. There have been no formal negotiations between the Government and the FPNCC to date. Different UPCs have included participation of different non-signatory groups, but never in a decision-making capacity. As a result, two years of NCA implementation, and over 20 months of national political dialogue have occurred in the absence of many EAOs. This has potentially negative implications for the inclusivity and sustainability of agreements already reached as part of the UPA.

- **Political parties** have so far had limited formal involvement in the peace process and were largely absent from ceasefire negotiations. However, they have been participating in all UPCs. Several ethnic political parties have close links to EAOs, but there is also a competition element. Ethnic political parties were not able to realise significant gains during the November 2015 elections due to the 'First-past-the-post' electoral system. Ethnic political parties do not necessarily represent EAOs (signatory or non-signatory) but do sometimes represent the interests and grievances of ethnic communities in their respective areas. Substantive involvement and participation of representatives of a wide range of political parties (elected or otherwise) in subnational dialogues is also important. Political parties are relatively under-resourced in comparison to other stakeholders, thereby limiting their substantive participation in the political dialogue process.
- Many ethnic **civil society organisations** are working with EAOs, particularly in support of social service delivery and other support for local communities. Meanwhile they can challenge the top-down, authoritarian structures of EAOs and, in this respect, play a critical role in local democratisation processes. This is particularly the case for a number of well-established and effective ethnic women's organisations, such as those included in the Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process (AGIPP). The current format for formal civil society participation in the political dialogue process is relatively constrained. CSOs are key for other areas related to resettlement, reconstruction and social development in ethnic areas.
- Local **ethnic communities** have suffered immensely from the armed conflicts and are a major driver of the push for peace. In some areas, EAOs enjoy significant popular legitimacy; yet in others local communities generally resent all armed groups. Regarding the situation of the **Rohingya** minority, during 2017 widespread public and national media support for anti-Muslim sentiment has grown as well as support for the actions of the Government and Tatmadaw, including amongst non-Bamar communities. Moderate voices are limited in public discourse although promisingly there have been some important statements by CSOs on civilian protection concerns in Rakhine State.

### **1.1.3 Priority areas for support/problem analysis**

Despite the NCA and other bilateral agreements, a high degree of ethnic-religious tension persists. Implementation of the NCA since October 2015 has resulted in the establishment of

various structures (UPDJC, JMC) whose proper implementation needs to be strengthened and improved at all levels. Ongoing support through the JPF to strengthen conflict parties' administrative capacities remains necessary, as well as building technical knowledge and soft skills to effectively develop strategies, negotiate and enable evidence-based policy making.

The national peace architecture has a very limited participation of women. The quota of 30% women's participation in the UPC has not yet been met. This action targets women's rights in the peace process, carefully taking into consideration the priorities of women, boys and girls. Increased participation of women at all levels (track I and II) and the role of women in conflict mediation and peace negotiations will be addressed through different ways with this action.

Other aspects will be also tackled with this action such as gender equality and women's and girls' rights and empowerment; prohibition of Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV) and an end to impunity for perpetration by parties to the conflict; treatment of sexual violence committed after the ceasefire agreement as a breach; attention to gender issues in IDP camps and in reintegration; increased substantive participation of women and youth in political dialogue processes at the national and subnational level; women's equal representation with men in decision-making roles at conflict and ceasefire monitoring, early warning, and early response mechanisms; peace-building, reconciliation and equal representation with men in decision-making roles in political dialogue mechanisms and the systematic development and use of gender analysis across national and international support to the peace process.

Meanwhile, high level of SGBV against girls and women is seen as likely to continue by remaining Rohingya in Myanmar/Burma and Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. An increase in forced and risky abortions is also likely for women who were raped during the period of the violence and clearance operations. This will require support to programs addressing physical and psycho-social trauma, to prevent and protect from further violence to take place and to address the issues of stigma related to sexual violence and the situation and legal status for the children born out of rape. Gender perspectives will need to be systematically mainstreamed across all support to Rakhine State. Interventions addressing violence against women and girls in Rakhine communities also require continued support. Assistance for any credible repatriation process of refugees from Bangladesh should also be addressed with this action and based upon gender analysis.

In Myanmar/Burma, inter-communal tensions remain high and anti-Muslim sentiment in particular has grown in 2017. For this reason, few moderate voices remain, the space for even limited public dialogue of these issues has reduced and interfaith dialogue faces many challenges. Ongoing denial of any wrongdoing by the military and security forces and the government's resistance to allow independent investigations into alleged human rights abuses are particularly worrying and increasingly affecting international relations. Any transformation of the Buddhist nationalist discourse has to come from within. Following the spike in tensions and violence, nuanced social cohesion approaches are required. There is also a need for trust building between government and communities and intra- and inter-communal dialogue among various parties. Civil society, in particularly Rakhine civil society, is a critical actor for this.

The suffering of civilians and forced displacement of ethnic minorities by Myanmar/Burma's military goes beyond the human rights violations against the Rohingya Muslims. While approaching seven years of displacement and despite ongoing and often increasing needs, displaced persons in northern Myanmar/Burma face decreasing aid and protection services. This is also the case in other regions where better peace dividends are required. A strong

conflict sensitive approach will be applied to all projects funded under this action and a robust conflict analysis with a strong participatory approach will be required for each implementing partner funded under this action.

## 2 RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS

<b>Risks</b>	<b>Risk level (H/M/L)</b>	<b>Mitigating measures</b>
The peace process fails and has serious repercussions on the Government, particularly on the decentralisation process.	L	Momentum in the peace process will be maintained through mediation and conflict mitigation measures. A wide range of stakeholders will need to be involved in case this is required. At this time NCA-signatory EAOs, Government and Tatmadaw all continue to show a commitment to the process.
Further division between EAOs: The advantages associated with signing the NCA in terms of donor support, training, etc., but also the possibility of going forward with the political dialogue process, may further increase the divide between signatory and non-signatory groups.	M	2017 and early 2018 has shown that fragmentation of EAOs has not undermined efforts to negotiate for peace, however it has had implications for the future of the NCA. It also has an effect on the negotiating position of the EAOs, in particular those with less military strength. Support from the JPF to NCA signatory and non-signatory EAOs to maintain their peace process engagement is an important mitigation measure. The JPF grants also enable regular contact between the NCA signatories and some non-signatories. Mediation measures could also be explored, especially concerning inclusion of the FPNCC EAOs in formal peace process negotiations (China is currently leading this role).
The Government's approach to peace is dominated by fostering the expansion of economic development and service delivery to areas that are not under their control.	H	The approaching 2020 elections increase the risk that development assistance will be used as a means to win popular support by different actors. Donor support should explore protocols to govern interim arrangements in NCA-signatory areas in order to mitigate this.
Lack of commitment to gender equality, women's rights, protection and meaningful participation further marginalizes women in Myanmar/Burma, and leads to agreements that do not factor in the needs and realities of half the population.	H	Given that leadership in Government, EAOs and Myanmar/Burma society in general is dominated by men, few women have been elevated to decision-making positions. Mitigating measures include: a) action on women meaningful participation in peace process and gender based violence; b) JPF commitment to 15% of all its funding being directed towards actions and activities focussed on gender; c) systematically setting the integration of gender perspective and analysis targets across all EU peace funding.

Weak capacity of national actors, including the Government, EAOs, political parties and CSOs results in major constraints for the implementation of the peace process.	H	Capacity gaps exist on all sides, but are more pronounced amongst those stakeholders that were historically under-resourced (EAOs and political parties). Combining technical support with capacity building and soft skills trainings is essential. A priority for all sides is increasing capacity to engage in evidence-informed policymaking. Careful attention should be paid when selecting implementing partners.
Government responses in Rakhine State are either heavily constrained by the military, or results in a breakdown in civil-military relations in Myanmar/Burma.	M	There have been very few meetings between ASSK and the Commander-in-Chief since August 2017. A number of forthcoming processes will require cooperation between the Government and Tatmadaw (i.e. UN fact finding mission, implementation of the RAC recommendations and repatriation of Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh). Alongside financial and technical assistance, diplomatic engagement with both the civilian Government and the military will be essential.
Increased tensions and anti-Muslim sentiments lead to intercommunal violence in Rakhine State or Myanmar/Burma.	H	Since the crisis in northern Rakhine State there has been a relatively high risk of intercommunal violence in central Rakhine State (where some Rohingya remain) and in other areas of Myanmar/Burma (where anti-Muslim sentiment is high). As mitigation, the EU will permanently use conflict sensitivity measures and conflict sensitivity analysis across its portfolio and will remain flexible to adapt support as the context evolves.
Continued or renewed armed conflict and/or intercommunal violence in some areas could make it impossible to deliver the kind of peace-support envisioned by this action.	M	Renewed efforts may be required to promote the humanitarian-development nexus in the affected areas, as well as to any new IDPs or refugees. It will also be essential to monitor assistance given to any repatriated refugees. Returns to northern Rakhine State will increase the risk of intercommunal violence in those areas. There is also the risk that international support to Government-led responses in Rakhine State inadvertently supports further human rights abuses. Advocacy measures for improving access from development and humanitarian actors should continue in order to provide services effectively.
Future ARSA attacks lead to renewed conflict in Rakhine State.	L	Analysts predict major ARSA attacks as unlikely but not impossible. The protracted displacement to overstretched camps in Bangladesh could provide a base for a regrouped effort. The EU should utilise

		accurate intelligence with the aim to mitigate any rise in violent extremism.
Further security activities, investigations and vetting by security forces in Rakhine State perpetuate further human rights abuses against the Rohingya.	M	Whilst the majority of the Rohingya population has now left Rakhine State, the potential for repatriation raises concerns for further action by security forces in the name of 'anti-terrorism'. The EU's support during 2018 must be highly flexible and responsive to the context and complemented with high-level talks with key actors.
<b>Assumptions</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It is implicitly assumed that more key EAOs will join the NCA, which in turn will establish the confidence on all sides needed to move forward with an inclusive National Political Dialogue and an inclusive Peace Accord.</li> <li>• The Government remains committed to the implementation of previously-endorsed recommendations of the RAC.</li> <li>• The Government will cooperate constructively with development partners allowing the reforms to progress effectively and efficiently with international funding to support a peaceful transition.</li> </ul>		

### 3 LESSONS LEARNT, COMPLEMENTARITY AND CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

#### 3.1 Lessons learnt

- **Be realistic about what international aid can accomplish in the peace process.** External actors can support but should not lead transitions to peace and intercommunal reconciliation, as these processes must be locally owned. Meanwhile, lower trust in traditional international donors and an increase in the role of non-traditional actors further limit the political and technical influence of the EU and Member States.
- **Diversify aid modality methods and implementing partners.** In line with OECD best practice in Transition Financing, various possible tools and aid modalities will have to co-exist in order to achieve a shared and common goal. Combining multiple aid delivery methods (Multi-Donor Trust Funds, bilateral grants and direct technical assistance) is the best possible way for achieving a high number of goals simultaneously. Similarly, the JPF cannot respond to all challenges faced by the peace process and the intercommunal violence and therefore, bilateral projects can sometimes be more efficient than working exclusively through a Multi-Donor Trust Fund.
- **Improve the humanitarian–development–peace nexus.** Aid systems in Myanmar/Burma are traditionally compartmentalised, with strong divisions between humanitarian and development systems. This limits effectiveness in protracted situations of displacement like Rakhine, Kachin and Northern Shan States. International actors in Myanmar/Burma should adopt a long-term, non-linear approach to the peace process and the intercommunal violence. Quick wins are difficult to achieve.
- **Foster interactions between EAOs and Government representatives at all levels, avoiding support to peace elite negotiations only.** This can strengthen mutual trust and confidence among various actors in localised contested areas. If Government and EAOs are both committed to any particular political reform, momentum can be built between critical partners.

- **Promote tangible benefits for people in conflict affected zones.** Recognising the highly-localised needs across Myanmar/Burma's diverse geographical and political landscape is important for delivering effective support to populations and achieving transformative outcomes. Programming approaches, aid modalities and implementing partner selection needs to match the contexts and needs in different ethnic areas and difference parts of Rakhine State. This includes implementing activities in various local languages to ensure relevance and accessibility.
- **Recognise the critical role of gender in addressing fragility.** Better analysis of women's engagement in the peace process as well as documentation of the impact of conflict on women (such as SGBV) can help to address the attention required for various gender issues. At this time, peace process parties also require significant support to operationalise their gender commitments, and to increasingly be held accountable for realising their verbal commitments.
- **Adapt to the specific participation constraints of beneficiaries.** Programmes aimed at women can face specific implementation constraints. In particular, the availability of beneficiaries in conflict areas and Rakhine State can be particularly challenging for women who also engage in income generation activities and domestic duties. Implementing partners can adjust programming to address these barriers, for instance by providing childcare during activities.
- **There is a need to engage more with non-traditional partners.** In both the peace process and support to Rakhine State, the roles of China, ASEAN nations, India and Japan is increasingly important. Substantial financial commitments from Myanmar/Burma's (predominantly ethnic Bamar) private sector have been made to support the peace process and Rakhine. Lack of engagement and coordination between OECD donors and non-traditional actors risks undermining transformational outcomes and conflict sensitive approaches. Ongoing engagement efforts need to be strengthened and reinforced.

### 3.2 Complementarity, synergy and donor coordination

In 2016, the Government announced the formation of a Joint Coordination Body (JCB) for peace process funding. Membership of the JCB includes Government, Tatmadaw, NCA signatory and non-signatory EAOs. It is currently the only formal body where all these parties are represented and have decision-making power. Nevertheless, the JCB is not fully operational and has not provided coherent or jointly agreed strategic priorities to the international community. Many elements of the JCB mandate, structure and process remain to be defined and jointly agreed by the parties. The JCB has not formally met since February 2017 and is not functioning as a joint mechanism.

The most sophisticated instrument for aligned support to the peace process is the **Joint Peace Fund (JPF)**, which was established in November 2015 as a multi-donor platform to provide coordinated support to the peace process. Whilst the JPF governance structure was at one time envisioned to include EAOs and Government, the only functioning body at the governance structure is the Fund Board, which currently comprises representatives from contributing donor countries. Until now, the JCB body has replaced the High Level Committee (HLC) that was foreseen under the initial JPF governance structure. During this period, the JPF has funded multiple activities such as the UPCs, support to the NRPC, UPDJC, NCA-signatory

and some non-signatory EAOs and their office structures, technical assistance to the JMC<sup>14</sup> and has appraised a significant amount of peacebuilding proposals whose operational activities have started recently. The main goal of the JPF is to provide long-term support to national efforts in order to achieve a final and sustainable settlement to ethnic armed conflict. With more than USD 100 million pledged by eleven donors and USD 76 million committed so far, the JPF is supporting the participation of the national parties to the NCA, working through the agreements, structures and processes determined by them. The JPF is highly adaptable and flexible.

There are two main groups seeking to coordinate international support to the peace process in Myanmar/Burma:

- The **Peace Support Group** (PSG) was initiated in 2012 at the request of the previous government to provide a common platform for dialogue between the Government and the donor community, and to better coordinate international support for the peace process. The PSG includes development partners active in supporting peace in Myanmar/Burma, as well as the UN and the World Bank. Most of the PSG members are active contributors to the JPF. The EU is a very active member of this group. Nonetheless under the current administration the role of the PSG has decreased;
- The **International Peace Support Group** (IPSG) is an informal coordination network of over 20 international NGOs (many of them funded by the EU), most of which provide expert analysis and/or capacity development in support of the peace process. It meets monthly, followed by a briefing to interested donors.

