

## SUMMARY

### Individual measure in favour of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to be financed from the 11<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund

### Support for reintegration and reconciliation of former armed non-state combatants and Boko Haram associates

#### 1. Identification

EDF allocation	11 <sup>th</sup> European Development Fund
Total cost	EUR 15 million of EU contribution
Basic act	Council Regulation (EU) 2015/322 of March 2015 on the implementation of the 11th European Development Fund

#### 2. Country background

In terms of development cooperation, the 11<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund (EDF) National Indicative Programme (NIP), EDF allocation to Nigeria has up until now followed the overall focus of the 10th EDF on measures to improve governance to encourage economic growth, strengthen the rule of law and expand social equity, with a reinforced focus on the North of the country.

The 11<sup>th</sup> EDF NIP focuses on 3 focal sectors: 1) Health, nutrition and resilience, 2) Sustainable energy and access to electricity and 3) Rule of law, governance and democracy. The total allocation is 562M€.

Sector 1: Health, nutrition and resilience (EUR 240 million) aimed to contribute to a reduction in poverty through improving policy and institutional governance to enhance health status, social cohesion, increasing maternal and child survival rates and strengthening the resilience of the most vulnerable households especially in Northern Nigeria.

Sector 2: Sustainable energy and access to electricity (150 million EUR), aimed to contribute to improving access to the sustainable supply of electricity, particularly for the poorest and in the least developed States especially in the North. This will be achieved by strengthening the capacity of relevant government agencies in developing policies and tailoring regulations to improve the functioning of the sector as well as target renewable energy infrastructure investments through blending to improve access.

Sector 3: Rule of law, governance and democracy (90 million EUR), aimed to contribute to government and civil society measures to improve economic governance, consolidate the rule of law, enhance peace and security, and reinforce democratic processes and continue the support to manage migration and mobility.

This action is particularly relevant to the third focal sector of the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF NIP for Nigeria, especially in regards to enhancing peace and security. In June 2009 the EU and the Federal Government of Nigeria signed the Nigeria-EU Joint Way Forward which gives an overview of the guidelines on principles, modalities and subjects for enhanced political dialogue and cooperation on a range of issues, including good governance, human rights, security and migration, followed on a yearly basis through ministerial and senior official dialogues. In March 2016, it was agreed to expand the level of engagement to include a local level political dialogue between the Federal Government of Nigeria, the EU Delegation and EU Member States.

Nigeria has been selected as one of the six pilot countries to operationalise the Humanitarian-Development Nexus, now known as the Humanitarian-Development,-Peace Nexus as requested by the Council of the European Union. The North East has been selected as the region to implement nexus activities; this intervention will contribute to strengthening community and state resilience to conflict and provide a complementary approach to addressing the underlying root causes to the conflict in the north east of Nigeria.

The intervention will adopt a Rights-Based Approach (RBA) in all activities in line with EU principles and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

The intervention logic of the AAP is especially relevant to the country's current context. The goal of the Nigerian government's 2017 PCVE Policy Framework and National Action Plan is to build safer communities resilient to violent extremism. In 2018 the government approved the 'Demobilisation, Disassociation, Reintegration and Reconciliation (DDRR) 3 year action plan,' which is specific in its goal of mitigating the threat of Boko Haram. It is aligned to the PCVE national action plan and other relevant national laws, such as 'National Security Strategy 2014' and 'National Counter-terrorism Strategy 2016', 'the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015', 'Child Rights Act 2003' and commits to abide by international human rights and humanitarian law. All intervention activities are in alignment with national DDRR and PCVE plans, and the Borno State Reconciliation and Reintegration policy which is nearing validation.

This intervention will coordinate closely with the EU's IcSP supported DDRR 18 month pilot project which has begun in the last quarter of 2018 and should provide the initial building blocks for this comprehensive intervention. Implemented by IOM, UNICEF and NEEM, a national CSO thematically expert in providing trauma related psychological support, it focusses on enhancing the authorities' registration, screening, categorization and referral process for former Boko Haram associates, the provision of basic reinsertion services and putting in place and testing the basic foundations for reintegration.

The choice of implementation modalities has also been done taking careful consideration of the country's context and its priorities. This action may be implemented in indirect management with an entity which will be selected by the Commission's services using the following criteria: demonstrable experience in the North East of Nigeria, specifically Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. Considerable experience in implementing complex programmes including security sector transformation, access to justice and community reconciliation and reintegration within the North East and other protracted conflict-affected areas is necessary.

The implementation by this entity entails all specific objectives which will contribute to 'Community-driven Reintegration and Reconciliation of former armed non-state combatants and Boko Haram associates.'

All actions are coherent with the objectives identified in the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF NIP.

### 3. Summary of the individual measure

#### 3.1. Action Proposed

##### 1. Action " EU Support for reintegration and reconciliation of former armed non-state combatants and Boko Haram associates " (CRIS reference FED/2018/041-601).

Amount EUR 15 million

The proposed action is in line with the EU's Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy of 2016 and will support Nigeria's integrated approach and the Humanitarian-Development,-Peace Nexus work of the EU. This means a broad range of cross-cutting and mutually reinforcing activities will be necessary, in implementation of the Nexus approach to enhance the impact of the EUs current 600 million plus Euro comprehensive support for the North East. The intervention will create multi-sectoral and multi-programmatic synergy where geographically and thematically relevant.

The overall objective of the '*Support for Reintegration and Reconciliation of former armed non-state combatants and Boko Haram associates*' intervention is to contribute to overall stability in the North East.

This intervention will build and develop as follows:

**Specific Objective 1:** Reduced rejection and stigmatisation of low risk associates.

**Specific Objective 2:** Increased community healing and reconciliation and decreased sense of injustice.

**Specific Objective 3:** Sustainable alternatives to violence increased and social cohesion enhanced.

**Specific Objective 4:** Non-state security providers are disarmed and demobilised

**Specific Objective 5:** Strengthened trust between citizens and government

**Implementation modality:** project modality. (Indirect management with an entity chosen at a later stage, as referred in section 5.4.4. of the Action document)

### 4. Cost and financing

Support for reintegration and reconciliation of former armed non-state combatants and Boko Haram associates	EUR 15 million
---	----------------

<i>Total EU contribution to the measure</i>	EUR 15 million
---	----------------

### 5. Communication and visibility

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

The actions under this individual measure shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated at the start of implementation and supported with the budget indicated in the relevant section of each Action Document.

In terms of legal obligations on communication and visibility, the measures shall be implemented by the Commission, the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and/or entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, the financing agreement, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.

The Committee is invited to give its opinion on the attached individual measure in favour of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.



**EN**

This action is funded by the European Union

ANNEX

**of the Commission Decision on the financing of the individual measure in favour of the Federal Republic of Nigeria**

**Action Document for Support for reintegration and reconciliation of former armed non-state combatants and Boko Haram associates**

<b>1. Title/basic act/ CRIS number</b>	Support for reintegration and reconciliation of former armed non-state combatants and Boko Haram associates CRIS number: NG/FED/041-601 financed under the 11 <sup>th</sup> European Development Fund (EDF)	
<b>2. Zone benefiting from the action/location</b>	Nigeria, North East States, primarily Borno, Yobe and Adamawa	
<b>3. Programming document</b>	National Indicative Programme (NIP) 2014-2020 for Nigeria	
<b>4. SDGs</b>	SDG 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages SDG 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls SDG 16: Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels	
<b>5. Sector of intervention/ thematic area</b>	Sector 2: Democracy, Governance and Migration	DEV. Assistance: YES
<b>6. Amounts concerned</b>	Total estimated cost: EUR 15 000 000 Total amount EDF contribution: EUR 15 000 000	
<b>7. Aid modality and implementation modality</b>	Project Modality Indirect Management with the entity(ies) to be selected in accordance with the criteria set out in section 5.4.1	
<b>8 a) DAC code(s)</b>	15220 Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution 50% 15240 Reintegration and Small Arms Light Weapons control 50%	
<b>b) Main Delivery Channel</b>	21000 – International NGO	