With respect to Rakhine State, the Government has taken some measures towards the implementation of a limited number of recommendations established in the RAC through the UEHRD (i.e. closure of some IDP camps and humanitarian access) but there is no clear prioritised, time-bound government work-plan to steer a systematic implementation process.

Another important contribution to social harmony in Myanmar/Burma is the Paung Sie Facility (PSF – previously known as the Peace Support Fund, funded by the United Kingdom, Sweden and Australia). From 2014-2016 the PSF provided funding to the peace process and inter-communal harmony. Its current goal is to enhance social cohesion by supporting locally driven, catalytic initiatives and ideas. Other prominent bilateral donors supporting peace are Norway, Japan, United States, United Kingdom, Australia and Switzerland. All of them are JPF contributors.

The World Bank, UN and EU are discussing a Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA) with a view to eventually develop a relief-to-recovery-to-development plan for Rakhine State that would help structure and prioritise the response across Government ministries and for all relevant stakeholders. The plan would also provide the foundation to mobilise technical and financial support from the international community.

The UN has prepared a Strategic Framework for International Engagement in Rakhine offering international partners a proposed framework towards principled and constructive engagement. This engagement is in support of all communities in Rakhine and in support of

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<sup>14</sup> The UN has set-up a Myanmar/Burma-based UN platform to serve as a conduit for international assistance to the JMC and provide coordinated financial, institutional and technical capacity building in support of the JMC's mandate and functions vis-à-vis the NCA. This local project structure is currently managed by UNDP Myanmar.



national and state institutions that are working to achieve a peaceful, fair and prosperous future for the people of Rakhine.

All EU interventions are closely coordinated with ECHO<sup>15</sup> and other relevant humanitarian actors (UK, US, AU, CH) in order to ensure the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, address the existing protracted displacement and gradually end dependence on humanitarian assistance by fostering self-reliance and enabling the displaced to live in dignity as contributors to their host societies, until voluntary return or resettlement options become possible.

The action intends to support phase 2 of the Women and Girls First programme, with phase 1 co-financed a.o. by AU, FI, IT, SE and UN, and implemented by UNFPA to protect the rights of the most vulnerable women and girls in Kachin, Kayin, Mon, Northern Shan and Rakhine States.

### **3.3 Cross-cutting issues**

As in many peace processes gender equality is one of the most prominent cross-cutting issues. A strong effort will be made both to encourage and support increased participation of women in peace negotiations and in decision-making bodies, and to ensure that gender issues, including violence against women, are properly addressed and in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and subsequent resolutions on Women, Peace and Security. A GBV component of the action will contribute to preventing and responding to violence perpetrated against women and girls in Myanmar/Burma, and to realizing their sexual and reproductive health and rights. Women and girls of childbearing age in Myanmar/Burma carry extraordinary burdens as deep poverty and gender discrimination are compounded by armed conflict and inter-communal violence. One more practical way to address these issues is to require implementing partners to demonstrate their proven track-record on incorporating gender aspects in peace support programmes. The EU will also set gender inclusion targets across all peace funding and support to Rakhine State and other ethnic areas. This action is consistent with the NSPAW 2013-2022, as well as the EU Gender Action Plan (GAP) 2016-2020. Detailed activities and approach on gender issues are further detailed in sections 1.1.3 and 4.

Few of the anticipated activities are likely to have significant environmental consequences, but this will be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Still, development as aimed for by this action includes economic development which will raise challenges in relation to environmental consequences as well as the management of and control over natural resources. Concerns of indigenous peoples and ethnic populations are considered through inclusive participatory planning. Ethnic communities will have the opportunity to design and develop proposals for interventions addressing their specific concerns.

Governance and human rights are overarching concerns while addressing ethnic grievances. The action will consider the status of the target groups as well as the concerns of the different ethnicities in the areas of intervention. Control over abundant natural resources and weak governance are among the root causes of the conflict.

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<sup>15</sup> Joint analysis, situational updates, assessments and interventions with ECHO (searching for LRRD connections) are being explored in most conflict-affected areas of the country and a Myanmar Nexus Plan of Action (NPoA) is under preparation.

## **4 DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION**

### **4.1 Objectives/results**

The overall objective of the action is to contribute to lasting peace, security, stability and sustainable development in Myanmar/Burma.

The specific objectives are:

1. Successive milestones of the peace process are reached, including effective progress in terms of women's participation in this process.
2. Improved socio-economic recovery in conflict-affected areas and areas affected by inter-communal violence with a special focus on gender.

Expected results:

Result 1.1: The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), or other inclusive negotiations for peace agreements, is effectively monitored by the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Mechanism (JMC).

Result 1.2: An inclusive national political dialogue process reaches a broad consensus on the key principles and elements of a comprehensive peace accord establishing a democratic federal union.

Result 2.1: Prompt, effective and efficient delivery of assistance for repatriation, recovery and gender-sensitive development in conflict-affected areas or areas affected by inter-communal tensions and violence.

This programme is relevant for the Agenda 2030. It contributes primarily to the progressive achievement of SDG Goal 16, but also promotes progress towards Goal 1. This does not imply a commitment by the country benefiting from this programme.

### **4.2 Main activities<sup>16</sup>**

Indicative activities for Result 1.1: (i) support for establishing new institutions or strengthening existing institutions required to monitor and sustain the ceasefires (JMC); (ii) support for the activities of these institutions, including training of staff, monitoring, liaising, conflict analysis and dispute resolution; (iii) provision of expert advice on the organisation and conduct of ceasefire monitoring; (iv) provision of international monitors/observers (as requested by relevant authorities); (v) gender and conflict analysis (e.g. research on causes of conflict, but also stakeholders, dynamics, scenarios at national level but also the different conflicts in the different conflict areas); (vi) collation and communication of relevant information to the public; (vii) provision of mine action activities; (viii) additional ad-hoc activities to facilitate confidence building; (iv) technical and financial support to ongoing peace negotiations with non-signatory EAOs; (v) training and broader capacity development (including soft skills) of participants in ceasefire monitoring committees, and ongoing ceasefire negotiations and women, peace and security at the national and subnational level

Indicative activities for Result 1.2: (i) support, including technical, for new or existing institutions required to guide, manage and support the national political dialogue (in particular the UPDJC); (ii) support for activities of these institutions, including training of staff, meetings, research and consultations with constituencies; (iii) training in gender analysis, gender sensitive approach, gender responsive budgeting and mainstreaming of gender

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<sup>16</sup> All activities mentioned below are indicative and will be eligible for Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) reporting.

perspective; (iv) training and broader capacity development (including soft skills) of participants in the dialogue to support development of evidence-informed policy positions; (v) provision of expert advice on the organisation of national dialogue processes and solutions to substantive issues; (vi) provision of international observers; (vii) research supporting identification of evidence-informed solutions to substantive issues; (viii) facilitation of broader confidence-building between the Government, the Tatmadaw, EAOs, political parties and civil society groups; (ix) collation and communication of relevant information to the public; (x) support for inclusion and empowerment of women in the dialogue process; (xi) support to increase the substantive inclusion of civil society, including women's organisations, in the national political dialogue process; (xii) support to initiatives to increase the substantive participation of youth in the peace process and national dialogue process.

Indicative activities for Result 2.1: (i) support for the establishment of new structures to manage needs assessments, with a special emphasis on Rakhine State; (ii) support for pre-assessment consultations with local stakeholders (EAOs and ethnic communities), data collection (including sex desegregated and gender sensitive), analysis and validation, and the formulation of repatriation and recovery strategies; (iii) training of data collectors; (iv) establishment of a funding mechanism to facilitate rapid implementation of priority projects identified by needs assessments, including in conflict-affected areas in the ethnic States; (v) projects in Rakhine State promoting intercommunal dialogue and interfaith cooperation; (vi) financial and technical support to implementation of the RAC recommendations; (vii) support to programs addressing physical and psycho-social trauma, (viii) support to individual mental health and psychosocial interventions through integrated sexual and reproductive health rights (SRHR) and SGBV response and prevention programmes; (ix) empowerment of women; (x) funding of priority projects, including assistance on resilience to the most vulnerable populations; (xi) support for transitional governance arrangements in former conflict-affected areas; (xii) support to return of refugees and IDPs, reconciliation; (xiii) and oversight of development projects to ensure that negative social or environmental impacts are minimal.

### **4.3 Intervention logic**

External support can play an important role in the peace process by providing technical knowledge and financial resources, in combination with diplomatic/political outreach to support a peace agreement that is durable. The ultimate goal of this action is to support national efforts to achieve a final and sustainable settlement to ethnic armed conflict, including repatriation of Rohingyas from Bangladesh and alleviating inter-communal tensions and violence. The activities and results in section 4.1 reflect the vision and roadmap agreed by all relevant stakeholders, having a direct relationship with the NCA, and the participation of the national parties to the agreement. By implementing the range of activities illustrated under results 1 and 2, the action should be able to provide the main expected outcomes.

Whilst international support to vulnerable communities and peace-building initiatives in Rakhine State has long faced restrictions, the current context necessitates that the EU approach in 2018 remains flexible and responsive to the shifting political context and specific needs of vulnerable populations. Opportunities to provide support to communities will also be dependent on the access granted to the international community by the Government. At this time it is unclear how effectively or fully the Government will commit to implementing the RAC recommendations. In addition, no independent fact finding or verification has been permitted. Finally, any support to repatriation of the Rohingya or citizenship documentation

programmes will need to be carefully evaluated to ensure efforts are in line with the MoU between Bangladesh and Myanmar/Burma and in accordance with international law.

A mix of implementation modalities (call for proposals and indirect management with one or more international organisations) will allow coherent and effective aid to the emerging needs of the peace process, plus rapid and flexible delivery to the eventual repatriation of Rohingyas. While activities under the JPF will support the NCA dialogue and monitor its implementation (*peace architecture and ceasefire monitoring*) the ones managed by UNFPA as well as the ones identified under the call for proposals aim to improve service delivery in areas where parties have signed the NCA as well as Rakhine State (*peace dividends*). For Rakhine State, a strong emphasis will be given in order to follow closely the RAC recommendations. In line with the recommendation expressed by the European Court of Auditors in its 2018 Special Report on EU Assistance to Myanmar/Burma, Rakhine State is included in the call for proposals, particularly since the JPF does not target intercommunal violence as such. Due to the extremely complex and volatile environment where the actions will take place, and in order to minimise implementation risks, a maximum level of flexibility will be required in the choice of implementing partner(s) under the call for proposals. The ultimate aim is to support the peace process and the intercommunal violence as a transition towards the use of the country's own systems for aid delivery in the future.

## **5 IMPLEMENTATION**

### **5.1 Financing agreement**

In order to implement this action, it is not foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner country.

### **5.2 Indicative implementation period**

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 4.1 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 60 months from the date of adoption by the Commission of this Action Document.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission's authorising officer responsible by amending this decision and the relevant contracts and agreements; such amendments to this decision constitute technical amendments in the sense of point (i) of Article 2(3)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014.

### **5.3 Implementation modalities**

Both in indirect and direct management, the Commission will ensure that the EU appropriate rules and procedures for providing financing to third parties are respected, including review procedures, where appropriate, and compliance of the action with EU restrictive measures affecting the respective countries of operation<sup>17</sup>.

#### **5.3.1 Grants: call for proposals '*Support to the conflict affected territories and the Peace Process in Myanmar/Burma*' (direct management)**

(a) Objectives of the grants, fields of intervention, priorities of the year and expected results

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<sup>17</sup> [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/restrictive\\_measures-2017-04-26-clean.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/restrictive_measures-2017-04-26-clean.pdf)

The objectives and expected results of the grants will be peace, reconciliation, reintegration, rehabilitation and sustainable development of Myanmar/Burma, as described in sections 4.1 and 4.2.

(b) Eligibility conditions

In order to be eligible for a grant, the applicant must:

- be a legal person,
- be a specific type of organisation such as: non-governmental organisation, public sector operator, local authority, international (inter-governmental) organisation;
- be directly responsible for the preparation and management of the action with the co-applicant(s) and affiliated entity(ies), not acting as an intermediary.
- be established in<sup>18</sup> a Member State of the European Union or in an eligible country for funding under the DCI Regulation, as stipulated in Article 9 of the Common Implementing Regulation (CIR). This obligation does not apply to international organisations.

Subject to information to be published in the call for proposals, the indicative amount of the EU contribution per grant is ranging from EUR 1 000 000 to EUR 9 000 000 and the grants may be awarded to sole beneficiaries and to consortia of beneficiaries (coordinator and co-beneficiaries). The indicative duration of the grant (its implementation period) is 48 months.

(c) Essential selection and award criteria

The essential selection criteria are financial and operational capacity of the applicant.

The essential award criteria are relevance of the proposed action to the objectives of the call; design, effectiveness, feasibility, sustainability and cost-effectiveness of the action.

(d) Maximum rate of co-financing

The maximum possible rate of co-financing for grants under this call is 95% of the eligible costs of the action.

If full funding is essential for the action to be carried out, the maximum possible rate of co-financing may be increased up to 100 %. The essentiality of full funding will be justified by the Commission's authorising officer responsible in the award decision, in respect of the principles of equal treatment and sound financial management.

(e) Indicative timing to launch the call

First trimester of 2019.

### **5.3.2 Indirect management with an international organisation**

A part of this action may be implemented in indirect management with the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). This implementation entails the whole contract management cycle of the JPF that the EU and other donors (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States) are already funding for the implementation of the peace process described above. Indirect Management with UNOPS is the best option to ensure a fully integrated and coherent implementation of the

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<sup>18</sup> To be determined on the basis of the organisation's statutes, which should demonstrate that it has been established by an instrument governed by the national law of the country concerned and that its head office is located in an eligible country. In this respect, any legal entity whose statutes have been established in another country cannot be considered an eligible local organisation, even if the statutes are registered locally or a 'Memorandum of Understanding' has been concluded.

action. This implementation is justified because UNOPS has an established presence and extensive experience in the management of multi-donor trust funds co-financed by the EU and other donors in Myanmar/Burma. UNOPS is in charge of the implementation of the JPF since 2015.

The entrusted entity would carry out the following budget-implementation tasks: procurement and grant award procedures, signing and executing the resulting procurement contracts and grant contracts, notably accepting deliverables, carrying out payments and recovering the funds unduly paid.

### **5.3.3 Indirect management with an international organisation**

A part of this action may be implemented in indirect management with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). This implementation entails the management of activities to (1) support individual, family and community capacity and resilience to participate in structures established by the programme which foster peace through active democratic processes; leading to harmony and peace in the home and community; and (2) build the capacity of national, local and community institutions to support the implementation of policies and administration of justice addressing women's human rights including the right to live a life free from violence and safety in conflict and emergencies; contributing to a peace and reconciliation in society. Links will be made between this project and the Spotlight Initiative<sup>19</sup>. This implementation is justified because UNFPA is the mandated UN agency for GBV issues, women's empowerment and population dynamics, and has an established presence (over 40 years) in Myanmar/Burma in the area of gender equality. UNFPA currently implements the Women and Girls First programme. UNFPA in Myanmar/Burma chairs or co-chairs key coordination structures to support gender equality such as the Government led Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment "Non" Sector Cooperation Group, GBV Coordination Working Group (at the national level as well as in Kachin, northern Shan and Rakhine), Law Drafting Committee for the Protection of Women against Violence Law and the UN Gender Theme Group.

The entrusted entity would carry out the following budget-implementation tasks: procurement and grant award procedures, signing and executing the resulting procurement contracts and grant contracts, notably accepting deliverables, carrying out payments and recovering the funds unduly paid.