<b>9. Markers (from CRIS DAC form)</b>	<b>General policy objective</b>	<b>Not targeted</b>	<b>Significant objective</b>	<b>Principal objective</b>
	Participation development/good governance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	X
	Aid to environment	<input type="checkbox"/>	X	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Gender equality and Women's and Girl's Empowerment	<input type="checkbox"/>	X	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Trade Development	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Reproductive, Maternal, New born and child health	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	<b>RIO Convention markers</b>	<b>Not targeted</b>	<b>Significant objective</b>	<b>Principal objective</b>
	Biological diversity	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Combat desertification	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change mitigation	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
	Climate change adaptation	X	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<b>10. Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC) thematic flagships</b>	N/A			

## SUMMARY

For nearly ten years, the insurgency in the North East of Nigeria, predominantly driven by Boko Haram, has had a devastating impact on the region and the wider Lake Chad area. In 2015, Boko Haram was named the most deadly global terrorist organisation. Approximately 15 million people have been affected, with over 30 000 deaths in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states.

The EU has responded by committing substantial support to the North East with humanitarian and also critical development funding, where there are limited numbers of major development donors, for this highly fragile region.

The counter insurgency military offensive has been more effective since 2015 and large numbers of people (estimates point to 7 000) have either surrendered or were captured and detained by the Nigerian military. Once surrendered/captured a two-pronged approach is being used to address reintegration needs. However, as the Nigerian Government adopted in 2018 a "Demobilisation, Disassociation, Reintegration and Reconciliation (DDRR) 3 year action plan", this action will follow this approach.

Firstly, Operation Safe Corridor (OSC), set up in 2015 is a multi-governmental department approach, led by the Nigerian military, for processing surrendered Boko Haram combatants and associates; determining who is classified as low-risk and suitable for eventual reintegration into the community. This is considered a form of a "DD" approach. Those not considered low-risk are therefore processed towards the justice system.

Secondly, supported by the EU (via the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)) and other donors, there is an ongoing pilot process to urgently develop state-led processes for the reconciliation and reintegration ("RR") needs of low-risk associates back into society post-release, under the umbrella of the DDRR National Action Plan (with IOM and UNICEF) because of growing numbers of people passing through Operation Safe Corridor and the risk of (re)radicalisation and, secondly, because of the current absence of a peace agreement or ceasefire between Boko Haram and the Nigerian Government.

It is recognised that a unique and comprehensive RR approach is urgently required that encompasses multiple dimensions from accountability for terrorist offenses to community-level reintegration. The Nigerian government has called for this RR programme to adopt a human-rights approach in the design of inclusive programmes for demobilisation, rehabilitation, reconciliation and community-based reintegration of former insurgents RR. It also recognises that reintegration must include the vigilante groups who have been part of communities' self-protection response as well as assisting the military offensive against the insurgency. The need for enhanced safety and access to justice at the community level, including remedial mechanisms to address abuses, is also recognised as crucial.

Long-term peace and stability in the region will likely be severely threatened unless the challenges of successfully reintegrating thousands of predominantly young people, both associated with Boko Haram and the vigilante groups are met, through effective exit strategies providing sustainable and meaningful civilian roles which also respond to the need for market adaptation to the extreme climatic stresses such as desertification and land degradation which have been contributing factors in the conflict in the North East.

Due to the EUR 50 million increase to Nigeria's National Indicative Programme envelope under the 11<sup>th</sup> EDF Mid-Term Review, a part of these additional funds are now being proposed to establish a fully-fledged RR action in conjunction with the Nigerian Government.

Activities to be carried out should use the methodology:

- Support community-based leadership platforms, inform communities of the OSC and DDRR processes, engage in dialogue and develop activities to prepare and sensitise families, communities and vigilantes for former associates' reintegration
- Support the development, piloting and implementation of transitional/restorative justice mechanisms at the community level
- Provide conflict-sensitive community-prioritised and sustainable livelihoods for former associates, vigilantes and the most vulnerable within the community through a multi-targeted approach with vigilantes and vulnerable community members matching, at a minimum, low-risk associate numbers
- Build resilience to violence or recidivism through a range of multi-targeted activities from access to improved public health, including psychological, to promoting intra and inter-cultural and faith-based dialogue and community-led social cohesiveness projects
- Support the authorities to develop vigilante disarmament and demobilisation processes and weapons collection/control in conjunction with wider community security planning
- Support the authorities to monitor and evaluate the process from detention to reintegration, for an **estimated minimum of 6 000 low-risk associates**, to ensure the safety and well-being of all citizens is prioritised

The proposed intervention is in line with the EU's Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy of 2016 and will support Nigeria's integrated approach and the Humanitarian-Development,-Peace Nexus work of the EU. This means a broad range of cross-cutting and mutually reinforcing activities will be necessary, in implementation of the Nexus approach to enhance the impact of the EUs current EUR 600 million plus comprehensive support for the North East. The intervention will create multi-sectoral and multi-programmatic synergy where geographically and thematically relevant.

## **1. CONTEXT ANALYSIS**

### **1.1 Context Description**

The insurgency in North East Nigeria has led to what is now one of the largest and most neglected humanitarian crises in the world. In addition to its humanitarian programme, the EU has launched a comprehensive package of support to enhance the resilience of conflict-affected people, begin physical reconstruction and strengthen public services as the insurgency declines, at least in certain areas. However, the task ahead is mammoth as highlighted by "The Recovery and Peace Building Assessment" (RPBA) for North East Nigeria. Peace-building, stability and social cohesion costs are estimated at almost USD 54 million across Borno, Yobe and Adamawa, while total recovery and peace building costs for the three states are expected to exceed USD 5 000 million.

This intervention is aimed at ensuring that reconciliation and reintegration efforts contribute to redressing the drivers of the conflict, it does not aim to re-establish pre-insurgency conditions or contribute to strengthening structures which have traditionally marginalised and excluded the most vulnerable.

Research suggests that while recruitment into Boko Haram has been a highly personalised process, there are common motivating factors such as an acute sense of grievance against the government, a lack of trust in the police and security apparatus, unequal access to basic services, a lack of economic opportunities compounded with environmental degradation in the region. The process has often been influenced by peers or family members. The conflict itself has enormously exacerbated the pre-insurgency context of under-development and inequality in the North East. There has been a breakdown of social contract between the generations at the community level.

Whilst female abduction and coercion has been a prominent feature of the insurgency, some women have chosen either to join willingly or appear to have willingly "converted" after abduction. For some women, Boko Haram provided an alternative to a traditionally patriarchal, honour-bound and conservative society. However, Boko Haram has its own gendered social hierarchies and, for some, the perceptions of empowerment within the group were in stark contrast to the violence and restrictions they experienced.

Many were recruited or coerced into the insurgency or vigilante groups when under 18 years old. Some children are used by Boko Haram as human bombs, particularly girls. Research indicates a high level of hatred, fear and reluctance to accept any children associated with Boko Haram back into their families and communities.

Children captured by the military are usually transferred to a transit centre in batches. Over three quarters of children currently in the Maiduguri rehabilitation centre are 13-18 year old boys. Exposure to violence carries the highest risk of life-long mental health problems for children, including an elevated risk of re-victimisation and violent behaviour. Approximately 10% of the children currently in the rehabilitation centre demonstrate acute psychosocial distress. There are over 3 000 children associated with vigilantes identified for DDRR who may also have been exposed to high levels of violence.

Studies have shown that there is no demographic profile of a Boko Haram member aside from most being young males. Some are educated, others not, religion is at the foreground for some, others not, some have converted from Christianity. However, Boko Haram has given members a feeling of significance, power and belonging. Young men have reported a sense of pride in learning skills, more access to goods and services - including to brides and marriage. Boko Haram has provided opportunities for young men, and for some young women, which they did not have access to within their communities. Pathways into and out of Boko Haram are blurred and the classification of individuals as solely victims or perpetrators can be misleading.

Anecdotal evidence suggests some people are leaving Boko Haram, particularly the most violent faction led by Shekau, under their own volition. Some are escaping while others are surrendering to military forces as an opportunity to leave the group. Reasons cited for voluntarily leaving Boko Haram are mixed but generally include a rejection of the level of violence used or witnessed, as well as fears for their own safety. Some have come to consider Boko Haram as hypocritical and as unjust as they perceive the communities they left. However, while some are choosing to reject violence, there are indications that some of those leaving Shekau's faction are joining a splinter insurgency group led by Al Barnawi. This group appears to be actively gaining new recruits.

Current numbers of active members within the insurgents groups are not known but estimates range from 5 000 to 20 000. The number of detainees under military control is estimated at around 7 000 with the number expected to rise as counter insurgency efforts continue and avenues for surrender become more viable. Those already assessed as low-risk associates are currently detained in military facilities and those selected for rehabilitation process receive basic psychosocial support, livelihood training and skills at the Operation Safe Corridor (OSC) centre before being eligible for release. Women and children, and also some elderly or sick males, are being released directly through the Maiduguri Rehabilitation centre, managed by the Ministry for Social Affairs and Women with international support.

Releases to date have not included information on classification, public consultation or awareness-raising/sensitisation and cases have not been formally tracked. There has also been a lack of coordination between the military - in charge of the DD part of the process - and the civilian authorities, expected to carry out activities related to the RR part of the process. Anecdotal evidence suggests released associates are being routinely rejected by their immediate families and communities including women and children previously abducted. The method of these releases has added to the climate of fear and heightened tensions within communities towards the people released.

With the absence of effective safety and security at the community level, vigilante groups have provided the link between the security agencies and communities, their numbers and roles increasing/widening in response to the insurgency, operating without a legal framework while providing intelligence, checking civilians, screening internally displaced persons (IDPs) and in some cases resolving local-level disputes. However, there are concerns over cases of extrajudicial killings, sexual harassment, exploitation, abuse and extortion. Anecdotal evidence also suggests a high level of substance abuse.

Recent research suggests many vigilantes' expectations of state assistance, post-insurgency, is high. The vigilantes are viewed as a potential threat to longer term state stability if members are not demobilised and provided with sustainable civilian roles post-conflict.

## **1.2 Public Policy Assessment and EU Policy Framework**

Following the Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (RPBA) undertaken in 2016, the Government of Nigeria developed the "Buhari Plan" as a comprehensive recovery and stabilisation framework for the northeast. Restoring peace, stability and civil authority in the North East region is the foremost objective outlined in the plan. International financial institutions, including the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the Islamic Development Bank, have approved loans adding up to more than USD 1 billion. Bilateral donors have committed funding for the northeast worth more than USD 500 million. A range of additional and complementary development frameworks – including the Government of Nigeria's Economic Recovery and Growth Plan (2017-2020) and the UN Sustainable Development Partnership Framework (2018-2022) – have also been developed. The North-East Development Commission (NEDC) assented into law on 26 October 2017 and is expected to be operational sometime in 2019 in assuming its functions as the central

coordinating body for the implementation of rehabilitation, reconstruction and development activities in North East Nigeria.

The Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) in 2018 agreed a "Regional Stabilisation Strategy". The process of disarmament to reintegration of people associated with Boko Haram is one of its strategic pillars. The Stabilisation Strategy paper calls for all future interventions to compliment the National Action Plans for the Preventing and Countering of Violent Extremism (PCVE). It also envisages conflict analyses, community security perception studies and climate change fragility assessments which, potentially through the regional governors forum or the intervention's steering committee can be shared between the LCBC and the intervention.

The goal of the Nigerian Government's 2017 PCVE Policy Framework and National Action Plan is to build safer communities resilient to violent extremism. In 2018, the government approved the "Demobilisation, Disassociation, Reintegration and Reconciliation (DDRR) 3 year action plan", which is specific in its goal of mitigating the threat of Boko Haram. It is aligned to the PCVE national action plan and other relevant national laws, such as "National Security Strategy 2014" and "National Counter-terrorism Strategy 2016", "the Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015", "Child Rights Act 2003" and commits to abide by international human rights and humanitarian law. All intervention activities are in alignment with national DDRR and PCVE plans and the Borno State Reconciliation and Reintegration policy which is nearing validation.

In addition, the intervention is in line with a number of EU policies as follows:

- EU Consensus on Development<sup>1</sup>
- EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy (June 2016)
- EU Communication on "a Strategic Approach to Resilience"<sup>2</sup>
- Policy Framework for a Crisis Approach for the Lake Chad region (2015)
- Joint Humanitarian and Development Framework approach "for building resilience for protection, food and nutrition security in a fragile context" (Abuja, July 2015)
- EU Communication on Social Protection in Development Cooperation<sup>3</sup>
- EU Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment: Transforming the Lives of Girls and Women through EU External Relations 2016-2020<sup>4</sup>

The EU Strategic Approach to Women, Peace and Security (WPS) annexed to the Council Conclusions on WPS<sup>5</sup>.

- EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy<sup>6</sup>

In June 2009, the EU and the Federal Government of Nigeria signed the "Nigeria-EU Joint Way Forward" which gives an overview of the guidelines on principles, modalities and subjects for enhanced political dialogue and cooperation on a range of issues, including good governance, human rights, security and migration, followed on a yearly basis through ministerial and senior official dialogues. In March 2016, it was agreed to expand the level of engagement to include a local level political dialogue between the Federal Government of Nigeria, the EU Delegation and EU Member States.

---

<sup>1</sup> OJ C 210 of 30.6.2017.

<sup>2</sup> JOIN(2017) 21 final of 7.6.2017.

<sup>3</sup> COM(2012) 446 final of 20.8.2012.

<sup>4</sup> SWD(2015)182 final of 21.9.2015.

<sup>5</sup> 10 December 2018, (15086/18).

<sup>6</sup> JOIN(2015)16 of 28.4.2015.

Nigeria has been selected as one of the six pilot countries to operationalise the Humanitarian-Development Nexus, now known as the Humanitarian-Development,-Peace Nexus as requested by the Council of the European Union. The North East has been selected as the region to implement nexus activities; this intervention will contribute to strengthening community and state resilience to conflict and provide a complementary approach to addressing the underlying root causes to the conflict in the North East of Nigeria.

The intervention will adopt a Rights-Based Approach (RBA) in all activities in line with EU principles and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

### **1.3 Stakeholder analysis**

This intervention takes a "whole of society" approach and will be area-based. Society in the North East has been fractured vertically and horizontally and people are resistant to and fearful of the reintegration of former Boko Haram associates, including the women, men, boys or girls forcefully abducted as well as children born out of sexual violence. The conflict has sowed mistrust not only towards those associated with Boko Haram but also between people who are displaced and people who remained in areas under Boko Haram control and has diminished trust in traditional and religious leaders. As a community-driven conflict-sensitive intervention, all community members are stakeholders and beneficiaries, with specific target groups being the low-risk associates, vigilantes and the most vulnerable members within the community, including those identified with "conflict, carrying capacities", typically young unemployed males

The Federal government, including the security sector, and the North East State governments of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa are also main stakeholders as well as duty-bearers to protect and respect citizens' human rights. At the state level, power is effectively centralised in the hands of the governors with weak accountability. The security services have failed to protect the citizens against insurgent violence and military operations have sometimes allegedly been disproportionate. There is mutual suspicion between the security agencies and civilian communities as well as growing concern over the future trajectory of the members of the vigilante groups. This intervention will create accountable processes at all levels, bridges between citizens and state, improving trust.