### **5.4 Changes from indirect to direct management mode due to exceptional circumstances**

In case the components of the action under sections 5.3.2 and/or 5.3.3 of this Annex cannot be implemented in indirect management due to circumstances outside of the Commission's control, the alternative implementation modality in direct management would be as per section 5.3.1.

### **5.5 Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants**

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply, subject to the following provision.

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<sup>19</sup> <http://www.un.org/en/spotlight-initiative/>

The Commission's authorising officer responsible may extend the geographical eligibility in accordance with Article 9(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the realization of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.

## 5.6 Indicative budget

<b>Implementation modality</b>	<b>EU contribution (amount in EUR)</b>	<b>Former EU contributions (EUR)</b>	<b>Indicative third party contribution, (in EUR)</b>
5.3.1 – Call for proposals "Support to the conflict affected territories and the peace process in Myanmar/Burma" (direct management)	9 000 000		473 684
5.3.2 – Indirect management with UNOPS (Joint Peace Fund)	6 000 000	28 823 687	60 560 202
5.3.3 – Indirect management with UNFPA (GBV activities, Women and Girls First Program)	5 000 000		Not yet known
<b>Total</b>	<b>20 000 000</b>	<b>28 823 687</b>	<b>61 033 886</b>

## 5.7 Organisational set-up and responsibilities

For the JPF, it was foreseen that a High Level Committee (HLC) would be set up to provide strategic direction and review overall progress. This committee would have three co-chairs, each appointed from within the respective stakeholder constituencies: Government, EAOs and contributing donors. In the absence of a HLC, all of the roles and authorities of the Committee are delegated to the Fund Board on an interim basis, until the joint governance structures are established. Additionally and as indicated in Section 1.1.2, the JCB is temporarily fulfilling some of the functions originally foreseen under the HLC, although notably it is not discussing strategic priorities for peace process support. Since it is unclear whether the HLC will be finally established, the JPF is for the time being operating in close consultations with the JCB and with all parties and stakeholders involved in the peace process in order to ensure proper coordination, transparency and efficiency.

EU will be represented in the UNFPA Women and Girls First phase 2 programme steering arrangements.

## 5.8 Performance monitoring and reporting

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be a continuous process and part of the different implementing partner's responsibilities. To this aim, the implementing partners shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the

action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (outputs and direct outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the logframe matrix. Implementing partners will be requested – during projects inception phase – to undertake a baseline study as well as to define target data and carry out a final study where necessary. The report shall be laid out in such a way as to allow monitoring of the means envisaged and employed and of the budget details for the action. The final report, narrative and financial, will cover the entire period of the action implementation.

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

## **5.9 Evaluation**

Having regard to the importance of the action, mid-term and final evaluations will be carried out for the various components via implementing partners.

Mid-term evaluations will be carried out for problem solving and learning purposes, in particular with respect to the chosen implementing modality and its efficiency and effectiveness in supporting the peace process in the right way.

Final evaluations will be carried out for accountability and learning purposes at various levels (including for policy revision), taking into account in particular the volatile peace process in Myanmar/Burma. Final evaluation will assess progress towards expected results by comparing start/end points as defined in the inception phases.

The evaluation reports shall be shared with the partner country and other key stakeholders. The implementing partners and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, in agreement with the partner country, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project.

The financing of the evaluation shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing decision.

## **5.10 Audit**

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audits or expenditure verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.

The financing of the audit shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing decision.

## **5.11 Communication and visibility**

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated at the start of implementation. Appropriate budget will be allocated for this purpose under each contract signed under sections 5.3.1, 5.3.2 and 5.3.3.



In terms of legal obligations on communication and visibility, the measures shall be implemented by the Commission, the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and/or entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, the financing agreement, procurement and grant contracts, and contribution agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.

## APPENDIX - INDICATIVE LOGFRAME MATRIX (FOR PROJECT MODALITY)

The activities, the expected outputs and all the indicators, targets and baselines included in the logframe matrix are indicative and may be updated during the implementation of the action, no amendment being required to the financing decision. When it is not possible to determine the outputs of an action at formulation stage, intermediary outcomes should be presented and the outputs defined during inception of the overall programme and its components. The indicative logframe matrix will evolve during the lifetime of the action: new lines will be added for including the activities as well as new columns for intermediary targets (milestones) for the output and outcome indicators whenever it is relevant for monitoring and reporting purposes. Note also that indicators should be disaggregated by sex whenever relevant.

	Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (incl. reference year)	Targets (incl. reference year)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions
Overall objective: Impact	To contribute to lasting peace, security, stability and sustainable development in Myanmar/Burma	<p>1. Status of National Peace Accord.</p> <p>2. Status of ongoing negotiations for amending structure of governance</p> <p>3. Annual number of violent deaths per 100.000 / number of deaths as a result of the ethnic conflict</p> <p>4. Annual number of victims of armed clashes. [EU RF Level 1 #7]**</p>	<p>1. On-going negotiations with 11 EAOs non-signatories of the NCA, code of conduct and framework for political dialogue [EU RF Level 2 #5]</p> <p>2. Deed of Commitment 12<sup>th</sup> February 2015 committed Government and military to the federal concept.</p> <p>3. Based on UNODC data, in 2015 there were 2.4 cases per 100,000 / Based on open data sources (not fully accurate): – 297 in 2017</p> <p>4. TBD in inception phase from JMC data</p>	<p>1. At least 6 new signatories to the NCA by end of 2020.</p> <p>2. Full implementation of the political dialogue process between 2018 and 2020. Amendments to the Constitution and other legal reforms based on final conclusions adopted by the UPDJC</p> <p>3. 15% reduction of number of violent deaths per 100.000 by end of year 2021 / 50% reduction of number of deaths as a result of ethnic conflict</p> <p>4. 90% reduction in victims of armed clashes by 2022.</p>	<p>1. Reports by the Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM)</p> <p>2. Reports by the UPDJC. Constitutional and legal reforms on various topics related to the political dialogue.</p> <p>3. Reports by JMC, National Police, Myanmar Peace Monitor and UNODC.</p> <p>4. Reports by the JMC</p>	

		<p>5. Perceived levels of interaction between members of different communities in Rakhine State compared to a year ago</p> <p>6. Economic development / growth indicators in ethnic areas.</p> <p>7. GDP per capita (US\$)</p>	<p>5. Increased 14% Same 35% Reduced 35% Don't know 14% n/a 1% (2016)</p> <p>6. Township development index developed in 2017 by The Asia Foundation, that measures multi-dimensional poverty at the local level.</p> <p>7. 1.275,02 (2016)</p>	<p>5. Interactions with members of another religion in Rakhine State have increased by 25% by the end of 2021.</p> <p>6. Improved economic development/growth indicators across all townships in Ethnic states from 2019 to 2023 – especially focusing on employment and investment rates.</p> <p>7. +25% in GDP by end 2023</p>	<p>5. Rakhine Needs Assessment II from the Centre for Diversity and National Harmony and follow-up study.</p> <p>6. National registered employment and investments figures.</p> <p>7. World Bank</p>	
Specific objective(s): Outcome(s)	<p>1. Successive milestones of the peace process are reached, including effective progress in terms of women's participation in this process.</p>	<p>1.1 Number of bilateral ceasefire agreements signed.</p> <p>1.2 Number of signatories to the NCA.</p> <p>1.3 Number of IDPs and refugees (disaggregated by sex).</p>	<p>1.1 14 out of 19 bilateral ceasefire agreements signed.</p> <p>1.2 10 out of 19 EAOs signed the NCA.</p> <p>1.3 By Dec 2017 UNHCR estimated that there were 635,000 IDPs in Myanmar/Burma and 102,607 refugees in Thailand. There were also more than 700,000 new refugees in Bangladesh</p>	<p>1.1 5 new bilateral ceasefire agreements signed by end 2022.</p> <p>1.2 At least sixteen EAOs sign the NCA by end of 2022.</p> <p>1.3 25% less IDPs by 2021(disaggregated by sex).</p>	<p>1.1. Joint ceasefire monitoring mechanisms by EAOs.</p> <p>1.2 Reports by recipient institutions on NCA implementation.</p> <p>1.3 UNHCR Country reports.</p>	<p>Peace and stability in certain regions of the country will contribute positively to other development objectives, including democratisation, broad-based economic development and human security.</p> <p>De-escalation and cessation of</p>

		<p>1.4 (GAP Indicator 9.6.) N# of individuals (male/female) directly benefiting from EU supported programmes that specifically aim to support civilian post-conflict peace building and/ or conflict prevention (EURF Level 2 no 5)</p> <p>1.5 (GAP indicator 17.4). Representation of women among mediators, negotiators and technical experts in formal peace negotiations (SGD 16.8)</p> <p>1.6 Annual number of returnees into local communities (disaggregated by sex).</p>	<p>1.4 TBD in inception period.</p> <p>1.5 Women's participation in the national dialogue process is less than 30%.</p> <p>1.6 By Dec 2016, there are 2238 returnees from Thailand to their original places in the Southeast. As per Rakhine, Kachin and Shan, baselines need to be determined in the inception phase.</p>	<p>1.4 TBD in inception period.</p> <p>1.5 At least 30% of women are participating effectively at the UPDJC and at the political dialogue by 2020. Ideally there are 30% or women at the JMC.</p> <p>1.6 By end of 2023 there are is a reduction of 25% of refugees from Thailand and a 30% reduction of IDPs from Kachin and N. Shan.</p>	<p>1.4 Project surveys conducted by JPF and other EU-funded implementing agencies.</p> <p>1.5 UPDJC, KMC and AGIPP reports</p> <p>1.6 UNHCR and IDMC reports.</p>	<p>armed hostilities will build the confidence needed on all sides to start negotiations of a national peace accord, dealing with the underlying causes of armed conflict, as well as to scale up efforts to promote recovery and development in former conflict-affected areas</p>
	2. Improved socio-economic recovery in conflict-affected areas and areas affected by the intercommunal violence with a special focus on gender	2. Township development index developed by The Asia Foundation (TAF), that measures multi-dimensional poverty at the local level (with sex disaggregated data for certain sub-indicators).	2. Data contained in the Township development index developed in 2017 by The Asia Foundation, that measures multi-dimensional poverty at the local level.	2. Improved economic development/growth indicators year on year in conflict-affected areas and in selected townships targeted by the project (s).	2. Specialised reports by TAF, the ADB, WB and other well respected think tanks and institutions.	

Outputs	1.1 The Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, or other inclusive negotiations for peace agreements, are effectively monitored by the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Coordination Mechanism (JMC).	<p>1.1.1 Status of the joint ceasefire monitoring mechanism (JMC).</p> <p>1.1.2 Status of functional codes of conduct</p> <p>1.1.3 Status of an appropriate dispute resolution mechanism that documents and reports armed clashes to the relevant authorities and stakeholders, in designated areas.</p> <p>1.1.4 Level of effectiveness of Government/Tatmadaw-EAO liaison mechanisms.</p>	<p>1.1.1 JMC launched at the National level. 4 Regional JMC Committees established. Local JMC to be established (final numbers undefined yet).</p> <p>1.1.2 Approved Code of Conduct in early 2017 (revised periodically)</p> <p>1.1.3 Standard Operating Procedures and Dispute Resolution Mechanisms approved by the JMC need TBD.</p> <p>1.1.4 EAOs have 30 Liaison Offices functioning.</p>	<p>1.1.1 All JMC at Regional and local level are established (final target to be determined by the JMC).</p> <p>1.1.2 A Code of Conduct that is not contested and is agreed by all parties.</p> <p>1.1.3 Effective dispute resolution is in place and more than 75% of complaints are resolved peacefully by end of 2022.</p> <p>1.1.4 Effective liaison offices and liaison mechanisms between the Government, Tatmadaw and EAOs in place by end of 2021.</p>	<p>1.1.1 NCA implementation reports and briefings by the JMC. BNI reports.</p> <p>1.1.2 Reports by JMC and civilian ceasefire monitoring organisations.</p> <p>1.1.3 Reports by JMC and civilian ceasefire monitoring organisations.</p> <p>1.1.4 Governments/EAOs reports, documents and press releases.</p>	<p>Sustained high-level commitment of Government, Tatmadaw and EAOs to end armed hostilities.</p> <p>Minimal use of violence by local armed groups for economic purposes.</p> <p>Sustained high-level commitment to resolve differences through political means.</p> <p>Sufficient symbolic and substantive concessions are made to allow compromise solutions.</p>
	1.2 An inclusive national political dialogue reached a broad consensus on the key principles and elements of a comprehensive peace accord establishing a	1.2.1 Number of Union Peace Conferences celebrated.	1.2.1 Three Union Peace Conferences and 4 Subnational conferences organised by July 2018.	1.2.1 6 Union Peace Conferences are organised by end of 2020 with a new political settlement agreed by all parties that is conducive for Constitutional amendments.	1.2.1 UPDJC reports; Constitutional amendments; New legal frameworks adopted under the areas covered by the UPDJC.	<p>Sufficient political will in Parliament – and, in case of solutions requiring constitutional</p>

	democratic federal union.	1.2.2 Level of satisfaction on national dialogue process (disaggregated by ethnic groups and male/female)	1.2.2 Surveys are being conducted on this specific topic by the JPF and other implementing partners – <i>final baseline TBD at a later stage.</i>	1.2.2 At least 70% of the participants and the population is satisfied with the final results of the political dialogue.	1.2.2 National and sub-national surveys conducted by the JPF / others.	amendments, in the broader population – to reach a national peace accord.
		1.2.3 Percentage of participants in the national dialogue process from ethnic groups and male/female	1.2.3 Baseline under construction by the UPDJC	1.2.3 TBD in inception period	1.2.3 UPDJC Reports / NRPC reports.	Government does not limit access to former conflict-affected areas and facilitates implementing partners in conducting all funded operations.
		1.2.4 Number of constitutional amendments, laws and policy changes developed with the support of this action.	1.2.4 TBD in inception period	1.2.4 TBD in inception period	1.2.4 Constitutional and legal reforms.	
	2.1 Prompt, effective and efficient delivery of assistance for repatriation, recovery and gender sensitive development conflict-affected areas or areas affected by intercommunal tensions and violence.	2.1.1 Status of peacebuilding needs assessments carried out in former conflict-affected areas, using appropriate methodology and with results shared among all relevant stakeholders.	2.1.1 Joint needs assessment currently being negotiated amongst donors.	2.1.1 Joint needs assessment completed and results shared with all the involved stakeholders by end of 2020.	2.1.1 Joint needs assessment is conducted by end of 2020 in ceasefire areas. Action plans that will emerge from the Joint Needs Assessment. Donor reports.	
		2.1.2 Level of participation of local communities in development management committees (disaggregated by sex).	2.1.2 TBD in inception period.	2.1.2 TBD in inception period.	2.1.2 Surveys conducted by this action with local communities.	
		2.1.3 Number of formal and/or informal	2.1.3 0 (2018)	2.1.3 At least 2 formal or informal effective	2.1.3 Reports by implementing	

		<p>mechanisms established with the support of this action to promote, facilitate and sustain inter-faith and inter-communal dialogue.*</p> <p>2.1.4 Status of arrangements for formal and/or informal transitional mechanisms established with the support of this action.</p> <p>2.1.5 (GAP Indicator 9.7). Number of EU funded humanitarian targeted actions that respond to GBV</p> <p>2.1.6 Support to individual mental health and psychosocial interventions through SRHR and SGBV response and prevention programmes</p>	<p>2.1.4 There are no formal or informal transitional mechanisms adopted by February 2018.</p> <p>2.1.5 UNFPA and other implementing partners have GBV actions in place.</p> <p>2.1.6 Lifetime physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence: 17%; Physical and/or Sexual Intimate Partner Violence in the last 12 months: 11 %. Gender Equality Indexes: 80</p>	<p>mechanisms for dealing with inter-faith and intercommunal violence are established by end of 2022.</p> <p>2.1.4 Formal and/or informal transitional mechanisms have been successfully established by end of 2021.</p> <p>2.1.5 At least one robust mechanism is in place by end of 2021.</p> <p>2.1.6 A reduction of 5% in physical and/or sexual intimate partner violence by end of 2023; A reduction of at least 5% in Physical and/or Sexual Intimate Partner by end of 2023;</p>	<p>partners.</p> <p>2.1.4 Agreed, signed and implemented informal and/or formal mechanisms that act as forums for regular discussion.</p> <p>2.1.5 Reports by implementing partners.</p> <p>2.1.6 Reports from Ministry of Health and Sports and ICF. Myanmar Demographic and Health Survey</p>	
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This action is funded by the European Union

## ANNEX 2

of the Commission Implementing Decision on the financing of the Annual Action Programme in favour of Myanmar/Burma for 2018 part 2

### Action Document for Strengthening Indigenous Provision of Education in Ethnic Areas of Myanmar

#### INFORMATION FOR POTENTIAL GRANT APPLICANTS

##### WORK PROGRAMME FOR GRANTS

This document constitutes the work programme for grants in the sense of Article 110(2) of the Financial Regulation in the following sections concerning calls for proposals: 5.3.1 Grants – call for proposals "Strengthening Indigenous Provision of Education in Ethnic Areas of Myanmar" (direct management).