Lessons from programmes operating in areas of intra-state conflict have shown that localised informal political systems of rule are often accompanied by significant levels of exclusion and corruption. The international organisation will be encouraged to conduct sustained political-economy analysis so that local rules, interests and relations are fed into the intervention as it becomes available, not as a one-off during the inception phase.

### **1.4 Problem analysis/priority areas for support**

In application of the integrated approach, the EU is already very present in the North East through humanitarian and recovery interventions. It is also contributing to building safer communities resilient to violent extremism objectives through a number of preventing and countering violent extremism (PCVE) specific interventions, such as the "Prisons De-radicalisation" and "Criminal Justice Response to Terrorism" programmes as well as PCVE-relevant interventions, such as "Strengthening Psychosocial Support and Health Services for Insurgency-affected Children in Borno". However, there is an urgent need to scale up reconciliation and reintegration interventions so that a viable exit strategy from Boko Haram is available to people, given a military approach alone is highly unlikely to succeed in ending the insurgency. The successful community-based reintegration of former Boko Haram associates is a necessary condition to allow the North East to stabilise.

## 2. Risks and Assumptions

Risks	Risk Level	Mitigation Measures
The security situation is volatile and could delay implementation and activities	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An area-based approach will analyse security trends before selection.</li> <li>• Close coordination with the authorities, including the security sector to mitigate risk.</li> <li>• Flexible programming to allow scale up/down of activities and resources in different areas.</li> </ul>
Stakeholders (including staff or low-risk associates) are targeted by those within communities resistant to reintegration and/or exposed to traumatic events	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conflict sensitivity analysis of all activities by International Agent.</li> <li>• Regular political economy analysis to inform localised activities.</li> <li>• Regular gender analysis to inform all other analysis as well as planning and conduct of activities.</li> <li>• Monitoring (warning) and reporting mechanisms to be set up.</li> <li>• Appropriate psychosocial support services to be available.</li> </ul>
International organisation's staff targeted by insurgents	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitoring and analysis of insurgency tactics and attacks in liaison with security specialist (I)NGOs, relevant community committees, the security sector and government officials.</li> <li>• High physical security standards such as compounds, vehicles, communications, including detailed security standard operating procedures.</li> <li>• Appropriate security training and resource support to any sub-contracted local agencies and high-risk stakeholders.</li> </ul>
Insurgents target communities where social cohesion activities begin to reduce their influence or recruitment ability	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mechanisms monitoring insurgents influence and trends must be developed to provide timely information to the governance structures, in liaison with security specialist (I)NGOs, relevant community committees, the security sector and government officials.</li> </ul>
Misappropriation or misuse of resources	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• International organisation to have sufficient methods and resources to ensure efficient monitoring at field level.</li> <li>• Careful selection of sub-contracted agencies.</li> <li>• Appropriate financial and technical capacity building support to any sub-contracted local agencies.</li> <li>• Careful selection of community representatives.</li> </ul>
Lack of political engagement or cooperation due to 2019 elections	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Wide stakeholder engagement including those in opposition at a variety of levels.</li> <li>• Consolidated peace and stability donor messaging.</li> </ul>

Lack of cooperation or engagement by communities	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regular political economy and conflict sensitivity analysis' to ensure activities are both appropriate and appropriately timed.</li> <li>• Activities to build resilience within the communities, with adequate coping mechanisms initially prioritised.</li> <li>• Careful selection of communities with continual monitoring to adapt activities as necessary.</li> </ul>
Recidivism or criminal activity by intervention beneficiaries	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Staggered approach to ensure support and monitoring mechanisms are in place</li> <li>• Adaptive iterative programming to allow flexibility of activities in response to ongoing monitoring and analysis.</li> </ul>
Sexual exploitation and abuse by (or of) agency staff at post	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Robust and accountable monitoring and safeguarding mechanisms are in place in the lead agency and all of their international partners.</li> <li>• Sufficient capacity building support to any sub-contacted local agencies to put safeguarding procedures in place, if absent.</li> <li>• Clear messaging on the EU zero tolerance on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse.</li> </ul>
Activities have unintended negative consequences or do not meet IHL or HR principles	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All activities must be risk assessed and monitored to ensure human rights violations are not committed or divisions within communities are not exacerbated.</li> <li>• Adaptive programming ensures activities can be halted and amended as necessary.</li> </ul>
<b>Assumptions</b>		
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The government and other development partners will implement national and state plans and provide support for reconciliation and reintegration of former insurgency associates.</li> <li>2. The security situation will allow for sustained access and implementation of activities including the demobilisation of vigilantes.</li> <li>3. Regular monitoring of implementation by international and regional staff will be permissible.</li> <li>4. Low-risk associates engage with the proposed action.</li> </ol>		

### 3. LESSONS LEARNT AND COMPLEMENTARITY

#### 3.1 Lessons learnt

Within the last decade, the nature of internal conflicts has increasingly blurred the lines between what constitutes a soldier, rebel, insurgent or civilian. Programmes are now being implemented in non-permissive security environments with incomplete situational intelligence. The new wave of DDRR programming moves away from narrowly conceived interventions towards activities connected to national development plans. Experimental, multi-sectoral design in the context of highly localised political and economic expediencies coupled with real-time impact research is currently considered "best practice".

In 2017, the European Commission published an external evaluation of IcSP, which included developing good practice notes relevant to DDRR projects. This intervention has been designed in relation to the lessons learned such as reframing programmes to the context and

conflict analysis, providing sustainable exit strategies and addressing the root causes of the conflict, ensuring complementarity and linkages with other programmes.

Specific to Nigeria, the EU's "Tomorrow is a New Day" project was designed to support community reconciliation in Nigeria's Delta region and influence wider conflict dynamics to support the 2009 Presidential Amnesty and DDR process. Key lessons learned included:

- Applying a fixed model in communities where there are major differences in the context, the conflict dynamics and the relations between the communities and ex-militants is not effective
- Re-integration is a process requiring sustained efforts from both the communities and ex-militants, with ongoing and effective communication with the wider constituency
- The bottom-up and context-specific approach demonstrated that community-led processes can effectively contribute to community cohesion and reintegration
- Local capacity needs nurturing and care employed to ensure local leaders and representatives engaged on the initiative are genuinely community representatives, not gatekeepers
- Strategic alliances with key stakeholders at the federal and state level are necessary for wider and sustainable impact
- In a context of underdevelopment and persistent poverty, a multi-sectoral approach is necessary with an increased focus on linking the participating communities into substantial economic development initiatives to see a real "peace dividend"

This intervention will coordinate closely with the EU's IcSP supported DDRR 18-month pilot project which has begun in the last quarter of 2018 and should provide the initial building blocks for this comprehensive intervention. Implemented by IOM, UNICEF and NEEM, a national civil society organisation (CSO) thematically expert in providing trauma-related psychological support, it focusses on enhancing the authorities' registration, screening, categorisation and referral process for former Boko Haram associates, the provision of basic reinsertion services and putting in place and testing the basic foundations for reintegration.

### **3.2 Complementarity, synergy and donor coordination**

The EU has a number of other initiatives which, through the nexus approach, will directly strengthen the DDRR intervention. This intervention will enhance area-based planning and coordination between various internal interventions, increasing impact within the broader peace-building and recovery framework for the North East. It provides the EU with an opportunity to harness its recovery and stability investments to inculcate a "peace dividend". Without reconciliation and reintegration these investments may be threatened.