<b>1. Title/basic act/ CRIS number</b>	Strengthening Indigenous Provision of Education in Ethnic Areas of Myanmar CRIS number: ACA/2018/040-857 financed under the Development Cooperation Instrument	
<b>2. Zone benefiting from the action/location</b>	Myanmar/Burma. The action shall be carried out in protracted conflict and post conflict areas, currently including the following states and regions: Kayin, Mon, Shan, Kachin, Chin, Kayah, Tanintharyi, Bago and Sagaing in Myanmar/Burma. It may be extended to include Rakhine (see footnote 16). The tentative location where the project team will be based is Pyin Oo Lwin (Mandalay Region).	
<b>3. Programming document</b>	Addendum No 1 to the Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014-2020) for Myanmar/Burma <sup>1</sup>	
<b>4. Sector of concentration/ thematic area</b>	Education	DEV. Aid: YES <sup>2</sup>
<b>5. Amounts concerned</b>	Total estimated cost: EUR 21 052 631 Total amount of EU budget contribution: EUR 20 000 000 This action is co-financed by potential grant beneficiaries for an indicative amount of EUR 1 052 631	
<b>6. Aid</b>	Project Modality	

<sup>1</sup> C(2018)4741 of 20 July 2018

<sup>2</sup> Official Development Aid is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective.



<b>modality(ies) &amp; implementation modality(ies)</b>	Direct management – grants – call for proposals			
<b>7 a) DAC code(s)</b>	15230 Post conflict – peace-building / 15160 Human Rights / 11130 Teacher Training / 11220 Basic Primary Education / 11230 Basic Life skills for youth and adults			
<b>b) Main Delivery Channel</b>	20000 – Non-Governmental Organisations and Civil Society			
<b>8. Markers (from CRIS DAC form)</b>	<b>General policy objective</b>	<b>Not targeted</b>	<b>Significant objective</b>	<b>Main objective</b>
	Participation development/good governance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Aid to environment	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Gender equality (including Women In Development)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Trade Development	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Reproductive, Maternal, New born and child health	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<b>RIO Convention markers</b>	<b>Not targeted</b>	<b>Significant objective</b>	<b>Main objective</b>
	Biological diversity	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Combat desertification	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change mitigation	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change adaptation	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>9. Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC) thematic flagship</b>	N/A			
<b>10. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)</b>	Main: SDG16 - Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development // Secondary: SDG 4 - Quality Education; SDG 1 - No poverty; SDG 5 - Gender equality			

## SUMMARY

The action will support indigenous providers of education to deliver a high-quality education that drives improvements in learning outcomes for indigenous boys and girls. The EU support will promote the convergence of government education policy delivery with indigenous education service delivery. Through this action, the European Union (EU) will: (i) foster inclusion of different ethnic and minority groups in the process of nation building, (ii) address inequities in education provision and performance, (iii) model an effective conflict sensitive approach to supporting the education sector, and (iv) demonstrate that a balanced commitment to government and non-government providers is possible and necessary during this transition period. The overall objective of this action is to contribute to a peaceful inclusive society for sustainable development in Myanmar/Burma.

This action complements the EU Education Sector Reform Contract (ESRC) "Enhancing the education and skills base in Myanmar" action and ensures a conflict-sensitive and balanced EU support to education provision in Myanmar/Burma. Sector budget support to the Ministry of Education (MoE), through the ESRC, and support to indigenous providers of education, through this action, will improve the quality and expand the reach of both government and indigenous education

services. The alignment and equivalency between government and non-government education systems will be strengthened. This action fosters dialogue, cooperation and collaboration between the MoE and indigenous providers of education in support of the country's objective of "leaving no child behind", the achievement of MoE's National Education Strategic Plan targets, and national peace building efforts.

The action builds on an ECHO-funded project, which enabled 12,534<sup>3</sup> indigenous<sup>4</sup> boys and girls access to education in some of the most remote conflict affected areas. In line with the humanitarian-development nexus, it will prioritise quality and sustainability dimensions and measure the impact of the intervention on learning outcomes and school retention for indigenous boys and girls. It will strengthen existing services and target communities without education services, Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps and villages, and those where services are not meeting children's learning and educational needs. The action will identify and develop relevant education programmes that address the learning needs of older out of school boys and girls as well as illiterate women, and will seek to partner with women and youth groups to support community outreach. It will seek to improve the quality and standards across indigenous provision of education by strengthening and unifying existing providers.

Due to the current fragility of indigenous services provision, the action will contribute financial and technical resources to sustain and expand education services; improve the quality of education; and build stronger alignment and complementarity with government education reforms, such as teacher education and qualifications, curriculum and performance, while also addressing issues unique to indigenous children, such as student transfer to government schools, student recognition of prior learning and mother tongue based multi lingual education (MTB-MLE). The evidence generated by the action will strongly position the EU for a well-informed policy dialogue with the MoE on these issues, which will be leveraged by the political and policy dialogue associated with the ESRC. Importantly, the action will provide much needed policy advocacy support to indigenous providers so that they can collectively engage directly in productive policy dialogue with the government.

## **1 CONTEXT**

### **1.1 Sector/Country/Regional context/Thematic area**

Myanmar/Burma is home to 135 officially recognised ethnic groups with over a hundred different languages. About two thirds speak the national language, Myanmar/Burmese, which is the language spoken by the ethnic majority, the Bamar people. Following independence 70 years ago, the country plunged into civil war and was ruled by a Military regime for 60 years. Since 2010, Myanmar/Burma has embarked on an ambitious range of political, economic and administrative reforms. Since 2016, a civilian government has taken over from the Military and has continued the process of democratic transition, including further social and economic reforms, and has made the ongoing peace process a top priority. The signing of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA, 2015) by some (although not all) ethnic armed groups (EAGs) are important events but fragility and conflicts continue, particularly in Rakhine, Kachin and Shan states. The peace process has stalled, threatening the country's tenuous democratic transition and peacebuilding efforts.

The education sector in Myanmar/Burma is highly diverse and is heavily marred by the country's complex and long history of conflict. Until very recently, there was chronic underinvestment in

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<sup>3</sup> ADRA (2018) Endline for CASE project, March 2018

<sup>4</sup> 'Indigenous' is used in relation to minority ethnic education providers in preference to 'ethnic' as this is the term the indigenous providers of education prefer to use. 'Ethnic' is still used in the Action Document when referencing regions or areas under ethnic control and when representing the views of government or other actors.

education support and the government education system was highly centralised. Prior to 2015, the Ministry of Education (MoE) mandated the sole use of Myanmar/Burmese as the language of instruction, prohibited the teaching of ethnic languages and used a standardised curriculum that did not reflect local contexts or ethnic minority cultures. Hence, government education has long been perceived by many ethnic nationality groups as a tool for assimilating non-Bamar populations and a key driver of conflict. In contrast, indigenous providers of education, some of which predate the colonial period, have developed and defined their own systems based on culture, ethnicity and language origins. Indigenous providers of education have played a significant role in providing access to culturally relevant quality education for indigenous children, particularly during the country's long period of civil war. During the 1960s-80s, several EAGs carved out independent micro-states with their own quasi governments, and departments to oversee service provision were established. Several EAGs continue to maintain territorial control over areas of the country. The status and future of EAGs governance regimes and basic service delivery systems will constitute a key issue in the ongoing peace process and political dialogue.

Education service provision in Myanmar/Burma falls within the humanitarian-development nexus, particularly in areas affected by conflict and recovering from conflict. It calls for a greater emphasis on strengthening local capacities, sustaining indigenous provision and promoting inclusive governance at the national and state level. This would address long standing grievances and a key driver of conflict and hence would support, rather than hinder, the democratic transition and progress in the peace process. To this end, the action builds on a previous ECHO-funded project, which supported the Rural Indigenous Sustainable Education (RISE) network of indigenous providers of education to expand their reach to 120 communities that previously had no access to education services, bringing 12,534 out of school boys and girls into school. The continuity of assistance from humanitarian aid to development will ensure indigenous providers of education can sustain and strengthen their services, improve the quality of education and learning outcomes, and support and engage with the MoE collectively and more effectively in policy dialogue on the national education reform agenda.

### ***1.1.1 Public Policy Assessment and EU Policy Framework***

From the outset of the transition in 2011, and more concretely since 2016, the EU swiftly responded to political changes and provided strong support to encourage reforms. The Council conclusions on the EU strategy with Myanmar/Burma, adopted in June 2016<sup>5</sup>, sets out the framework for EU's support to the ongoing reforms in Myanmar/Burma. In the Council conclusions on Myanmar/Burma of February 2018<sup>6</sup>, the EU and Member States reconfirmed their strong engagement to support the country's democratic transition, peace and national reconciliation, and inclusive socio-economic development, and reiterated their readiness to continue support to ongoing reforms, specifically in the education sector.

The action takes forward the Council conclusions on Indigenous Peoples of May 2017<sup>7</sup> and the Joint Staff Working Document "Implementing EU External Policy on Indigenous Peoples"<sup>8</sup>, which highlight the need to strengthen EU's support to indigenous peoples and boost their capacity to control their own social, economic and cultural development to advance democracy and human rights. It also takes forward the Council conclusions on operationalising the humanitarian and development nexus, adopted in May 2017<sup>9</sup>, for which Myanmar/Burma is a pilot country. It also supports implementation

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<sup>5</sup> <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10482-2016-INIT/en/pdf>

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/32958/st06418-en18.pdf>

<sup>7</sup> <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8814-2017-INIT/en/pdf>

<sup>8</sup> [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/swd\\_2016\\_340\\_f1\\_joint\\_staff\\_working\\_paper\\_en\\_v2\\_p1\\_865982.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/swd_2016_340_f1_joint_staff_working_paper_en_v2_p1_865982.pdf)

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24010/nexus-st09383en17.pdf>

of the May 2018 European Commission's Communication on Education in Emergencies and Protracted Crises<sup>10</sup> to promote safe, inclusive and quality learning for children in such contexts. The action is in line with the EU policy priorities PEOPLE and PEACE, as well as PROSPERITY. Other EU frameworks relevant to this action are the 2017 European Consensus on Development<sup>11</sup>, the Gender Action Plan (GAP) 2016-20<sup>12</sup>, and the European Commission Staff Working Document "More and better education in developing countries"<sup>13</sup>.

The government has identified education and poverty alleviation as key drivers to support the democratic and peace-building processes, and to achieve the national goal of becoming a Middle-Income Country by 2030. The recent Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (MSDP)<sup>14</sup> is firmly aligned to the SDGs, and this action relates in particular to MSDP Goal 1: Peace, National Reconciliation, Security & Good Governance, and Goal 4: Human Resources & Social Development for a 21<sup>st</sup> Century Society.

The NCA<sup>15</sup> commits all sides to holding political dialogue aimed at forming a federal, democratic union; recognises the authority of EAGs in their respective areas, including in the field of education; and provides for international assistance in these fields. The NCA interim arrangements emphasise the need for cooperation between the EAGs and the government in basic service delivery until a full peace settlement is achieved. Decentralisation of education speaks to the heart of indigenous providers of education desire for an inclusive education sector that upholds the rights of ethnic minorities and promotes inclusive economic growth. The National Education Law (NEL, 2014 and NEL amendment 2015) provides the legal framework for education while the National Education Strategic Plan (NESP) 2016-21 sets out sector-wide education reforms aimed at improving equitable access to quality education for all children. Both the NEL and the NESP recognise to an extent the need for support to diverse education opportunities respecting the ethnic diversity of the country. According to the NEL a key objective of national education is *'To develop union spirit and to create citizens who respect, value, preserve and develop all the ethnic groups' languages, literatures, culture, arts, traditions, and historical heritage*<sup>16</sup>. The NEL mandates *'help to open classes to develop the ethnic groups' literature, language, culture, arts and traditions*'. It also highlights that at the *'basic education level, ethnic languages can be used together with Myanmar language as the classroom language*' (i.e. to explain when ethnic students do not understand), but falls short of authorising their use as the language of instruction, which is a key demand of indigenous providers of education. The NESP education sector reform priorities include *'support and promotion of ethnic languages and cultures, including for primary-age ethnic children who speak different languages'*, and aims to *'prioritize the needs of schools in less developed areas to make education more accessible to all.'* Importantly, the NESP recognises that the MoE is not the sole provider of education services in the country and that *'an important factor in the successful implementation of the basic education reforms is the extent to which they are mainstreamed in other organisations involved in basic education provision, such as [...] schools managed under ethnic education systems.'* It foresees the development of *'a partnership mechanism to support the participation of different education service providers in basic education reforms.'* However, both the NEL and NESP

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<sup>10</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/news/Communication\\_on\\_Education\\_in\\_Emergencies\\_and\\_Protracted\\_Crises.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/news/Communication_on_Education_in_Emergencies_and_Protracted_Crises.pdf)

<sup>11</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/european-consensus-on-development-final-20170626\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/european-consensus-on-development-final-20170626_en.pdf)

<sup>12</sup> <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/public-gender/minisite/eu-gender-actionaction-plan-2016-2020>

<sup>13</sup> [https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/swd-more-and-better-education-in-developing-countries-2010\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/swd-more-and-better-education-in-developing-countries-2010_en.pdf)

<sup>14</sup> [http://www.themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Core\\_Doc\\_Myanmar\\_Sustainable\\_Development\\_Plan\\_2018\\_-\\_2030\\_Aug2018.pdf](http://www.themimu.info/sites/themimu.info/files/documents/Core_Doc_Myanmar_Sustainable_Development_Plan_2018_-_2030_Aug2018.pdf)

<sup>15</sup> [http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/images/2015/oct/nca\\_contract\\_eng.pdf](http://www.mmpeacemonitor.org/images/2015/oct/nca_contract_eng.pdf)

<sup>16</sup> <http://www.myanmar-law-library.org/law-library/laws-and-regulations/laws/myanmar-laws-1988-until-now/union-solidarity-and-development-party-laws-2012-2016/myanmar-laws-2014/pyidaungsu-hluttaw-law-no-41-2014-national-education-law-burmese-and-english.html>

fail to provide details on how these objectives will be implemented and achieved. Nevertheless, this opens an unprecedented space for supporting and facilitating engagement by both sides on the transition to a diverse but coherent and equitable education system. However, this remains highly sensitive politically given persistent distrust on both sides. It is therefore critical to apply a conflict sensitive approach to effectively contribute to peace and reconciliation through supporting indigenous providers of education to collectively develop a unified and sufficiently strong position from which to negotiate their engagement with the MoE.

To this end, the action aims to foster positive collaboration between government and indigenous providers of education through supporting and strengthening their education services and building their collective policy advocacy capacity so that they can constructively negotiate on key education reforms issues and the terms of their potential partnership with the government system. This will ultimately ensure that education in Myanmar/Burma can reach and meet the needs of all children and that functional links between government and indigenous systems are established so that they both contribute to Myanmar/Burma's education targets, democratic transition and peace and reconciliation efforts.

### ***1.1.2 Stakeholder analysis***

It is estimated that over a quarter of education services in Myanmar/Burma are provided by either indigenous providers, the monastic system or faith-based organisations. Indigenous providers of education include the education departments of EAGs, as well as indigenous community-based organisations. They provide education services in non-government-controlled areas, as well as in many mixed administration and government-controlled areas where government education services have recently been established but often remain weak and under-resourced. Where government education services exist in conflict and post conflict affected areas, they remain inaccessible for many indigenous children as they lack linguistic and cultural relevance. Indigenous providers therefore fill critical gaps in education provision. In 2017, 14 existing indigenous providers of education collectively served 343,649 children in 4,009 schools staffed by 21,846 teachers in remote and conflict-affected areas across 9 states and regions of Myanmar/Burma (Kayin, Mon, Shan, Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Tanintharyi, Bago and Sagaing). While their size and reach vary greatly, as well as the quality of their education services, they have proven resilient to local conflict dynamics and reach some of Myanmar/Burma's most marginalized and disadvantaged children. However, a further 719,674 children (aged 5-18) are estimated to be out of school (OOS) in the geographical areas reached by indigenous providers of education.

Participation in open dialogue is fundamental to this action. The RISE network of 10 indigenous providers of education have consulted with EAGs, local authorities, community teachers and their local communities and collected preliminary data on the out of school children (OOSC) population in their respective areas. Formal consultations with the RISE network and development partners (DPs) have been undertaken to inform the design of this action. These key stakeholders have repeatedly affirmed their desire for and commitment to improving access to quality basic education.

The MoE aims to dramatically increase access to basic education, in line with the NEL and the government's commitment to leaving no child behind. The government recognises that universal access to quality basic education is fundamental to reducing poverty, addressing equity and achieving national social-economic development goals. Ceasefires and increases in government spending on education have allowed MoE to reach new populations. However, recent MoE expansion of government education services has not yet included conflict-sensitive consultations, sometimes exacerbating long-standing conflicts over the status of indigenous education systems and jeopardizing confidence in the ceasefires. Some indigenous providers of education and local communities perceive that the government is using ceasefires to expand its authority into previously autonomous areas, including through building schools and providing teachers who do not speak the

local ethnic language, and that international aid is supporting this without considering the impact of their support on peace and conflict dynamics. Distrust remains, even of the new government (particularly the Union level), as ethnic communities and political leaders feel that they are not yet being genuinely consulted and do not yet receive the support or funding necessary to facilitate inclusive community development in ethnic areas.

Nevertheless, indigenous providers of education are gradually building positive relationships with state and township government education authorities to improve coordination of education services in post-conflict and conflict affected areas. Some indigenous providers of education, such as the Mon National Education Committee (MNEC) and the Karen Education Department (KED), now regularly attend Education State Coordination Group meetings hosted by government State Education Departments. While such cases, thus far, are an exception, they can serve as examples of good practice. At the other extreme, particularly where conflict persists (e.g. Kachin), indigenous providers are still unwilling to collaborate with government systems. Strengthening engagement and coordination between indigenous providers of education and government education authorities at all levels is a key component of this action and is critical to, building greater trust and collaboration, which is instrumental to local and national peace building efforts. Some indigenous providers have affirmed their willingness to engage in policy dialogue with the MoE. They recognise that to achieve government recognition and receive government funding for their education services they must work towards greater alignment and equivalency with the government system and strengthen cooperation and collaboration with the MoE.

MoE is, and will remain, the largest provider of education services and is the lead Ministry for all education sector reforms under the NESP, which recognises the need to create partnerships and mainstream education reforms within indigenous provision of education to achieve universal basic education. This offers an unprecedented opportunity to support progressive engagement between both sides. However, the ability and willingness of the new government and the MoE to meaningfully act on the NEL and NESP commitments that relate to ethnic education and to take a more conflict-sensitive approach has yet to be demonstrated. The government is yet to make progress in engaging most indigenous providers of education at the Union level, and in addressing key grievances such as the language of instruction, contrary to advances made by the previous administration in these two critical areas.

While complex education reform issues, such as the desire of indigenous providers for a national MTB-MLE system, will take time to resolve, the willingness of the MoE to address the education needs of the significant OOSC population offers opportunities to promote and support greater engagement and collaboration on both sides. Hence, supporting the indigenous providers to engage with the MoE on government-led priority initiatives for OOSC will help build mutual understanding and cooperation and pave the way for further engagement on more complex reform issues. As the relationship matures, negotiation between the MoE and indigenous providers will become more possible.

The Ministry of Border Affairs is potentially another stakeholder. However, its educational reach is limited to a few schools and technical and vocational training centres, and one university producing a limited number of teachers. As this Ministry is headed by the Military, its potential involvement in the action will have to be carefully assessed, given persistent distrust between EAGs and the Military. The applied education policy is under the auspices of MoE in any case.

The action will directly complement the EU "Enhancing the education and skills base in Myanmar" education sector reform contract (ESRC) (ACA/2018/039-665) by supporting indigenous providers of education to effectively strengthen the quality and standards across their education provision, build stronger alignment and complementarity with government education reforms, develop capacities for joint advocacy on issues unique to indigenous children and strengthen engagement

with the MoE to negotiate their role in the future national education system. Strengthening their position and voice in policy dialogue with the MoE can best be achieved through strengthening coordination and collaboration among them. Key stakeholders and beneficiaries of the action therefore include the 10 active members of the RISE network, and potentially other indigenous providers of education, who will be supported to expand access and improve the quality of basic education services in their respective geographical areas. Local teachers and children from community schools, OOSC, parents, local communities in remote villages, returning refugees and IDP camps and villages throughout post-conflict and conflict affected areas in target areas across the 9 states and regions mentioned above<sup>17</sup> are the final beneficiaries of the action. Local and state government education authorities and the MoE are critical stakeholders to the action for engagement in key education reform processes. Strengthening the capacity of indigenous providers to effectively participate in dialogue opportunities with government education authorities at all levels is a key component of the action.

### ***1.1.3 Priority areas for support/problem analysis***

Despite progress with enrolment and completion in government-led primary education, decades of underinvestment, conflict and poverty have stymied progress in ethnic areas. In many areas, schools are not available at all or only for a limited number of primary grades. Where schools are available, accessibility is often limited by weather, distance and terrain, in particular for younger children, those with disability and for girls, due to security concerns. Higher levels of poverty in these areas, often exacerbated by conflict, reduce the affordability and accessibility of education. A further barrier is the level of acceptability and relevance of the limited government education available as it does not meet local needs and demand, when there is a linguistic, cultural and religious divergence between communities and schools. Consequently, early dropout and high rates of OOSC persist in ethnic areas, much higher than the national average. Based on the 2015 education census, illiterate households are mainly a rural and ethnic phenomenon, especially in Chin (10.7 %), Kayah (17.1 %) and Shan (24.9 %) States. Data on education outcomes show that 63% of conflict-affected townships score below the national average on a composite education sub-index.

While there is gender parity in education at the national level, participation rates and learning outcomes vary for girls and boys in the lowest economic quintile, and in conflict-affected areas. The gender gap in adult literacy rates is pronounced in rural areas (men: 90.7; women: 83.8) and widens with increasing age, with over a quarter of women (27.3%) aged over 30 years reported as having never attended school compared to 17.2% of men. Poverty, child labour, patriarchal cultural norms and the lack of relevant quality education continue to create gender disparities with girls dropping out of school earlier and at a greater rate than boys. For those children who complete no higher than grade 2, almost two thirds (63.1%) were girls and a little over a third (36.9%) were boys, showing that fewer girls go on to higher levels of education. The educational imbalance is reversed at higher levels of education, with more than half (54.7%) of those who progress to grade 12 or higher being girls. Furthermore, at least 47% of primary aged children with disability do not attend school (more disabled boys are out of school than girls), with insufficient resources, lack of pedagogical support (learning materials and teaching specialists), lack of co-ordination and effective linkages between

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<sup>17</sup> Although an ethnic area, the situation in Rakhine State is different since there are no 'indigenous providers of education'. Education services are provided through the government system, alongside religious (monastic, madrasah) schools. Support to education in Rakhine State, including for IDPs, is and will be provided through the EU "Quality Basic Education Programme", through the Peace III action (ACA/2017/039-980), and through the EU "Enhancing the education and skills base in Myanmar" action (ACA/2018/039-665) which will support nationwide reform of the government education system. In case indigenous providers of education that will partner with the action identify the possibility of supporting remote conflict affected communities without education services in Rakhine State, particularly northern Rakhine State, this could be supported through the action.

special education schools and basic education school and lack of data on children with disabilities all being cited as significant barriers for children with disabilities.

The experiences of indigenous children as they progress through schooling highlight critical policy gaps that require redress. Whilst MTB-MLE is promoted by indigenous providers in community schools it is not consistently applied and the government has yet to approve a standardised approach to MTB-MLE in government schools. Indigenous providers promote MTB-MLE (not bilingual education) due to the multiplicity of languages and the value they place on maintaining their mother tongue. As many as 30% of all rural school children will not have heard the Myanmar/Burmese language before entering school.<sup>18</sup> Meanwhile, an estimated 70% of teachers working in government schools in ethnic areas are unable to speak the local language or dialect. Children's Myanmar-language competence is particularly low in communities that have lived primarily under the governance of EAGs and thus separate from mainstream Myanmar/Burma society<sup>19</sup>. In Myanmar/Burma, indigenous providers start children's education in their mother tongue. The national or dominant language (e.g. Myanmar/Burmese) is then introduced as a second language in early grades, but it does not become the medium of instruction until the students are sufficiently familiar with it.<sup>20</sup> This approach enables children to develop a firm foundation in their first language. In ethnic areas where community ethnic schools dominate, the mother tongue continues to be the medium of instruction throughout primary school. The ethnic language is taught as a subject as is Myanmar/Burmese (and English) usually from Grade 2 or 3.

Furthermore, while the NEL includes a provision to '*make arrangements to enable students to transfer between government schools and other schools according to designated standards*', there is no formal framework as yet for the transfer of students from community schools supported by indigenous providers to government schools: while some local arrangements allow students to sit the government exam or to take a placement test, non-native speakers of the Myanmar/Burmese language are at a huge disadvantage because the examination is in Myanmar/Burmese and English. The placement test is based on the national curriculum, which is viewed by indigenous communities as distinctly Bamar-centric<sup>21</sup> and often utilise Bamar and Buddhist concepts and experiences that may not be encountered in other parts of the country<sup>22</sup>. For many indigenous children, this means that they are unable to continue their education, since post primary services from indigenous providers of education are very limited. Whilst the NESP acknowledges the importance of recognition of student's prior learning, the policy to support its consistent implementation has yet to be developed. The action will support the indigenous providers in developing their first and second language learning programmes. This will be valuable, as it will support student transfer and education continuity as formal student transfer systems are developed between the ethnic and government education systems.

The government does not officially recognise community teachers from indigenous providers of education. While teacher accreditation is a key reform agenda under the NESP, dialogue with indigenous providers of education has not begun. The MoE Comprehensive Teacher Education Framework and Teacher Competency Framework, designed to inform the professionalization of teachers, has yet to integrate or consider the perspectives and unique qualities indigenous community teachers bring to the country.

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<sup>18</sup> UNICEF 2010, cited in Pyoe Pin (2014), p. 8

<sup>19</sup> Jolliffe, K (2016) *Strength in Diversity: Towards Universal Education in Myanmar's ethnic areas*, (Asia Foundation)

<sup>20</sup> UNESCO (2003), p. 32. in Jolliffe, K (2016)

<sup>21</sup> Salem-Gervais and Metro. (2012), pp. 30, 34-53

<sup>22</sup> Ibidem 19



Conflict, remoteness and resource scarcity have starved many indigenous providers of the valuable long-term investment needed to strengthen provision. As DPs have increasingly normalised relations with the government and turned to supporting the MoE, the availability of external funding to most indigenous providers of education has become unstable and has decreased significantly. Resources barely stretch beyond maintenance, leaving most providers without the necessary frameworks and policies to guide effective teaching and learning. Most report that their energy is spent on sourcing vital funding for teacher stipends rather than on initiatives that would strengthen quality in service provision.

The erosion of many indigenous education services in Myanmar/Burma is happening at a pervasive rate. The expansion of government services in ethnic areas is being undertaken without proper conflict sensitive consideration of the damage this potentially causes to local providers and the learning outcomes of indigenous children. Community teachers are being displaced by newly recruited daily wage government teachers, local language teaching is being compromised, and indigenous children are struggling to adapt to Myanmar/Burmese as the language of instruction, which is contributing to early drop out. These losses are significant. When 70,000 daily wage teachers were deployed over the period of 2015-2016 to increase the government teaching force, indigenous providers of education reported that 30% of daily wage teachers deployed to their areas left their post within one year. This directly impacted 50,000 children who experienced significant disruption in their education or dropped out of school. Many indigenous providers have suffered significant losses to their oversight of community schools with community schools now managed under a mixed administration arrangement.

Despite the challenges faced by indigenous providers of education, they have many strengths, in particular: their ability to reach the most remote and marginalised populations; their resilience to local conflict dynamics; their experience in providing mother-tongue based and multilingual education; their value, relevance and legitimacy in the eyes of communities; and their potential to play a role in the longer-term rebuilding of social cohesion. Undermining the capacity of indigenous providers risks further excluding marginalised children from access to education, heightening local tensions and fuelling further concerns over the peace process. Considering the likely lengthy period before a comprehensive political settlement, support from the international community, to both government and indigenous education provision, is essential to meet the immediate needs of children and communities in ethnic areas and to demonstrate that peace can lead to positive improvements in community development.