The EU will act as the coordinating body between ongoing EU programmes which offer synergy for example with the EU's "Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism" initiative which focuses specifically on the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of terrorism cases. This should increase transparency in the process of either prosecuting suspects or assessing them as low-risk and eligible for DDRR. There are a wide range of initiatives which offer increased impact potential at the community level such as "Support to Response, Recovery and Resilience in Borno State", "Enhancing State and Community Level Conflict Management Capability in North-Eastern Nigeria" (MCN) and "Strengthening Civilian Protection Policy and Practice in Nigeria".

The EU will continue to coordinate with other donors and stakeholders. Donor and UN agencies meet regularly in Abuja to share information and discuss challenges on DDRR. USAID has been providing ad hoc support to DDRR, such as providing food and non-food items in the transit and rehabilitation centres. However, it will end all direct DDRR support by September 2019 to focus on the direct prevention of violent extremism. However, USAID

has contributed their DDRR evaluations and research papers to aid the design of this intervention and is willing to provide ad hoc activities to support this intervention where necessary. The UK and the Netherlands are also planning DDRR support. The UK is about to begin the design of its intervention and is looking to be part of a broad coalition, with the EU, potentially with complementary programming. Donors are aiming to complement or scale up each other's efforts, the risk of duplication of effort is low.

#### **4. DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION**

##### **4.1 Overall objective, specific objective(s), expected outputs and indicative activities**

The overall objective of the *"Support for Reintegration and Reconciliation of former armed non-state combatants and Boko Haram associates"* intervention is to contribute to overall stability in the North East.

Most research from the North East indicates that reconciliation and reintegration processes will require action at the community level to restore individual livelihoods, community infrastructure and public services prior to the actual process of reintegration. Recent research for the EU's pilot DDRR programme indicates that, with sensitisation and support at the community level, there is cautious optimism that reintegration may be possible in a less sequential manner. However, this will require careful and continual analysis.

Planned activities for prioritised area-based programming will be informed by where low-risk associates are expecting, planning and/or are able to settle; community activities will include those currently in IDP camps or host communities. Initial geographic areas will be determined during programme inception based on further analysis of data from detention, transit and rehabilitation centres, in consideration of whether the areas have safe and permitted access for stakeholders and beneficiaries. Given the limited access, livelihoods opportunities, basic services and government control/security in rural areas, it is assumed that most associates will choose to settle in urban areas for the short to mid-term, as experienced currently in Somalia's DDRR programme.

The intervention areas below cover a wide range of potential activities. The extent and nature of activities in each intervention area will be determined by the international organisation. However, a conceptual framework to guide (and evaluate) activities should be developed during the inception phase with stakeholders to ensure consistent thinking in the various locations about the influence of activities on the mental health, well-being and social inclusion of beneficiaries, their families and the most vulnerable within their communities. A depth of understanding of the community and its strengths will be required to develop the framework. The framework should incorporate markers such as employment, housing, education and health, social connections such as social bridges, bonds and links, facilitators such as safety and security, language and cultural knowledge, on a foundation of rights and citizenship.

Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) should be integrated into the design of the conceptual framework as well as the design and implementation of community-based reconciliation and reintegration activities. CSOs will need to be carefully selected based on their credibility within the communities, those trusted to safeguard community interests while being able to reach out to marginalised community groups. The selected CSOs may need the intervention to support their organisational and/or thematic capacity-building.

This intervention assumes that the EU's pilot DDRR project will enhance detainees screening procedures and initial rehabilitation support and that this intervention will link with the pilot but primarily address the reintegration and reconciliation of low-risk former associates of Boko Haram who are either eligible for release under OSC or have been assessed within

communities in collaboration with the authorities as low-risk, and disarmed and demobilised vigilantes. Under the pilot DDRR project, a risk and vulnerability assessment tool is being developed for government approval. It will be used throughout the process with associates from detention to reintegration to assess associates external vulnerabilities, for example socioeconomic, religious and political as well as internal vulnerabilities such as cognitive style, fixedness of belief and attitude.

This intervention will build and develop from the pilot as follows:

**Specific Objective 1:** Reduced rejection and stigmatisation of low risk associates

This intervention area will support community-based leadership platforms engage in dialogue, develop activities and have support mechanisms in place to prepare and sensitise families, communities and vigilantes for low-risk associates' reintegration, both adults and children, in projected short and medium term locations of resettlement. The platforms will be developed through community consultation. Activities will ensure the community has a better awareness of and confidence in the DDRR processes, including the categorisation of people as low or high-risk and either eligible for rehabilitation and reintegration support or to remain in detention.

This intervention area will provide the building blocks to support community-based reintegration. However, this intervention area leads into a longer term process and the skills that community champions/leaders develop in managing dialogue and fostering deep listening should create an enabling environment for other community grievances to be become apparent. Those linked to the drivers of the conflict or caused by the conflict should feed into community-led social capital and cohesiveness projects or transitional/restorative justice processes dependent on the issue, supported by Specific Objectives 2, 3 and 4.

**Specific Objective 2:** Increased community healing and reconciliation and decreased sense of injustice

Assessments and consultation at the community level will inform the development, piloting (or strengthening) and implementation of transitional/restorative justice mechanisms that will be supported at the community level. These should be gender and conflict sensitive and enhance community cohesiveness and victims' healing, while adhering to national and international law and ensuring the specific needs and rights of juveniles are met.

Research shows that communities across the North East view men as the primary victims of killings, beatings, imprisonment, forced labour and forced participation in violent acts. Women are perceived as the primary victims of sexual violence. However, the entire community is seen to have suffered various forms of abuse, loss of property and denial of freedoms. While insurgent groups have been primarily responsible, all parties to the conflict have committed civilian harm, including the security services.

A transitional/restorative justice approach at the community level for low-risk associates or others within the community who have committed low-level conflict-related violations should have capacity to absorb the complexity of the victim/perpetrator dynamic, with mechanisms to channel primary perpetrators into the criminal justice system, potentially via the Human Rights Commission. This intervention will support a community reparations approach to addressing grievances, building capacity at the community level and within the oversight bodies in restorative justice principles, approaches and techniques. Capacity building and support at the judicial level may be required, dependent on the model which is adopted at the community level.

**Specific Objective 3:** Sustainable alternatives to violence increased and social cohesion enhanced

The stigma of association with Boko Haram affects both men and women and it has incentivised narratives of coercion and abduction, rather than address the structural violence in the North East, the intergenerational breakdown, and the ideological appeal of an anti-state movement. This intervention area recognises that sustainable reintegration will require a wide range of activities which, through a stratified community-led cluster approach, will all contribute to building community social cohesiveness, in close and continual consultation with the communities. Community cohesion activities will need to be inclusive of current and former vigilantes and low-risk associates as well as broader community members, particularly the most vulnerable. The multi-targeting approach is to avoid exacerbating the divisions between the former associates in particular and community members. All activities should be contextualised to align with national strategy while reflecting local needs.

Communities will be supported, including former associates and vigilantes, to build resilience to violence or recidivism through a range of activities from access to livelihoods, improved public health, including psychological and substance abuse support, to promoting intra- and inter-cultural and faith-based dialogue and community-led social cohesiveness projects. The provision of psychological support for associates will be continued from the DDDR pilot but this intervention will take a wider "whole of society" approach, acknowledging the mental distress among those living in crisis. A particular focus will be on youth, to weaken the potential cycle of trauma-related violence. The intervention will link, where relevant, to other EU packages where psychological support provision is already in place or to new packages, for example in education, to include schools in trauma-related service provision.

There is a strong link between psychological well-being and the ability to obtain and retain work opportunities. Likewise, accessing work characterised by fair remuneration, safe working conditions and job security also aids psychological well-being. The intervention will therefore also seek to leverage opportunities afforded by the wide range of EU packages with appropriate livelihood components, given the high levels of unemployment and lack of livelihood opportunities, including agricultural, in the North East in general. Recent evaluations into pilot community cohesion interventions in the North East have demonstrated that livelihood schemes had the single largest beneficial effect on reducing the perception of community problems.