## 2 RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS

Risks	Risk level (H/M/L)	Mitigating measures
<b>Political:</b> The peace process fails and has serious repercussions on the government's current decentralisation processes and a federal system is rejected by the government, the Parliament and the military.	H	A commitment to the federal concept is part of the NCA. Nevertheless, the form, and extent, of any federal system is likely to be highly contentious, will take significant time to negotiate, and will ultimately require Constitutional change (an area where the military holds veto power). The ability of external actors to efficiently mitigate political risks is relatively limited. The action seeks to support the peace process and the federal concept by supporting engagement of indigenous providers with MoE and progress towards decentralisation of education service provision. Furthermore, peacebuilding and reconciliation will be promoted in this action's support to teachers and students where peace, non-violence, tolerance and respect for diversity will be

<p>The government does not prioritise peace over economic development and continues the expansion of government services in contested ethnic areas and areas not under their control.</p>		<p>integrated into life skills curriculum for OOS youth, women's literacy classes and in the content of teacher education programs under wellbeing and pedagogy modules.</p> <p>This action complements efforts under the IAQE project and ESRC to support the MoE to engage in policy dialogue and create a partnership with indigenous providers of education by directly supporting constructive engagement with the MoE. This will help ensure that any further expansion of government education is done in a more consultative and conflict sensitive manner and that the MoE recognises and harnesses the significant contribution of indigenous service providers in helping meet national education targets. The action also seeks to engage DPs in coordinating efforts in ethnic areas and as a way of ensuring service expansion does not negatively impact indigenous communities and the peace process.</p>
<p><b>Strategic:</b> The positive relationship between indigenous providers deteriorates and they are unable to find common ground in relation to government education sector reforms.</p> <p>Donor strategy favours particular providers over others and causes fragmentation in the network, eroding the possibility of unification.</p>	H	<p>The action specifically supports existing networks of indigenous providers of education and fosters inclusion of new members to mitigate risks of fragmentation, support and promote unity, and create and harness joint policy advocacy efforts with the MoE. An existing network (RISE) has expressed their willingness to engage in education reform processes currently underway and the action seeks to ensure inclusivity and a conflict sensitive do-no-harm approach to the provision of international assistance.</p> <p>The coordination platform supported under this action will enable DPs to harmonise efforts in ethnic areas and encourage balanced support to indigenous providers.</p>
<p><b>Economic:</b> The MoE does not establish partnerships with indigenous providers of education as foreseen in the NESP and government funding does not become available to sustain indigenous education provision.</p> <p>Funding to indigenous providers of education favours particular providers over others and undermines the financial stability and capacity of indigenous providers, particularly smaller groups that do not have a diverse funding base.</p>	M	<p>The action supports the engagement of indigenous providers of education with the World Bank Inclusive Access and Quality Education (IAQE) program and the DP coordinating mechanism to support the identification of sustainable funding models, including through government resource allocation.</p> <p>The action specifically supports the network of indigenous providers of education and provides space for the inclusion of new members to mitigate risks of lack of funding leading to the collapse of indigenous provision of education. This approach ensures inclusivity and a conflict sensitive do-no-harm approach to the provision of international assistance and promotes inclusive development practices and the harmonisation of support.</p>
<p><b>Operational:</b> The weak financial and technical capacity of indigenous providers leads to issues in financial compliance and weak monitoring and evaluation processes.</p>	M	<p>The EU will select an implementing partner with the necessary level of trust and capacity to support the institutional development of indigenous providers of education.</p> <p>The indigenous providers of education have a proven track record of being highly resilient and responsive to</p>

Conflict escalates/ resumes in indigenous providers areas to the extent that access to selected communities is disrupted		conflict dynamics in their respective areas. While the resumption and/or escalation of conflict may necessitate revisions to the objectives of the action and implementation plans it is envisaged that partners will maintain some operational capacity to deliver education services in their areas. Partners will be supported to operationalize alternative strategies if conflict resumes/escalates in their areas.
<p><b>Developmental:</b> Appropriate pathways for OOS boys and girls and illiterate women are not available.</p> <p>Lack of commitment to disability and gender inclusion and gender and disability sensitive outcomes further marginalise women and persons with disabilities.</p>	L	<p>The action will leverage the work undertaken by the EU and other DPs to support the MoE to establish alternative education pathways for OOSC and illiterate women, including NFE and TVET, and will support indigenous providers of education to adapt these education opportunities for indigenous OOSC. Furthermore, engagement with women and youth civil society organisations (CSOs) will be fostered to promote linkages and partnerships for the implementation of alternative education options for OOSC illiterate women.</p> <p>Conflict dynamics and social norms have led to disability and gender inequities in education outcomes of boys and girls and children with disabilities, with more than 47% of children with disabilities being OOS; more males than women are employed as mobile teacher trainers and more women than men work as community teachers.</p> <p>Mitigating measures include: ensuring that all education data collected is disaggregated by gender and where possible disability; conducting a gender and disability inclusion analysis of community schools; training Teacher Trainers and school leaders on gender and disability sensitisation and mainstreaming; including gender and disability inclusion strategies and pedagogy practice in preservice and in-service teacher education programmes; and developing gender and disability inclusion organisational policies.</p> <p>Furthermore, strategies and approaches to address the education needs of OOSC will specifically identify and address the barriers faced by both girls and boys and children with disabilities; teacher training materials and curricula will be de-stereotyped; and women's organisations will be engaged to support women's literacy and empowerment, and a gender balance in the recruitment of indigenous education provider staff at all levels will be promoted.</p>
<b>Assumptions</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The on-going process of political, economic and administrative reforms continues.</li> <li>• Progress in the national peace process will continue, culminating in an agreement that will, among other things, establish a federal union that will recognise the role of the basic service departments of the EAGs in a decentralised federal system.</li> <li>• The MoE remains committed to the implementation of the NESP 2016-21.</li> <li>• The government will continue to cooperate constructively with DPs allowing education reforms to progress effectively and efficiently with international funding and support for the reforms.</li> <li>• Both government and DPs continue to adhere to the Development Assistance Policy.</li> </ul>		

### 3 LESSONS LEARNT, COMPLEMENTARITY AND CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

#### 3.1 Lessons learnt

There is substantial global evidence in both developed and developing countries of the challenges faced by national education systems to adequately support indigenous and ethnic minority children. This is due to the remoteness of many ethnic communities, the significant poverty profile and the complex multi-lingual/multi-cultural contexts where many indigenous and ethnic minority children live. These children often find it challenging to adapt to a standardised national curriculum that is foreign to their traditional way of knowing and does not include content that acknowledges their history or culture. High dropout and poor performance often typify the experiences of many indigenous children in national government systems. It is also a very challenging environment for non-indigenous teachers to work within. Coupled with the 'culture shock', the intermittent quality of services and the physical isolation of such communities, non-indigenous teachers do not stay long.<sup>23</sup> As a result, indigenous and ethnic minority children often face significant disruption to their education when teacher absenteeism is high. International experience shows that diverse systems are especially important in multi-cultural and multi-lingual societies. In Myanmar/Burma, non-state (ethnic, faith-based, community) schools play an important role by complementing state education in underserved areas and for the most disadvantaged children. Studies show that they are culturally resonant and more responsive to local needs, particularly when they recruit teachers from the local community, and existing non-state and state collaborative arrangements at local level can provide good practice examples.

International engagement with indigenous providers of education over the past decades show weaknesses in how conflict sensitivity is understood and applied in ethnic areas of Myanmar/Burma. Dialogue with indigenous providers of education has highlighted some key learnings.

1. **Spend time to build trust and a positive relationship with indigenous providers of education.** Forming a relationship with them takes time and trust is essential. External organisations are generally viewed with suspicion due to a long history of exclusion and non-engagement in national education reforms. Spending time and participating in open, honest and genuine dialogue, and using culturally sensitive language is critical.
2. **Empower indigenous providers of education.** Recognise and respect their in-depth knowledge of local needs, their expertise, their bonds with communities, and their outreach capacity. Do not by-pass them. Involve them (genuinely) in the design of the implementation strategy, in the selection of the implementing partner(s), and in the governance and monitoring mechanisms (e.g. Steering Committee). Acknowledge their limited capacities and priority needs and adopt flexible procedures while developing their capacities.
3. **Avoid actions that can cause fragmentation.** Consulting one group and not another or giving information to different groups at different times erodes confidence, leads to misunderstandings and creates divisions between those who have been consulted and those who have not. Avoid competitive funding mechanisms which inevitably favour the strongest indigenous providers over smaller ones with less capacities. Recognise and support their willingness and efforts to work collaboratively and equitably.
4. **Development assistance can exacerbate conflict.** Assistance frequently distorts social relations, entrenches inequalities and can allow some groups to benefit to the detriment of others. Many local indigenous communities prioritise security over development and are deeply suspicious of development delivered by the government.

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<sup>23</sup> Van Gelderen, B. (2017). Growing Our Own: A 'two way' place-based approach to Indigenous initial teacher education in remote Northern Territory. *Australian and International Journal of Rural Education*, 27(1), pp. 14–28.

5. **Acknowledge heterogeneity within and between indigenous providers of education.** Diversity is a positive feature of indigenous providers of education in Myanmar/Burma and it needs to be promoted.
6. **Ensure adequate (and up to date) understanding of the (conflict) context through conflict analysis from an indigenous perspective and continued monitoring of developments.** Without a sound understanding of specific dynamics in each of the ethnically controlled areas and within and between indigenous providers of education, there is a risk of doing harm or of failing to seize opportunities to foster social cohesion and promote genuine peace building.
7. **Strengthening systems cannot be done in the absence of maintenance.** Unlike government education systems which are financed through tax revenues and bilateral and multilateral funding, indigenous systems of education, particularly when they exist outside the government system, do not have access to sustainable funding to pay for the basics of provision, such as teacher salaries and learning materials. Donors often prefer to fund system strengthening without the foresight to understand how the basics are being financed.

The ECHO-funded project has contributed to develop strategies to rapidly train and deploy teachers to communities without education services, alongside sensitisation of communities on the importance of education, which proved very effective in reaching OOSC and keeping them in school once enrolled. By working through the RISE network, it has effectively contributed to strengthening coordination among indigenous providers of education and has reinforced their interest in developing common quality standards, directions and positions, establishing a stepping-stone for their collective engagement with the MoE on education reforms. This project has however been constrained by the humanitarian nature of ECHO's support, which limited the scope of activities, the duration, and was missing the dialogue with government on education policy in the affected areas. In line with the humanitarian-development nexus, this action will continue to support indigenous providers of education in sustaining and expanding their services, reaching another level by focusing on improving quality and learning outcomes and developing capacities for joint advocacy and positive engagement with the MoE. This action will also seek to identify and develop sustainable funding modalities for indigenous providers of education beyond this funding period. Key to this will be to promote partnerships with MoE, in direct complementarity with the Inclusive Access and Quality Education (IAQE) project (see 3.2). This is politically sensitive however, given persistent distrust between government and EAGs and the slow pace of the peace process, and hence partnerships may take time to materialise.

### **3.2 Complementarity, synergy and donor coordination**

The action operationalises the humanitarian-development nexus by directly building on and leveraging the relationships built through the EUR 1.01 million ECHO-funded project (2016-2018). To ensure maintenance of education services that were supported by ECHO, the "EU Peace Support in Myanmar/Burma - PEACE III" (ACA/2017/039-980) action is supporting a transition phase which will also serve to prepare for the longer-term support of this action.

Synergies with the MoE IAQE project, managed by the World Bank (WB) and funded by the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), an International Development Association (IDA) loan, and by the EU for Public Financial Management (PFM) system strengthening (under the "Enhancing the education and skills base in Myanmar" (ACA/2018/039-665) action) have been developed in close collaboration with the WB. A core component of the IAQE project is to drive forward the development of the NESP partnership mechanism between MoE and indigenous providers of education through: the development of a roadmap to establish a minimum and coherent education framework; the implementation of selected initiatives/pilots for partnership; and the establishment of innovative funding arrangements for partnership. The action will provide much needed policy advocacy capacity development for indigenous providers, while strengthening coordination among

them, to ensure that they are fully prepared and supported to engage in constructive dialogue with the MoE. This will provide the foundation from which indigenous providers of education can then engage with the MoE on potential joint programme and funding pilot initiatives with the MoE, directly supporting and contributing to the successful implementation of the IAQE project.

Furthermore, the action complements, and will be closely coordinated and possibly cooperate with, the Myanmar Education Consortium's (MEC) support to three of the largest EAG-affiliated indigenous providers of education (Karen Education Department (KED), the Kachin Independence Organisation Education Department (KIOED) and the Mon National Education Committee (MNEC)), funded by Australia, Denmark and the United Kingdom currently through Save the Children. The MEC strategy focuses on system strengthening and works bilaterally with the monastic system and some selected established indigenous education systems (providing support for education service delivery, institutional strengthening, and advocacy and policy engagement). This action takes a complementary approach, since it focuses on promoting unity and strengthening coordination between indigenous providers of education and enabling support to smaller providers, with a view to raising quality and standards across all the indigenous providers of education and ensuring greater alignment with the government education system.

The action also complements ongoing support to indigenous providers of education supported by other DPs, including: 1) the "Strengthening Equity, Access and Quality in Education" project, implemented by ECHO and DEVCO's (transition phase) implementing partner, ADRA, and funded by NORAD with a new phase of funding in preparation; and 2) the recent USAID funded "Advancing Community Empowerment in Southeast Myanmar" project, which aims to empower communities to access the services they need and will work through yet to be selected indigenous providers of education.

Although political sensitivity remains, growing openness and freedom to discuss work undertaken in ethnic areas has allowed the recent establishment of an "Education in Ethnic States and Regions (ESSR)" group, which will be the platform for coordination and dialogue between organisations supporting education in ethnic areas. Co-led by ADRA and MEC, it involves the main partners working in these areas (Save the Children, PACT, World Education, World Vision, VSO, UNICEF etc.) and key donors and, in the longer term, should involve indigenous providers of education. This platform will be a key instrument to avoid duplication of efforts, address gaps and improve support for service providers. It will also help ensuring coordinated advocacy and common messaging, and strengthening alignment across programmes and partners in areas such as capacity development, teacher remunerations, curriculum, language and recognition. It will also promote links to other existing groups (e.g. Education in Emergencies, Teacher Training, Disability, etc.).

The action will also promote linkages with the efforts of DPs involved in supporting implementation of various aspects of the NESP. This includes linkages with the MoE Department of Alternative Education, which is mandated to significantly expand non-formal education opportunities for OOSC throughout the country (WB/GPE); efforts to support the development of a comprehensive teacher education policy framework (WB, UNICEF, UNESCO, JICA); efforts to promote the teaching of ethnic languages and the inclusion and development of local curricula (UNICEF) within the government education system; and efforts by DPs through the Education and Disability Sub Working Group, which collaborates with the MoE, to promote disability inclusion in education reforms.

Finally, the action directly complements the EU "Enhancing the education and skills base in Myanmar" ESRC and ensures a conflict-sensitive and balanced EU support to education provision in Myanmar/Burma. Under the ESRC, budget support will be provided to the government to implement the NESP, strengthen PFM systems, and support policy dialogue. Through this action, complementary support to indigenous providers of education will allow them to improve the quality of their education provision and expand their reach to some of the most marginalised children in

conflict affected and post-conflict areas. The action will contribute to meeting the MoE education targets in the NESP and strengthen alignment of indigenous education services with government education. This will prepare indigenous providers for government recognition and financing options for the future. The action will support indigenous providers of education to develop evidence-based policy positions on key issues related to the education needs of indigenous children and support their policy advocacy engagement with the MoE. This evidence base will strongly position the EU for a well-informed policy dialogue with the MoE, which will also be leveraged by the political and policy dialogue associated with the ESRC, to encourage MoE to progressively address in government education reforms issues relating to education of indigenous children. Hence, through the ESRC and this action, EU support will improve the quality and expand the reach of both government and indigenous provision of education, and will foster greater dialogue, cooperation and collaboration between the MoE and indigenous providers of education in order to forge, in the longer term, a partnership between the MoE and indigenous providers of education that creates a diverse but coherent national education system that promotes and protects the right of indigenous children to a quality education.

### **3.3 Cross-cutting issues**

The action will contribute to cross-cutting issues through the following:

- Collection and analysis of sex disaggregated data to inform and improve education programme strategies and approaches, gender and disability inclusion analysis and the development of school inclusion policies; and capacity development of teachers so that they are better equipped to teach effectively in a gender and disability inclusive manner. This, together with establishing education services in communities without school, will directly contribute to reducing the number of girls out of school. Improvements in equitable teacher stipends and teacher competencies will directly benefit the living conditions of women in conflict affected rural ethnic areas as women constitute most of the teaching force. Furthermore, improvements in access, retention and completion rates of both girls and boys and adult literacy programmes for older women will directly contribute to improving literacy rates, breaking the cycle of poverty, improving women's livelihood opportunities, and combating child labour and early marriage, which are all prevalent in ethnic areas. This, in turn, will inform policy engagement by indigenous education providers to raise awareness and promote these issues at the state and national level. Promoting women to senior roles within indigenous providers of education organisations and supporting their capacity development to engage in policy dialogue with the government is a key component of the action and will support the inclusion of more women in decision making roles.
- Improving environmental sustainability, disaster risk reduction and preparedness and mine risk education will be undertaken and will include support to School Management Committees and Parents-Teachers Associations to develop action plans to support environmentally sustainable school operations.
- Indigenous providers of education will be supported to develop collective policy positions informed by evidence from implementation of the action and other donor funded programmes and to engage in policy dialogue at the local, state and national levels. This will contribute to keeping equity issues high on the education reform agenda, particularly related to human rights and rights of indigenous and ethnic minorities, and gender and disability inclusion.
- Strengthening the governance capacity of indigenous providers of education will support their ability to ultimately establish a partnership with the MoE to achieve an equitable and coherent national education system that meets the needs of all children. This will not only ensure that the indigenous peoples of Myanmar/Burma directly contribute to their own social, economic and cultural development but that they also have a place within and help inform Myanmar/Burma's transition to democracy.

## 4 DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION

### 4.1 Objectives/results

The **overall objective** of the action is to contribute to a peaceful and inclusive society for sustainable development in Myanmar/Burma.

The **specific objective** is: Improved access and learning for indigenous children, youth and women in conflict affected and post-conflict areas who benefit from indigenous education and training harmonised with national education standards.

#### **Expected results:**

1. **Improved standards of education provision** in schools supported by indigenous providers of education.
2. **Expansion of indigenous education services** to communities without schools and strengthened alternative education pathways to reach OOS youth and illiterate women.
3. **Strengthened Indigenous Teacher Professional Development (TPD).**
4. **The policy positions and standards of operation of indigenous providers of education are more harmonised** and unified, including gender and disability inclusive strategies.
5. **Progressive alignment between** the services provided by indigenous providers of education and government services.

This action is relevant for the Agenda 2030. It contributes primarily to the progressive achievement of SDG 16: *Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development*, in particular Goal 16.b.2 *Educational Equality*, but also promotes progress towards SDG 4: *Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education*, SDG 1: *End poverty*, and SDG 5: *Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls*. This does not imply a commitment by the country benefiting from this action.

### 4.2 Main activities

Indicative activities for Result 1: (i) recruit and provide a minimum of 1 year preservice teacher training for community teachers, (ii) improve the standards of preservice teacher education by revising the 1 year preservice training programme to achieve greater alignment with equivalent teaching standards and the Myanmar/Burma teacher competency framework as well as gender and disability inclusion strategies and MTB-MLE, including developing a student teacher placement program, (iii) pay teacher stipends according to agreed equitable standards, (iv) distribute mother tongue based resources and quality teaching and learning materials, (v) conduct a gender and disability inclusion analysis of community schools managed by indigenous providers of education, (vi) train school leaders on instructional leadership and management, gender and disability sensitisation and mainstreaming, (vii) support Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs)/School Management Committees (SMCs) to mobilise resources to support school improvement plans and initiatives, (viii) conduct mine risk and disaster risk education, (ix) support to community schools to develop Codes of Conduct, child protection and safeguarding policies, (x) contextualise early grade literacy and numeracy assessments for local language, contextual relevance and alignment with government curriculum standards, (xi) undertake literacy and numeracy assessments at baseline, midline and end-line, (xii) report learning outcomes and results, and (xiii) conduct annual learning events to share results and develop actions to address gaps in results for boys and girls.

Indicative activities for Result 2: (i) recruit and train teachers using the 3-month rapid preservice training program for communities without school, (ii) revise the rapid preservice training manual to achieve greater alignment with equivalent MoE teaching standards, (iii) support community education sensitisation events in these communities, support to establish PTAs/SMCs in communities where school services are established, (iv) train SMC/PTAs to develop action plans to support school operations, (v) support new partnerships/collaborations with local indigenous CSOs



such as women's and youth groups to expand community outreach and education initiatives, (vi) undertake a needs assessment for non-formal education (NFE)/Technical Vocational Education and Training (TVET)/literacy, numeracy and life skills targeting older OOS boys and girls and women who have missed out on basic education, (vii) funding of priority projects, including assistance for OOS boys and girls and women to participate in appropriate education programmes, and (viii) document action research to capture learning and results of alternative education provision for older OOS boys and girls and women in conflict affected and post-conflict communities.

*Indicative activities for Result 3:* (i) revise the existing Master training course for Teacher Trainers with a focus on gender and disability inclusion sensitisation, (ii) develop/align in-service teacher training (TT) materials to MoE in-service TT programme and include gender and disability inclusion pedagogy practice, (iii) support to establish and maintain teacher peer networks, (iv) improve management of the TPD database, (v) support mobile teacher trainers (MTT) community school visits, (vi) develop a unified teacher competency framework (TCF) for indigenous providers of education that aligns with MoE TCF, (vii) develop teacher assessment instruments, including observational forms and self-review, (viii) develop a TPD implementation guide that aligns with the MoE Comprehensive Teacher Education framework and best practice TPD models, and (ix) document action research on TPD approaches in remote areas.

*Indicative activities for Result 4:* (i) develop a joint advocacy strategy, (ii) develop advocacy positions and policy documents to support local and national dialogue, (iii) conduct advocacy training for leaders of indigenous providers of education, (iv) develop gender and disability inclusion organisational policies, (v) conduct quarterly leadership forums, (vi) hold state forums to showcase results of studies undertaken, (vii) hold national forums to promote sharing and learning from indigenous providers of education, and (viii) support for inclusion and empowerment of women in the dialogue process.

*Indicative activities for Result 5:* (i) exposure visits to MoE teacher training colleges and to training preparation centres managed by indigenous providers of education, (ii) dialogue to advance partnerships with MoE teacher education institutes, (iii) research to map local curriculum delivered by indigenous providers of education including MTB-MLE, (iv) research to document evidence of progressive alignment agenda of services provided by indigenous groups and government services, (v) consultation and dialogue between indigenous providers of education and MoE to advance reform topics of importance to the Indigenous providers of education, with a likely focus on MTB-MLE and (vi) support to continuous coordination between DPs working on education in ethnic areas to create synergies and harmonise efforts to support indigenous service provision.

### 4.3 Intervention logic

**If standards of education provision in indigenous schools are improved, more indigenous children will receive a higher quality education** and learning improvements will be visible in assessment data and retention and grade promotions will be evident in school data. This will be more likely if sustainable funding for the maintenance of education services, such as payment of teacher stipends and teaching and learning resources can be secured. Conflict and disaster events will also need to limit disruption to school operations and not prevent distribution of materials, training and supportive supervision inputs reaching schools in a timely manner. With the introduction of quality standards, internal human resource capacity of indigenous providers of education will need to be sufficient to apply quality standards consistently across the diversity of education provision where poverty and remoteness typify the locations where indigenous services are provided.

**If the action expands services to communities without schools, more indigenous children will have access to education.** This will only be possible if community leaders and indigenous providers of education can identify suitable individuals in their communities to become teachers. Local recruitment is a critical component of the rapid deployment strategy and the cornerstone to the

expansion of services to remote locations. For older OOS youth and women who have either never attended school or have very limited education to engage in non-formal or vocational training programmes, several key assumptions exist. This will be more probable if current national NFE curriculum and national TVET programs can be contextualised for the indigenous learner and the contexts where they live. This will also be more straightforward if TVET and NFE services exist in ethnic areas and have committed organisations to support them. The government and local communities will need to foresee support to the local population to make livelihoods while studying in TVET and NFE centres. Furthermore, collection and making available some labour market information would help motivation of the local population to attend TVET and NFE.

Improving the quality of education delivered by indigenous providers of education can only be made possible if significant investment is undertaken to **strengthen Indigenous TPD and bring TPD into alignment with key national education reforms**, such as the Comprehensive Teacher Education Framework and Teacher Competency Framework. Several factors influence progress in this result area. Many of the locations are extremely remote and conflict affected so the ability to establish peer teacher networks in all locations will need a degree of adaptation based on what is possible in some locations. Similarly, MTTs' support to schools is a critical feature of the indigenous TPD approach, yet regularity of visits can sometimes be hampered by the weather and the distance they must travel, usually by foot across difficult terrain. This approach has been implemented in conflict affected areas for over a decade, and indigenous providers are adaptable and resilient to a forever changing context. The action however will require that indigenous providers reach agreement and endorse the frameworks for teacher education that align to the MoE TPD framework and TCF.

This will be more possible through a network approach. **Increasing the harmonisation and unification of indigenous providers of education** in relation to their policy positions and standards of operation, including gender and disability inclusive strategies, will contribute to improving education quality in ethnic areas and have a positive effect on overall education equality in Myanmar/Burma. In the short term this will also enable indigenous providers of education to leverage capacities across the network and build on each other's strengths. This will be possible if conflict does not escalate and reduce the willingness of providers to become more unified and/or engage with the government on education reform issues.

**Progressive alignment between the services provided by indigenous providers of education and government services** will contribute to raising the standards of community schools and create greater complementarity between government and indigenous services. There is much anticipation about this result although it will be dependent on whether the government and indigenous providers continue to be open to constructive dialogue.

The **contribution made by this action's overall objective towards a peaceful inclusive society for sustainable development in Myanmar/Burma** will be possible if the government remains supportive of establishing a national platform for dialogue as outlined in the NESP and remains committed to education equality as articulated in its commitment to 'leaving no child behind'. It is critical that the government expansion of services into ethnic areas is done in a conflict sensitive way and does not displace community teachers and erode indigenous systems as this will reduce trust in the peace process and impact the willingness of indigenous providers to identify common ground and build complementarity. Therefore, a nuanced conflict sensitive approach has been developed to promote unity and avoid fragmentation between indigenous providers who currently service community schools in remote conflict affected regions in Myanmar/Burma. The action will minimise unintended negative outcomes and increase intentional positive ones, while fostering collaboration with the government at local, state and national levels.

## **5 IMPLEMENTATION**

### **5.1 Financing agreement**

In order to implement this action, it is not foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner country.

### **5.2 Indicative implementation period**

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 4.1 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 72 months from the date of adoption by the Commission of this Action Document.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission's authorising officer responsible by amending this decision and the relevant contracts and agreements; such amendments to this decision constitute technical amendments in the sense of point (i) of Article 2(3)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014.

### **5.3 Implementation modalities**

Both in indirect and direct management, the Commission will ensure that the EU appropriate rules and procedures for providing financing to third parties are respected, including review procedures, where appropriate, and compliance of the action with EU restrictive measures affecting the respective countries of operation<sup>24</sup>.

#### **5.3.1 Grants: call for proposals “Strengthening Indigenous Provision of Education in Ethnic Areas of Myanmar” (direct management)**

(a) Objectives of the grants, fields of intervention, priorities of the year and expected results

The objectives and expected results of the grants will be to improve access to education and learning outcomes for indigenous boys and girls living in remote conflict affected areas of Myanmar/Burma, as described in sections 4.1 and 4.2.

(b) Eligibility conditions

In order to be eligible for a grant, the applicant must:

- be a legal person,
- be a specific type of organisation such as: non-governmental organisation, public sector operator, local authority, international (inter-governmental) organisation;
- be directly responsible for the preparation and management of the action with the co-applicant(s) and affiliated entity(ies), not acting as an intermediary.
- be established in<sup>25</sup> a Member State of the European Union or in an eligible country for funding under the DCI Regulation, as stipulated in Article 9 of the Common Implementing Regulation (CIR). This obligation does not apply to international organisations.

Subject to information to be published in the call for proposals, the indicative amount of the EU contribution per grant is EUR 10 000 000 to EUR 20 000 000 and the grants may be awarded to sole beneficiaries and to consortia of beneficiaries (coordinator and co-beneficiaries). The indicative duration of the grant (its implementation period) is 60 months.

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<sup>24</sup> [https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/restrictive\\_measures-2017-04-26-clean.pdf](https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/restrictive_measures-2017-04-26-clean.pdf)

<sup>25</sup> To be determined on the basis of the organisation's statutes, which should demonstrate that it has been established by an instrument governed by the national law of the country concerned and that its head office is located in an eligible country. In this respect, any legal entity whose statutes have been established in another country cannot be considered an eligible local organisation, even if the statutes are registered locally or a 'Memorandum of Understanding' has been concluded.

#### (c) Essential selection and award criteria

The essential selection criteria are financial and operational capacity of the applicant.

The essential award criteria are relevance of the proposed action to the objectives of the call; design, effectiveness, feasibility, sustainability and cost-effectiveness of the action.

#### (d) Maximum rate of co-financing

The maximum possible rate of co-financing for grants under this call is 95% of the eligible costs of the action.

If full funding is essential for the action to be carried out, the maximum possible rate of co-financing may be increased up to 100 %. The essentiality of full funding will be justified by the Commission's authorising officer responsible in the award decision, in respect of the principles of equal treatment and sound financial management.

#### (e) Indicative timing to launch the call

First semester of 2019.

### 5.4 Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply.

The Commission's authorising officer responsible may extend the geographical eligibility in accordance with Article 9(2)(b) of Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.

### 5.5 Indicative budget

	<b>EU contribution (amount in EUR)</b>	<b>Indicative third party contribution (amount in EUR )</b>
5.3.1 – Call for proposals “Strengthening Indigenous Provision of Education in Ethnic Areas of Myanmar” (direct management)	20 000 000	1 052 631
5.8 – Evaluation, 5.9 – Audit	will be covered by another decision	N.A.
5.10 - Communication and visibility	will be covered by another decision	N.A.
Total	20 000 000	1 052 631

### 5.6 Organisational set-up and responsibilities

For the action, it is foreseen that a Steering Committee will be set up to provide strategic direction and review overall progress. This committee would have two co-chairs, i.e. from the indigenous providers of education and the EU. To build trust between indigenous providers and the MoE and to promote the cooperation and formal partnerships, the participation of MoE in the Steering Committee will be explored and pursued.

Policy dialogue will take several forms: (i) EU policy dialogue with the indigenous providers of education through the Steering Committee and regular monitoring of the action; (ii) EU policy dialogue with the MoE and other Ministries through the political and policy dialogue associated with the ESRC and ad hoc bilateral meetings with the government; (iii) EU's participation in forums and events and in consultations and dialogue between indigenous providers of education and the MoE supported by this action; (iv) policy dialogue with the MoE through the governance structure of the IAQE, to which the EU expects to be associated given the strong complementarity; (v) policy dialogue with the MoE through EU's participation in the regular education sector coordination mechanisms; and (vi) EU's participation to the recently established coordination platform between DPs working on education in ethnic areas, which will be further supported through this action.

## **5.7 Performance monitoring and reporting**

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be a continuous process and part of the implementing partner's responsibilities. To this aim, the implementing partner shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and final reports.