Conflict-sensitive community-prioritised livelihoods should be created, to target low-risk associates and demobilised vigilantes as well as other vulnerable groups. Unemployment and underemployment are critical vulnerability factors which, anecdotal evidence suggests, the insurgency has exploited. Market-need analyses are being undertaken under the pilot project which this intervention will build on. "Public service" work will be created where necessary in the short term, such as in land clearance, reforestation, waste management or public/community infrastructure projects. Lessons learned demonstrate that the needs and labour demands of the private sector, which will ultimately provide sustainable employment, need to be mapped with skills and academic training tailored to them accordingly.

The EU is about to begin working with the Borno State government as part of the Borno package on PFM and developing the capacity of the Ministry of Rehabilitation, Reconciliation and Reintegration and the North East Development Commission (still to be established). The interventions will liaise closely to ensure labour market analysis, including private sector needs, are fed into government to support planning. Livelihoods will also need to contribute to mitigating or be adapted to the consequences of climate change for example waste-to energy recycling, forest management or climate-resilient agricultural training

This intervention area provides low-risk associates and former vigilantes with the support to become productive members within their chosen area of settlement and have viable alternatives to recidivism or criminality. Research indicates that communities view potential reintegration support as "reward" packages for insurgents. A conflict-sensitive, multi-targeted approach will be adopted by the intervention to ensure that the barriers to providing employment to former associates are overcome. Particular care will need to be paid to the timing and preparedness of people to be placed together, associates and vigilantes in particular. However, evidence from other conflict affected countries has demonstrated that productively working together has motivated self-initiated reconciliation between former enemies.

#### **Specific Objective 4: Non-state security providers are disarmed and demobilised**

The authorities, in consultation with the communities and vigilante commanders, will be supported to develop an efficient vigilante disarmament and demobilisation process and weapons collection/management in conjunction with wider community safety and security planning.

This intervention area will require policy dialogue at the community, state and federal level to ensure a security vacuum is not created at the community level and a consistent approach is developed. Close liaison with security sector transformation and access to justice initiatives will be required. The UK, for example, is planning to support the development of community policing in the North East and could potentially operate in the same locations. The EUTF's MCN programme has recently developed a number of Community Peace and Safety committees with an ambition to scale in other areas of the North East. It is also supporting the development of Voluntary Policing Sector groups, which include vigilantes. This intervention will liaise closely with the MCN project for lessons on non-state security provision to be incorporated. Close consultation will also be required with the authorities and communities on whether a state level mandate needs to be developed outlining the role and oversight mechanisms of non-state security providers until their complete demobilisation is possible.

Partial or entire demobilisation of vigilantes will only be possible in government-controlled areas given the insurgency is ongoing, activities are therefore envisaged to be in the same locations as reconciliation and reintegration activities.

Activities may need to be staggered in line with security needs, for example, initial activities may be focused more towards vigilante arms control and management than disarmament, depending on the context in each location. Children can also be prioritised in a first instance.

#### **Specific Objective 5: Strengthened trust between citizens and government**

This intervention area will support building capable and effective governance structures which will ensure a coherent and coordinated DDRR process at state and federal levels. Activities should ensure that the main governance body has all DDRR intervention activities mapped and is supported in monitoring activities to ensure they are mutually reinforcing and results are evaluated for future planning. This should strengthen citizens' trust in the authorities and increase state legitimacy. The governance bodies will be supported to share lessons learned with other relevant federal and regional bodies.

#### **The expected results (outputs) are that:**

- Communities are consulted and psychologically prepared to allow low-risk associates to safely settle

- Transitional/restorative justice mechanisms process cases which support community members and associates understanding and tolerance of each other, aiding their healing process
- Low-risk associates, vigilantes and the most vulnerable are supported to become economically and socially productive, psychologically healthy civilians
- Non-state/former security providers' arms are accountably controlled and managed
- Inclusive, responsive and accountable structures managing DDRR are created

Based on a conservative estimate of numbers of low-risk associates, vigilantes and their families who will be directly assisted by this intervention, a minimum of 50,000 people is expected. However, the intervention will have an area-based approach and beneficiaries should number a minimum of 200,000, based on one in four members of the community benefitting if activities are implemented in a minimum of 3 Local Government Areas.

## 4.2 Intervention Logic

The logic of this intervention is as follows:

*If* low-risk associates rehabilitation and release processes are transparent and communicated effectively, then communities will begin to develop confidence in the DDRR process; and

*If* communities are sensitised, psychologically and socio-economically prepared and supported before and during the reintegration of low-risk associates, including children, then the rejection and stigmatisation of associates will reduce; and

*If* locally-appropriate transitional or restorative justice mechanisms are developed at the community level, then people's sense of grievance will reduce and communities will begin to heal; and

*If* a stratified community-led cluster approach is adopted to provide economic, psychological and socio-political alternatives to former associates, vigilantes and the most vulnerable in the community, then social cohesion will increase and the risk of recidivism and the ability of violent extremist organisations to recruit will decrease; and

*If* the state supports responsive and accountable DDRR processes, then the state's legitimacy will begin to be restored and prospects enhanced for a long term peace dividend; and

*If* the cross-sectoral and multi-targeted approach from rehabilitation to community-led reintegration contributes to addressing the drivers of the conflict, then stability in the North East will be strengthened.

## 4.3 Mainstreaming

**Gender perspective:** Recognizing the widespread, gendered and deliberate use of sexual violence in the North East of Nigeria and in line with Council Conclusions on the Gender Action Plan and on Women, Peace and Security<sup>7</sup>, the intervention should:

- Ensure girls' and women's security and safety, physical and psychological integrity
- Promote social and economic rights
- Strengthen girls' and women's meaningful participation.

The experiences and actions of women, men, girls and boys from diverse backgrounds in the context of conflict, peacebuilding and reconstruction are sometimes similar and sometimes different. This must be analysed, assessed and addressed to ensure adequate and sufficient

---

<sup>7</sup> 15086/18

response from EU actors. Women, men, girls and boys all face risks of trafficking. Although women and girls face a higher risk of sexual violence, of becoming the domestic and sexual slaves of combatants and of being forced into marriages, men and boys can also be targeted as victims of such violence. In addition, men and boys may face further risks of forced recruitment and targeted killings.

Women are not only victims of war and violence. They also play diverse roles as, for example, combatants, peace builders, politicians, economic actors and activists. The equal participation of women and men is both an essential end and a way to prevent and resolve conflicts and promote a culture of inclusive and sustainable peace. Women, men, girls and boys have often become targets, sometimes on a massive scale, of sexual and gender-based violence, and used as means to political, economic or military ends. There are multiple ways in which violence against women and girls evolves and worsens during and after conflict, increasing their risk of experiencing physical, psychological, sexual and structural violence within their own homes and in the public sphere. Despite prohibitions in international humanitarian, human rights and criminal law, crimes of sexual and gender-based violence committed in the context of inter- and intra-state conflict remain largely unchecked and impunity for these crimes needs to be addressed.

Although men and boys can also be victims, sexual and gender-based violence disproportionately affects women of all ages across every phase of the peace and conflict continuum (although this is often exacerbated during violent conflict). Women are at risk of violence in both the public and the private sphere. The closing of civic spaces, and in particular the silencing of the voices of women in general and of women and men who do not conform to society's social norms, can be an indicator of sexual and gender-based violence. Hate speech, threats, defamation campaigns, repression and violence against human rights defenders can manifest itself in different ways linked to sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, socioeconomic status, education, age, ethnicity, class, religion or belief, among others.

Furthermore, women's meaningful participation in activities to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism are critical.