The monitoring system shall include metadata on the definition of indicators specified in the log frame below. Data collection instruments, methods, staffing and training will be established at the beginning of the action. The necessary surveys (e.g. on mapping locations without school services, foundational literacy and numeracy assessment, community school quality standards survey, Indigenous teacher competency assessment, local curriculum mapping, estimates of out of school children, the TVET and skill-building needs for youth and illiterate women, etc.) will be planned and budgeted in the program budget. The grantee will submit annual brief reports on the collected statistics. For the indicators matching with the EU Development and Cooperation Results Framework<sup>26</sup>, the grantee will consult the respective methodological notes.

Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (outputs and direct outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as reference the log frame matrix (for project modality) or the list of result indicators (for budget support). The report shall be laid out in such a way as to allow monitoring of the means envisaged and employed and of the budget details for the action. The final report, narrative and financial, will cover the entire period of the action implementation.

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

## **5.8 Evaluation**

Having regard to the importance of the action, a mid-term and final evaluation will be carried out for this action or its components via independent consultants.

The mid-term evaluation will be carried out for problem solving and learning purposes, in particular with respect to emerging policy concerns for indigenous providers of education and to review action research undertaken to inform special projects and advocacy objectives. The mid-term evaluation will provide an opportunity for modifications to the log frame and implementation approach to ensure it remains relevant to the needs of indigenous providers of education.

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<sup>26</sup> <https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/eu-rfi>

The final evaluation will be carried out for accountability and learning purposes at various levels, (including for policy revision), taking into account in particular key achievements in relation to teacher competency, boys and girls learning outcomes, the non-formal education pilots to support older OOS boys and girls and progress made in developing unified policy positions and alignment to quality standards of the government. The final evaluation will also consider the volatile peace process and any contextual factors that have influenced implementation and results.

The Commission shall inform the implementing partner at least two months in advance of the dates foreseen for the evaluation missions. The implementing partner shall collaborate efficiently and effectively with the evaluation experts, and inter alia provide them with all necessary information and documentation, as well as access to the project premises and activities.

The evaluation reports shall be shared with the partner country and other key stakeholders. The implementing partner and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, in agreement with the partner country, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project.

The financing of the evaluation shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing decision.

## **5.9 Audit**

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, based on a risk assessment, contract independent audits or expenditure verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.

The financing of the audit shall be covered by another measure constituting a financing decision.

## **5.10 Communication and visibility**

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the action, to be elaborated at the start of implementation and supported with the budget indicated in section 5.5 above.

In terms of legal obligations on communication and visibility, the measures shall be implemented by the Commission, the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and/or entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, the financing agreement, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the action and the appropriate contractual obligations.

## APPENDIX - INDICATIVE LOGFRAME MATRIX (FOR PROJECT MODALITY)<sup>27</sup>

The activities, the expected outputs and all the indicators, targets and baselines included in the logframe matrix are indicative and may be updated during the implementation of the action, no amendment being required to the financing decision. When it is not possible to determine the outputs of an action at formulation stage, intermediary outcomes should be presented and the outputs defined during inception of the overall programme and its components. The indicative logframe matrix will evolve during the lifetime of the action: new lines will be added for including the activities as well as new columns for intermediary targets (milestones) for the output and outcome indicators whenever it is relevant for monitoring and reporting purposes.

	Results chain	Indicators	Baselines (incl. reference year)	Targets (incl. reference year)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions
<b>Overall objective : Impact</b>	To contribute to a peaceful and inclusive society for sustainable development in Myanmar/Burma	Education equality (SDG 16.b.2 complementary <sup>28</sup> )	0.84 (2014)	TBD in inception phase	SDG16 Data Initiative <sup>29</sup>	
<b>Specific objective: Outcome</b>	Improved access and learning for indigenous children, youth and women in conflict affected and post-conflict areas who benefit from indigenous education and training harmonised with national education standards	Primary completion rate for children (GAP, ** EU RF L1 #14) attending indigenous education services disaggregated by sex and indigenous provider	TBD in inception phase	TBD in inception phase	Indigenous providers EMIS	Transportation is available and travel is not impacted by ongoing conflict or natural weather events. Conflict does not prevent children from enrolling in community schools. Government schools do not further displace community teachers. Education pathways for older OOSC boys and girls and women can be identified and supported. Government is
		# of children (disaggregated by sex, disability, indigenous provider) enrolled in primary education with EU support (GAP, EU RF L2 # 15 **)	343,649 (49.4% girls, 50.6% boys) (2018) <sup>30</sup>	TBD in inception phase	Indigenous providers EMIS	
		Early grade Literacy and Numeracy outcomes for children attending indigenous education services disaggregated by sex and Indigenous provider	TBD in inception phase	TBD in inception phase	Midline and endline studies of early grade literacy and numeracy	
		% (number) of community schools with EU support reaching agreed quality standards that supports learning for primary aged children disaggregated by sex and Indigenous provider	TBD in inception phase	TBD in inception phase	Community school quality standards assessment tool	
		% (number) of community teachers disaggregated by sex and Indigenous provider achieving satisfactory teacher competency based on the agreed TCF standards	TBD in inception phase	TBD in inception phase	Indigenous providers TCF assessment tool adapted from	

<sup>27</sup> Indicators aligned with the EU Results Framework are marked with '\*\*'.

<sup>28</sup> A complementary set of 2 indicators has been recommended to be used to supplement SDG b.1 – Proportion of population reporting having personally felt discriminated against or harassed in the previous 12 months on the basis of a ground of discrimination prohibited under international human rights law. SDG b.2 measures education equality whereas SDG b.3 measures health equality.  
[http://www.sdg16.org/map/?layer=educational\\_equality&layerType=indicator](http://www.sdg16.org/map/?layer=educational_equality&layerType=indicator).

<sup>29</sup> <http://www.sdg16.org/about/>

<sup>30</sup> Figures from endline of ECHO funded Conflict Areas Support for Education (CASE), which supported 8 indigenous providers of education (ended in April 2018).

					Myanmar TCF	supportive of establishing a national platform for dialogue. Indigenous teachers are hired and paid continuously. The learning materials are supplied uninterruptedly.
		# Out of school (OOSC) children (disaggregated by sex, disability and Indigenous provider) reported by indigenous providers (** EU RF L2 #5)	719,674 (2018) <sup>31</sup>	TBD in inception phase	OOSC baseline study	
		Number and ratio of female to male participants who have benefited from skills development with EU support from TVET and non-formal education (GAP, EU RF L2 # 28**).	TBD in inception phase	TBD in inception phase	Indigenous providers EMIS data for TVET and NFE	
		# older OOSC (disaggregated by sex, disability and Indigenous provider) and women enrolled in non-formal education programs <sup>32</sup> supported by Indigenous providers of education.	Zero	TBD in inception phase	Indigenous providers EMIS data for NFE	
		# pilot policy initiatives supported by the national government	Zero	TBD in inception phase	Documented evidence of the national government's support for policy initiatives	
Outputs	1. <b>Improved standards of education provision</b> in schools supported by indigenous providers of education.	1.1: # community teachers (disaggregated by sex and Indigenous provider) complete 1-year preservice Teacher Training program or equivalent with the support of this action (** EU RF L2 #17)	1.1: Zero	1.1: TBD in inception phase	TPC registration and completion data from TPC student teacher records	Sustainable funding for long term support for maintenance of education services of indigenous providers can be secured by the end of the action.
		1.2: # community teachers (disaggregated by sex and Indigenous provider) receiving equitable stipends annually with support from this action	1.2: Zero	1.2: TBD in inception phase	Indigenous providers EMIS	
		1.3: # communities where Indigenous providers of education schools receive Mother Tongue Based learning resources and Teaching and Learning Materials from this action annually	1.3: Zero	1.3: TBD in inception phase	Indigenous providers EMIS	Weather events or conflict preventing assessment teams from conducting assessments in schools.  Indigenous providers of
		1.4: # of community schools with gender and disability inclusion analysis conducted with support of this action by 2021	1.4: Zero	1.4: TBD in inception phase	2021 gender and disability inclusion report	

<sup>31</sup> et.al. 23

<sup>32</sup> Non-formal education programs may include women's literacy, life skills education, NFE and TVET



		1.5: # school leaders (disaggregated by sex and indigenous provider) trained in Instructional leadership, management, gender and disability sensitive and mainstreaming approaches	1.5: Zero	1.5 TBD in inception phase	records of participation in school leaders training	education have financial and Human/Professional capacity to apply the local curriculum framework in their indigenous community schools.
		1.6: # of community schools supported by this action that receive mine risk education and DRR training	1.6: Zero	1.6 TBD in inception phase	Training records from MRE and DRR training events	
		1.7: # community schools supported by this action with Code of Conduct, child safeguarding and child protection policies in place	1.7 Zero	1.7: TBD in inception phase	School codes of conduct and child safeguarding policy documentation	
		1.8: # reports on early grade learning outcomes disaggregated by Indigenous provider	1.8 Zero	1.8: 2 learning assessment reports incl. chapter for each Indigenous provider	Learning assessment reports	
	2. <b>Expansion of indigenous education services</b> to communities without schools and strengthened alternative education pathways to reach OOS youth and illiterate women	2.1: # OOS children (disaggregated by sex, disability, and indigenous provider) reached with the provision of indigenous teachers in their communities	2.1: Zero	2.1: TBD in inception phase	Indigenous providers EMIS	Community leaders and indigenous providers of education can identify suitable individuals in their communities to become teachers.
		2.2: # teachers (disaggregated by sex and indigenous provider) who have been deployed to communities after completing the 3-month rapid training program with the support of this action (** EU RF L2 #17)	2.2: Zero	2.2: TBD in inception phase	Indigenous providers EMIS	
		2.3: Status of revision to the ‘Rapid preservice training’ manual to increase alignment with Myanmar government’s Teacher Education Framework and integrate gender and disability inclusive teaching strategies and MTB-MLE	2.3: Edition 1 in 2016	2.3: Edition 2 endorsed by the Indigenous providers by 2021	The Rapid Preservice training manual	The national NFE and TVET programs can be contextualised for use in ethnic areas by indigenous providers of education.
		2.4: # of participants in education sensitization events organised with the support of this action (disaggregated by sex and indigenous provider)	2.4: Zero	2.4: TBD in inception phase	Attendance forms from sensitisation events	
		2.5: # of communities with Parent-Teacher Associations/School Management Committees established with the support of this action	2.5: Zero	2.5: TBD in inception phase	Indigenous providers EMIS	The local population is supported for making livelihood while studying at TVET and NFE centres.  The governmental and local employment
		2.6: # of communities with involvement of women’s and youth groups in community outreach & education support organised by this action	2.6: Zero	2.6: TBD in inception phase	Partnership agreements with women’s and youth groups	

		2.7: # of communities with ECD/NFE/TVET/life skills programs established with the support of this action	2.7: Zero	2.7: TBD in inception phase	ECD/NFE/TVET/life skills training need assessment report	centres avail information on labour market to the indigenous population.
3. <b>Strengthened Indigenous Teacher Professional Development (TPD)</b>	3.1: # indigenous teachers (disaggregated by sex and indigenous providers) who complete 70 hours of in-service TT with the support of this action (** EU RF L2 #17)	3.1: Zero	3.1: TBD in inception phase	Records of training	Peer teacher networks can be established in remote conflict affected areas of Myanmar.	
	3.2: # indigenous teachers (disaggregated by sex and indigenous providers) involved in a peer teacher network with the support of this action	3.2: Zero	3.2: TBD in inception phase	Teacher database	MTTs can travel to remote community schools without difficulty.	
	3.3: # indigenous teachers (disaggregated by sex and indigenous provider) with up to date records of professional development stored on the teacher database	3.3 Zero	3.3: TBD in inception phase	Teacher database	Indigenous providers and local communities endorse the developed frameworks and tools and negotiations with central gov. are ongoing	
	3.4: # community schools receiving MTT school visits annually as part of the school based TPD provision (disaggregated by indigenous provider)	3.4: Zero	3.4: TBD in inception phase	Indigenous providers EMIS	The teachers are supported by the communities and government to travel and exchange.	
	3.5: The status of harmonisation of the TCF to Myanmar TCF	3.5: Not aligned	3.5 Developed and discussed with MoE and indigenous providers	Minutes of meetings with MoE and Indigenous providers	Indigenous providers and communities reach a consensus with the government on how to further finance the TPD framework.	
	3.6: Status of alignment of Teacher assessment instruments to Myanmar TCF	3.6: Not aligned	3.6: Developed and discussed with MoE and indigenous providers	The Teacher assessment instruments incl. observation and self-review forms		
	3.7: The status of the TPD Implementation guide	3.7 Not developed	3.7: Developed and endorsed by indigenous providers	TPD implementation guide document		
	3.8: Status of updating the in-service teacher training program with gender and inclusive teaching strategies and MTB-MLE	3.8 Edition 1 – not updated	3.8 Edition 2 endorsed by indigenous providers by 2021	In-service training materials		
	3.9: # in service TT programs delivered to Indigenous teachers annually	3.9: Zero	3.9: TBD in inception phase	In-service training records		
4. <b>The policy positions and standards of</b>	4.1: # unified positions concerning Myanmar government policy developed by indigenous providers	4.1: Zero	4.1: TBD in inception phase	Policy positions	Conflict does not escalate and reduce the	

	<b>operation of indigenous providers of education are more harmonised and unified</b> , including gender and disability inclusive strategies	with the support of this action				willingness of providers to become more unified and to harmonise their policies and strategies.  The ability of Indigenous providers of education to consolidate, cooperate and utilise the outputs of the project.
		4.2: # personnel from Indigenous providers of education whose knowledge and skills have been built through advocacy training events	4.2: Zero	4.2: 5 (1 per year)	Minutes and presentations from advocacy training events	
		4.2: # Indigenous providers of education presenting papers or speeches at state and national forums with the support of this action	4.3: Zero	4.3: TBD in inception phase	Minutes and reports from state and national forums	
		4.4: # Indigenous women from Indigenous providers of education supported by this action to engage in the dialogue process	4.4: Zero	4.4: TBD in inception phase	Network membership profiles	
		4.5: # indigenous providers of education with gender and disability inclusive strategies in place	4.5: Zero	4.5: TBD in inception phase	Copies of gender and inclusive sensitivity strategies	
		4.7: Status of mapping of local curriculum delivered by indigenous providers of education including MTB-MLE	4.7: Not performed	4.6: 1 mapping report published	Local curriculum mapping report	
		4.8 status of a harmonised local curriculum framework including MTB-MLE for indigenous providers of education supported by this action	4.8 None	4.7: 1 local curriculum framework	Local curriculum framework document	
	5. <b>Progressive alignment</b> between the services provided by indigenous providers of education and government services.	5.1: # partnerships formed with Myanmar teacher colleges and teacher preparation centres to strengthen complementarity and alignment	5.1: Zero	5.1: TBD in inception phase	Meeting minutes and MoUs	National government and Indigenous providers of education continue to be open to constructive dialogue.
		5.2: # research studies documenting evidence of progressive alignment produced to guide political dialogue	5.2: Zero	5.2: TBD in inception phase	Research reports	
		5.3: Status of a coordination platform with DPs to better harmonise and leverage support to indigenous providers of education and avoid duplication	5.3: Zero	5.3: 1	ToR and working documents of the coordination platform	
		5.4: # of topics (local curriculum, teacher qualification, MTB-MLE) under the discussion of DPs with recommendations for joint action	5.4: Zero	5.4: TBD in inception phase	Joint action briefing notes & minutes from meetings	