Thus, all activities across all intervention areas will be based upon gender analysis and systematically mainstream gender perspectives.

The WPS Agenda focuses on ensuring that relief, recovery and reconstruction are inclusive and takes into account the specific needs of women and girls. Special attention is paid to the most vulnerable groups taking part in processes linked to peacebuilding, such as repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction. This includes displaced women and girls, survivors of gender-based violence, older people, people with disabilities, minorities and indigenous peoples.

The relief and recovery pillar of the WPS agenda also calls for more efforts to support women's active participation and activities in relief and recovery efforts, including providing women with equal access to livelihood opportunities and justice. Women and women's organisations delivering humanitarian assistance are often the first responders to crisis situations. However, women's leadership and priorities are often excluded from humanitarian- and development-related decision-making, programming, planning and budgets.

Relief, recovery and reconstruction may be a unique window of opportunity to transform discriminatory social structures and to promote women's human rights, participation and meaningful engagement.

**Youth:** The PCVE Policy Framework and National Action Plan explicitly recognise that youth are vulnerable to the drivers of violent extremism (VE) and insurgency recruitment as well as youth being victims of VE. In the North East, many youth have also lacked educational opportunities, employment or livelihood abilities and will be actively engaged in all social cohesion and action activities. It is expected that many low-risk associates, demobilised vigilantes and vulnerable members of the community engaged in project activities will also be youth.

**Vulnerable groups:** The most excluded or marginalised within communities, including the disabled, elderly and single-headed households, will be actively engaged in the intervention to promote social cohesion, as well as those identified as having "conflict carrying capacity".

**Environment:** Prior to the insurgency, the increasing reduction of agricultural-based employment/livelihoods due to the spread of desertification and land degradation across the North East was already putting a strain upon communities. The international organisation will be asked to ensure that activities either mitigate or are adapted to the climatic stresses in the North East. This is particularly relevant to livelihoods and social impact projects. Awareness and management of the local environment could be integrated into apprenticeship training as appropriate.

#### **4.4 Contribution to SDGs**

The intervention through reconciliation and reintegration activities will promote more just, peaceful and inclusive communities for sustainable development, provide greater access to justice through transitional/restorative justice mechanisms and contribute to building more effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels, (SDG 16). It will also contribute to achieving gender equality through challenging exclusionary practices (SDG 5) and promoting inclusive and sustainable productive economic opportunities (SDG 8).

This intervention also directly contributes to the progressive achievement of many of the SDGs, given that it takes an integrated approach to reconciliation and reintegration through multi-layered, multi-level and multi-dimensional activities. Ensuring healthy lives and promoting well-being for all (SDG 3), particularly through the provision of psychological/trauma-related support will be prominent. The interlinkages between SDGs could be demonstrated through the reintegration conceptual framework which will guide thinking on activities. These activities could be linked to numerous SDGs such as goal 1 - ending poverty or goal 2 - achieving food security. Livelihood provision and support will be a major activity within the intervention and will contribute to goal 13 - taking urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.

### **5. IMPLEMENTATION**

#### **5.1 Financing agreement**

In order to implement this action, it is foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner country.

#### **5.2 Indicative implementation period**

The indicative operational implementation period of this action, during which the activities described in section 4.1 will be carried out and the corresponding contracts and agreements implemented, is 60 months from the date of entry into force of the financing agreement.

Extensions of the implementation period may be agreed by the Commission's authorising officer responsible by amending this decision and the relevant contracts and agreements.

### 5.3 Implementation of the budget support component

N/A

### 5.4 Implementation modalities

The Commission will ensure that the EU appropriate rules and procedures for providing financing to third parties are respected, including review procedures, where appropriate, and compliance of the action with EU restrictive measures<sup>8</sup>.

#### 5.4.1 Indirect management with an international organisation

This action may be implemented in indirect management with an entity which will be selected by the Commission's services using the following criteria: demonstrable experience in the North East of Nigeria, specifically Borno, Yobe and Adamawa; considerable experience in implementing complex programmes including security sector transformation, access to justice and community reconciliation and reintegration within the North East and other protracted conflict-affected areas is necessary.

The implementation by this entity entails all specific objectives which will contribute to "Community-driven Reintegration and Reconciliation of former armed non-state combatants and Boko Haram associates".

### 5.5 Scope of geographical eligibility for procurement and grants

The geographical eligibility in terms of place of establishment for participating in procurement and grant award procedures and in terms of origin of supplies purchased as established in the basic act and set out in the relevant contractual documents shall apply.

The Commission's authorising officer responsible may extend the geographical eligibility in accordance with Article 22(1) (b) of Annex IV to the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement on the basis of urgency or of unavailability of products and services in the markets of the countries concerned, or in other duly substantiated cases where the eligibility rules would make the realisation of this action impossible or exceedingly difficult.

### 5.6 Indicative budget

	<b>EU contribution (in EUR)</b>
5.4.4 Indirect management with international organisation	14 000 000
5.9 Evaluation, 5.10 Audit/Expenditure verification	250 000
5.11 Communication and visibility	100 000
Contingencies	650 000
<b>Total</b>	<b>15 000 000</b>

### 5.7 Organisational set-up and responsibilities

The overall responsibility for the coordination and implementation of the programme lies with the Federal Government of Nigeria, represented by the National Authorising Office (NAO) and Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), as well as with the North East State

---

<sup>8</sup> [www.sanctionsmap.eu](http://www.sanctionsmap.eu) Please note that the sanctions map is an IT tool for identifying the sanctions regimes. The source of the sanctions stems from legal acts published in the Official Journal (OJ). In case of discrepancy between the published legal acts and the updates on the website it is the OJ version that prevails.

governments of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. The EU Delegation to the Federal Republic of Nigeria will have permanent oversight on the overall progress of implemented activities under the project.

### **Governance structure**

DDRR involves numerous stakeholders at the federal and state level. The governance structure will be finalised during inception, specifically to assure alignment with Borno state's Reconciliation and Reintegration policy, which is under development, as well as policies which may be developed by Yobe and Adamawa states.

- (i) **A Programme Steering Committee**, co-chaired by the NAO and ONSA with the following membership: the North East governors and state and federal level relevant ministries representation such as Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Justice.
- (ii) **A Technical Implementation Committee** co-chaired by the NAO, ONSA and the rehabilitation, reconciliation and reintegration Commissioner(s), comprising the EU Delegation, the implementing agency and the relevant federal and state level ministries. It will meet quarterly to ensure coherence between interventions, discuss technical issues on the implementation of the project (e.g. the targeting of beneficiaries), share information on security issues and identify and respond to new and emerging challenges.

**A Donor Coordination Committee**, comprising international development partners including bilateral and multilateral agencies, certain diplomatic missions and key international non-governmental organisations will (continue to) meet quarterly or as required to ensure coordination and complementarity within and among development partners to improve effectiveness of democratic support and prevent duplication and/or overlap in activities among the community of the donors.

### **5.8 Performance monitoring and reporting**

The international agency will have a specific results framework that will be monitored by dedicated monitoring and evaluation specialists on an ongoing basis with the EU Delegation and the NAO and ONSA overseeing the compilation of the information at programme level. Intervention specific baselines will mainly be established during the inception phases of the various programme elements and will be updated on a regular basis during the implementation. The target values established will reflect an accurate assessment of the feasibility of the activities and achievements within the timeframe. The monitoring will provide an accurate account of implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (outcomes and direct outputs) as measured by corresponding indicators, using the log frame matrix as reference. Project outputs which require quantitative or qualitative baseline data are indicated in the logframe. A number of projects funded by the EU and other donors are conducting a variety of baseline surveys in Local Government Areas in the North East. Once the geographic areas for implementation are determined, the international organisation will map baseline surveys available and, with the EU Delegation, decide which outputs require additional baseline surveys. The international organisation will also be responsible for final data collection.

The day-to-day technical and financial monitoring of the implementation of this action will be a continuous process and part of the international organisation's responsibilities. To this aim, the international organisation shall establish a permanent internal, technical and financial monitoring system for the action and elaborate regular progress reports (not less than annual) and financial reports. Every report shall provide an accurate account of implementation of the action, difficulties encountered, changes introduced, as well as the degree of achievement of its results (outputs and direct outcomes) as measured by corresponding indicators, using as

reference the logframe matrix (for project modality). SDGs indicators and, if applicable, any jointly agreed indicators, for instance, Joint Programming document, should be taken into account.

The report shall be laid out in such a way as to allow monitoring of the means envisaged and employed and of the budget details for the action. The final report, narrative and financial, will cover the entire period of the action implementation.

The Commission may undertake additional project monitoring visits both through its own staff and through independent consultants recruited directly by the Commission for independent monitoring reviews (or recruited by the responsible agent contracted by the Commission for implementing such reviews).

## **5.9 Evaluation**

Having regard to the importance and nature of the action, mid-term and final evaluations will be carried out for this action or its components via independent consultants contracted by the Commission.

A mid-term evaluation will be carried out for problem solving and learning purposes, in particular with respect to i) the adaptive and iterative approach the intervention will take to ensure the logframe and results matrix remain valid and ii) the nexus approach. A final evaluation will be carried out for accountability and learning purposes at various levels (including for policy revision), taking into account in particular the fact that the logframe work will be further elaborated after actions have started on the ground and that there is a need to make sure through the final review that partners have achieved the targets indicated in their logframes.

The Commission shall inform the international agency at least 1 month in advance of the dates foreseen for the evaluation missions. The international agency shall collaborate efficiently and effectively with the evaluation experts, and inter alia provide them with all necessary information and documentation, as well as access to the project premises and activities.

The evaluation reports shall be shared with the partner country and other key stakeholders. The international agency and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, in agreement with the partner country, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project.

Indicatively, two contracts for evaluation services may be contracted under a framework contract.

## **5.10 Audit**

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audits or expenditure verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.

Indicatively, two contracts for audit services shall be concluded under a framework contract.

## **5.11 Communication and visibility**

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU.

This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action, to be elaborated at the start of implementation.

In terms of legal obligations on communication and visibility, the measures shall be implemented by the Commission, the partner country, contractors, grant beneficiaries and/or entrusted entities. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in, respectively, the financing agreement, procurement and grant contracts, and delegation agreements.

The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.

APPENDIX - INDICATIVE LOGFRAME MATRIX

	<b>Results chain: Main expected results (maximum 10)</b>	<b>Indicators (at least one indicator per expected result)</b>	<b>Sources of data</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>
<b>Impact (Overall Objective)</b>	Community-driven reintegration and reconciliation of former armed non-state combatants and Boko Haram associates contributes to enhanced peace and stability in the North East	1. Status of peace and stability in the North East	1.1 UN situational reports	<i>Not applicable</i>
<b>Outcome(s) Specific Objective 1</b>	Reduced rejection and stigmatisation of low risk associates	1.1 Percentage of community members willing to accept low-risk associates settle (disaggregated by sex) 1.2 Percentage of low risk associates facing stigmatisation	1.1 Development partners reports 1.2 ICRS data	Election outcomes do not substantially change State and National DDRR plans
<b>Outcome(s) Specific Objective 2</b>	Increased community healing and reconciliation and decreased sense of injustice	2.1 Status of community perceptions of justice (disaggregated by sex) 2.2 Status of community perceptions of reconciliation (disaggregated by sex)	2.1 State Reconciliation and Reintegration Ministry reports 2.2 State Social Services programme reports and ICRS data	The communities want to be involved in transitional/restorative justice activities  The security situation will allow for sustained access and implementation of activities

<b>Outcome(s) Specific Objective 3</b>	Sustainable alternatives to violence increased and social cohesion enhanced	3.1 Extent to which members in the community perceive of their socio-economic and mental and physical well-being (disaggregated by sex). 3.2 Extent to which members in the community perceive community cohesiveness (disaggregated by sex).	3.1 Multi-sector needs assessments (REACH) and state ministries service programme reports 3.2 Development partners security reports	The security situation will allow for sustained access and implementation of activities, including the demobilisation of vigilantes
<b>Outcome(s) Specific Objective 4</b>	Non-state security providers are disarmed and demobilised	4.1 Status of collected weapons control and management	4.1 Ministry of Interior and/or Defence reports	The security situation will allow for sustained access and implementation of activities
<b>Outcome(s) Specific Objective 5</b>	Strengthened trust between citizens and government	5.1 Status of community perceptions of government effectiveness and accountability	5.1 Selected community surveys	Election outcomes do not substantially change state and National DDDR plans
<b>Outputs</b>	1. Communities are sensitised and prepared for reintegration	1.1 Number of Reintegration and Reconciliation platforms/committees (members disaggregated by sex) 1.2 Extent of community awareness of reintegration and reconciliation activities including OSC process (disaggregated by sex)	1.1 Reports from development partners 1.2 Selected community surveys	The security situation will allow for sustained access and implementation of activities in selected LGAs
	2. Community-level transitional/restorative justice mechanisms are developed	2.1 Number of stakeholders attending transitional/restorative justice training (disaggregated by sex) 2.2 Number of cases processed through the mechanisms set up within the community (disaggregated by sex)	2.1 Reports from training providers 2.2 Reports from development partners	

	3.1 Conflict-sensitive community-prioritised livelihoods are created for the most vulnerable, low risk associates and non-state security providers	3.1.1 Numbers of beneficiaries in long term employment(disaggregated by sex) 3.1.2 Numbers of beneficiaries completing market-orientated training programmes (disaggregated by sex) 3.1.3 Number of beneficiaries receiving entrepreneurial /self-employment grants or credit (disaggregated by sex)	3.1 – 3.4 Reports from development partners	
	3.2. Stratified community-led activities increase community cohesiveness and coping mechanisms for the most vulnerable, low risk associates and non-state security providers	3.2.1 Extent of levels of understanding between intra-and inter economic, cultural and faith-based sectors of the community 3.2.2 Numbers of beneficiaries receiving specialist support (substance abuse, SGBV, trauma) 3.3.3 Number of community-led social cohesion projects 3.3.4 Percentage levels of perceived resilience	3.2.1 Selected community surveys 3.2.2 – 3.2.3 Reports from development partners 3.3.4 Selected community surveys	
	4. Process for non-state security providers disarmament and demobilisation developed	4.1 Database of non-state security providers developed in selected communities 4.2 Number of community safety and security research projects 4.3 Status of SOPs development and implementation 4.4 Number of non-state security providers weapons collected	4.1 -4.2 Reports from development partners 4.3-4.4 Reports from Ministry of Interior and/or defence	
	5. Inclusive, responsive and accountable structures to manage DDDR activities are created between and across the various levels of government and communities	5. 1 Number of coordination and oversight bodies at state and community level (members disaggregated by sex) 5.2 DDDR information management system developed 5.3 Community members extent of involvement in DDDR structures at the varying levels	5.1-5.2 Reports from development partners  5.3 Selected community surveys	

NB: If data is not collected by government agencies on a regular basis to reliably reflect progress in the supported communities on the Specific Objectives then the project will include it in its own monitoring. Relevant baseline data will be agreed with the International Organisation to be collated during inception and updated before project closure.

The EU Results Framework has been reviewed in 2018 in order to reflect the Sustainable Development Goals and the new EU development priorities as put forward in the recently approved new European Consensus on Development. Indicators aligned to the revised EU Results Framework will be marked after the revised framework is published.